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INTRODUCTION 
Vaugan, Sjoberg, & Reynolds (1993) observe that 
sociology has received considerable criticism over the last 
few decades from the media as well as from within (in 
particular from the American Sociological Association). It 
has lost ground in terms of funding and visibility. A great 
many departments are problem-plagued and some have been 
downsized considerably or shut down entirely. These authors 
argue that much of sociology's lost relevance and other 
problems are rooted in theoretical and methodological 
orientations. 
A new range of social issues are emerging and yet 
little addressed. This is seen as a consequence of the 
dominance of a paradigm that claims neutrality to the point 
of irrelevance. (If sociology implicitly supported the 
status quo through the dominance of functionalism, the 
dominance of the positivist methodologies implicitly arrives 
at irrelevance). 
Our diagnosis is that over the past several decades the 
discipline's intellectual contribution has been deeply 
eroded by the growing dominance of the natural science 
model. Standardized technical research procedures have 
been employed at the expense of sustained theoretical 
analysis of empirical phenomena (Vaugan, 1993:5). 
The authors note this perspective's emphasis in the 
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major schools as well as the research journals. They see 
this as a legitimacy issue. Their criticism is built upon 
Mills, Gouldner, and Sorokin as well. They add that it is 
unfortunate that Sorokin "undercut his powerful intellectual 
argument in, for instance, his Fads and Foibles in Modern 
Sociology and Related Sciences by the harshness and 
'overstatement' of his attacks" (Vaughn, 1993:7). 
Vaughan further notes: 
We reason, instead, that the fundamental crises in the 
field exists in the failure of sociologists to engage 
in, and make significant contributions to, the discourse 
concerning the major empirical and moral problems 
confronting humankind as we approach the end of the 
twentieth century (Vaughn, 1993:11). 
The focus of sociology has been defined progressively by the 
growing dominance of a specific methodology grounded in an 
intellectual bias which has a dubious basis in the realm of 
the hard sciences themselves. This outdated mode of thinking 
and perceiving has limited the sphere of investigation and 
the subject matter to be investigated. Whole realms of human 
experience have been disqualified and these realms appear to 
be increasingly relevant (if in fact they ever really lost 
relevance) to modern conceptions of reality. 
Underlying the apparent fragmentation is a pervasive 
metliodological paradigm that stresses the necessity of 
technical research procedures, primarily quantitative in 
nature, as the basis for scientific sociology. 
Technical precision and replicability are the hallmarks 
of the current methodological hegemony. Yet to 
achieve these objectives, researchers typically focus on 
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narrow, manageable research problems, thereby furthering 
the fragmentation in the discipline (Vaughn, 1993:11). 
This has lead to the deplorable condition which science has 
traditionally fought against. "Instead of the research 
problem defining the methods to be employed, research 
techniques define the sociological problem to be addressed" 
(Vaughn, 1993:12). Vaughan sees this as a form of 
intellectual hegemony and as a threat to sociology as "a 
viable scholarly enterprise" (Vaughn, 1993:12). He notes 
that the situation has also been acknowledged by two recent 
past presidents of the American Sociological Association and 
so is not merely the complaint of a few discontented 
sociologists. 
As a consequence of my analysis in this paper I have 
concluded that this methodological struggle has its roots in 
the history of the discipline as well as in the history of 
the natural sciences. Legitimation appears to play a major 
role. In the past, science has been closely allied with the 
voices of authority and power. Any discipline seeking 
legitimation will need to find it in the arena defined and 
funded by those with power and authority. 
Of particular interest among my findings, is that the 
practitioners of the natural sciences themselves seem to have 
tried to ignore the implications of Relativity theory and 
Quantum mechanics for their own disciplines. Worse still is 
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how completely it seems to be ignored in sociology. The 
dominance of a methodology with no basis for legitimacy in 
philosophy or contemporary science is clearly backward to a 
fault. Vaughan notes that in their efforts to deal with 
evaporating funds due to political climate, sociologist seem 
to have tried harder to win approval by becoming more 
conservative and rigid in their embracement of positivism. 
Those who study physics and the epistemology of science know 
that the paradigm has lost much of its foundations. We 
appear to be waiting for the old guard to die out as Kuhn 
(1962) might suggest. 
Our 'natural science sociologists and psychologists 1 
try to build their disciplines according to the model of 
this Newtonian macrophysics. They seem not to have 
noticed that the development of the physical science in 
the twentieth century, especially after the emergence 
and growth of quantum microphysics, has made this 
Newtonian physics if not obsolescent then, at least, 
inadequate (Sorokin, 1956:151). 
This paper will be an effort to thoroughly explore from 
a philosophical and historical perspective the evolution of 
science and the positivist tradition as it relates to 
sociology. In the process an effort will be made to identify 
its shortcomings for sociological research and to explore an 
alternative route of development that already has a strong 
history within sociology. This paper seeks to demonstrate 
that Mead had developed the basis for a sophisticated 
research perspective with regard to social phenomena. This 
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perspective and the associated epistemelogical reasoning were 
derived from his analysis of traditional philosophy as well 
as Relativity theory in physics. This program of development 
has never been clearly explicated and yet its implications 
would appear to be profound. 
This paper will also seek to explain why this 
perspective is better suited to sociology and that it is 
because it has its foundations in social phenomena itself and 
was developed specifically for that domain from developments 
in physics and philosophy. It will be further demonstrated 
how that perspective continues to be supported by further 
developmental convergences in several important related 
sciences as well as philosophy. 
More specifically this paper proposes that the early 
division of the world into primary and secondary qualities 
by the "new philosophers" (Flew, 1994:18) of science was a 
fundamental error that was to plague the natural scientists 
for centuries to come. This distinction would lead to 
numerous consequences, including the cultural adoption at the 
cognitive level of a mind-matter duality and a subject-object 
duality which was continually overlooked in scientific and 
philosophical debates as a primary problem concerning the 
natural science model. 
This distinction which was so fundamental to the 
Newtonian model of the universe, also made the natural 
science model inappropriate for the universe of Relativity as 
well. Mead was one of the first to emphasize the error of 
this primary/secondary distinction and the problems it 
presented for both the social sciences and physics. His 
model of the universe attempted to steer clear of both 
determinism and solipsism (Miller, 1973). It was a 
perspective grounded in primitive terms of sociality, systems 
theory, emergence, and a new relation between mind and 
matter. 
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Herbert Blumer began to forge a research tradition based 
on this perspective and it appears from my analysis that he 
came under attack because of the hegemony of the natural 
science cognitive bias. The political struggle that resulted 
left sociology divided and Blumer's program incomplete in 
light of Mead's theories. 
The natural science model apparently adopted by 
sociology in its search for legitimacy based around the 
mind/matter cognitive bias continues to dominate the 
discipline today even though it has little philosophical or 
other legitimate basis since the advent of Quantum mechanics 
(other than ignorance). 
The fulfillment of Mead's arguments awaits the 
reconciliation of these two perspectives, quantitative and 
qualitative, into one integrated model. This paper argues 
for a sociological paradigm of empirical science based on the 
entire domain of phenomena, including primary and secondary 
qualities, and utilizing the natural science model as a 
subordinate procedure applicable to a stable domain of data 
which can be used as a reference system. This reference 
system would anchor and orient research in a wider 
ontological domain of data utilizing a variety of 
methodological and theoretical strata. 
Thesis 
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The scope of this paper is unfortunately but necessarily 
broad and it is often easy to lose sight of the central 
arguments in the exploration of all the avenues pertinent to 
the central issues of consideration. With this in mind I 
present a core thesis around which the other themes of the 
dissertation are built. 
1. A certain class of social objects are measurable and 
understandable through the postulate of relative causality. 
They consist of primary qualities accurately described by 
scientific method. 
2. A certain class of social objects are not measurable and 
understandable through the postulate of relative causality-
they are complementary. They consist of secondary qualities. 
These objects are understandable through descriptive meaning 
already general and agreed upon through the process of 
language. Their accurate description can be achieved through 
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observation, intuition, deduction, and induction. 
Phenomena one is a subset of phenomena two. The meaning of 
all phenomena is through consensus (Brissett & Edgley, 1990) 
The agenda here is not to entirely disqualify positivism 
but to take a critical look at it in depth with respect to 
sociology. Although other writers have done this, it has not 
been in light of Mead's contribution. Lincoln & Guba (1985) 
and perhaps Phillips (1973) have made the most informed 
effort to date, but they fail to account for some key issues 
which Mead had brought to light. Consequently, I believe 
their solutions fall short of the mark. The fact that the 
traditional positivist perspective continues to dominate 
sociology demonstrates the unconvincing nature of their 
arguments. There seems to be a need for a more thorough 
analysis and documentation which reviews the historical 
development of thought and the context it emerged from as it 
relates to science. In this careful, if sometimes tedious, 
process the truth concerning positivism's weakness and 
shortcomings should become evident to even the most 
skeptical. 
As I explore the strengths and weaknesses of Symbolic 
Interactionism (SI), I will present the thesis that the 
primary existing weaknesses of this perspective are due to 
two major factors. The first is that its critics have argued 
against it from the perspective of positivism and that once 
this is taken into account many of the arguments fall short 
of their mark. The second factor is the mysterious failure 
of Herbert Blumer to include the primitive notion of systems 
in his method and perspective. This concept was central to 
Mead's perspective and provides a dimension to SI which 
answers a majority of its critics with regard to other major 
criticisms not directly linked to the now discredited 
positivistic perspective. 
The outcome of this analysis will be to present SI as a 
stronger and more comprehensive theory with respect to social 
phenomena and a perspective which has developed within the 
sociological tradition and specifically for the study of 
social phenomena. SI methods have not been imported from 
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another discipline and they are grounded in a strong 
contemporary philosophical and scientific perspective. 
Positivism, on the other hand, has been imported from another 
scientific domain, dealing with different variables, and 
based on an outmoded philosophical and experimental 
tradition. 
Method 
My methodology is entirely archival. I will draw from 
several disciplines to establish my theses as sociology alone 
does not provide the resources for a full analysis. I will 
draw from philosophical and historical perspectives to 
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describe the development of positivism. It will also be 
necessary to utilize concepts from modern physics to explain 
fully the problems with the positivist perspective and lay 
the groundwork for understanding the full implications of the 
perspective of Mead which have never been entirely 
explicated. 
Once this background has been developed it will be 
possible to better analyze and evaluate the arguments between 
positivists and interactionists within the sociological 
tradition. Brief historical accounts of the developments of 
SI, systems theory, and positivism within sociology will 
further round out the picture. 
Finally I shall be drawing on convergences between SI 
and developments in cognitive psychology, neurophysiology, 
and modern physics which cross-validate and support the basic 
approach of SI as well as further explicate its potential as 
a meta-perspective within sociology. 
In consideration of this task the first chapter will 
briefly review the development of ideas of early science and 
the key players. It will focus on the piecemeal fashion in 
which they emerged and examine how they were aggregated 
together in several competing perspectives. It will explore 
the key moment in history when these ideas seemed to be 
legitimately integrated. It will consider how this 
legitimation came to be in spite of their contradictory 
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nature and the weakness of the arguments supporting them. 
The second chapter examines the crises that befell 
science due to the inconsistencies on its conception that 
were never fully addressed. In this chapter the implications 
of Relativity theory and Quantum mechanics for traditional 
science are reviewed. A detailed examination of the efforts 
of the Logical Positivists and Karl Popper to rescue 
traditional science and their failure will be made. This 
brings us to the modern period in which scientists either out 
of frustration or ignorance have lost track of the debate and 
continued to use the methods and philosophy of the 
positivists without regard to their fallacies and 
shortcomings. 
Chapter three explores the process by which positivism 
became legitimated. Why did the methods of science come to 
dominate the intellectual life of the west in spite of its 
inconsistencies and shortcomings. Why does it continue to 
have such a revered position in academia and why is its use 
and legitimacy almost unquestioned in sociology. 
Chapter four focuses on the problems which have resulted 
from trying to use positivism in sociology. It reviews the 
history of positivism within sociology and the arguments of 
some of its leading proponents such as Lundberg and 
Zetterberg. It also evaluates their arguments in light of 
the perspective developed in the preceding chapters including 
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the problems of induction, causality, prediction, and 
implicit cultural bias. 
Chapter five reviews the history of systems theory 
within sociology in order to provide a clearer definition of 
the concept of system. The stereotypes surrounding systems 
theory in sociology dramatically distort the picture of its 
development in the sciences in general due to its relation 
with Parson's perspective. It is necessary to specify the 
differences between various systems perspectives in order to 
clearly define Mead's position as well as fully understand 
that position. Since systems theory is presented in this 
paper as fundamental to Mead's perspective, this 
clarification regarding the definition of systems is crucial 
to the development of my thesis. 
Chapter six examines the work of George Herbert Mead as 
a source of an alternative epistemology of science tailored 
specifically for social phenomena and grounded in the 
perspective of Relativity theory. This chapter reviews the 
cogency with which Mead analyzed the historical shortcomings 
of the traditional conceptions of knowledge and the 
relationship of mind and matter. It explicates the 
disregarded importance of systems as a central concept of 
Mead's perspective. It establishes Mead as a theorist with a 
unique intellectual vision that generates a more adequate and 
fuller conception of social phenomena. 
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Chapter seven begins to demonstrate some of the 
ramifications this has for sociology, its methods, and its 
scientific perspective. It looks at Blumer's methodologies, 
his political conundrum, and its shortcomings with respect to 
Mead's vision and sociology in general. It focuses on the 
implications of reintegrating a systems perspective into SI 
and the benefits that are derived from this effort. 
Chapter eight attempts to outline in sum the overall 
implications of these findings for sociology. It suggests an 
ontological perspective that includes both primary and 
secondary (qualities) data in analysis as well as 
establishing a solid rational for the synthesis of 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies within the domain 
of meaning. It suggests roughly the contours of such a new 




THE EMERGENCE OF SCIENCE 
Science is an intellectual product (phenomena) of 
western civilization and it emerged from Europe primarily in 
the 15th through the 18th centuries. It was in part a 
reaction to the confusion and social turmoil arising from 
increasing warfare between cultures and the expansion of 
trade (Palmer, 1964). As contradictory ideas flowed into 
Europe posing as cultural absolutes, writers, scholars, and 
intellectuals began to succumb to a degree of relativism in 
their thinking as espoused in the form of the French essayist 
Montaigne. Skepticism became very popular and it was held by 
many that all beliefs were only customs as in the writings of 
Pierre Bayle (Palmer, 1964). Alchemy and astrology .included 
beliefs and practices that today distinguish them from 
chemistry and astronomy. The authority of the revered 
scholars and traditional books of the middle ages came under 
serious scrutiny. The doctrines of the church began to be 
questioned and Aristotelian scholasticism came under attack 
as well. 
Along with these new ideas rediscovered from ancient 
times (especially the Greeks) came a new system of math 
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developed by the Arabs which included rudimentary algebra. A 
new interest in atomism was revived (Brown, 1996). The 
internal consistency of Euclid's geometry and Arab 
mathematics suggested the possibility of a more exact and 
reliable system of knowledge which might combat the 
relativism of metaphysics as it was manifesting. Many 
educated men in the Church (as well as outside) privately 
dabbled in math in the belief that it held a mystical 
connection to the fundamental truths about the world (Palmer, 
1964). The Ptolemaic model of the solar system, the model 
accepted by most educated Europeans, was itself a complex 
mathematical model. It was however getting to be difficult 
to sustain it due to observations. which, as they became more 
precise, demanded greater detailed accounting which also 
became more contradictory (Sharratt, 1994). 
Such men as Kepler and Copernicus worked privately at 
developing a mathematical system of knowledge (Scharratt, 
1994). Others dabbling in experimentation and observation 
techniques as well as astronomy such as Tycho Brahe and 
Galileo sought a more empirical basis for knowledge than 
mathematics alone (Sharratt, 1994). Still others such as 
Francis Bacon advocated a strictly experimental and empirical 
approach to such a new system of knowledge (Faulkner, 1993). 
This debate over a mathematically based or an empirically 
based system of criteria raged for several centuries and in 
fact continues into the present, especially in the field of 
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sociology. 
It cannot be emphasized enough that several 
approaches to defining a new system of knowledge were 
competing in the European intellectual currents and that this 
new effort was stimulated by confusion and the overwhelming 
desire to establish a new basis for order especially by the 
Deists (Brown, 1996). In central Europe especially the 
Thirty Years War and the witchcraft panic generated an 
atmosphere of confusion and terror among the population. 
Efforts to establish greater social order, especially for 
trade purposes, encouraged the development of advances in law 
(Palmer, 1964). 
New forms of government were also emerging alongside of 
advances in political-social thought. Law was increasingly 
being based on appeals to reason based on evidence. After 
the mid 1600s hearsay evidence was no longer valid in English 
courts (Palmer, 1964) and confession under torture 
discontinued. Truth was becoming progressively a matter of 
evidence rather than a matter of faith. Reasonable people, 
that is the educated authorities, based their decisions on 
evidence. Since science proposed the same agenda, it was 
associated with this perspective as well. Doubt, or 
skepticism became an important component of reasonable 
analysis of any subject where evidence was lacking (Brown, 
1996). The philosopher Rene Descartes in particular 
popularized the idea of reasoning based on doubt, as the 
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ancient sophists did, but many other philosophers in dialogue 
with him at the time were also enamored of its potential 
(Brown, 1996; Flew, 1991). 
The competing perspectives of the time often emphasized 
mathematics or empirical experimentation as their basis for 
analysis. Mathematics was championed especially by Descartes 
and experimental method by championed by Bacon (Brown, 1996). 
Another perspective, championed by Hobbes, attempted to 
balance the two approaches of mathematical analysis and 
empirical experimentation and was inspired by Euclid's 
geometry and strongly reflected Galileo's ideas (Losee, 1972; 
Scharratt, 1994; Woolhouse, 1988). This combination of 
approaches suddenly emerged through the work of Kepler when 
he established the mathematical correlation of his equations 
with the empirical observations of Tycho Brahe (Scharratt, 
1994). The discovery astounded everyone involved in the 
debate and suggested that there really was an undeniable 
connection between math and the physical world. 
Galileo shook the world with the development of his new 
technology for observation, the telescope. This further 
verified the work of Copernicus and demonstrated the 
importance of discovery through empirical observation rather 
than reason alone as Aristotle had suggested (Scharratt, 
1994). Galileo argued for an ontology where the world was 
divided into primary and secondary objects (Brown, 1996). 
The primary objects would be the focus of investigation for 
the new science and Galileo suggested a special method for 
these investigations (Losee, 1974). 
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From this point on much of the debate centered on the 
proper method to be developed for uncovering and verifying 
new information about how the world worked. A new ontology 
and epistemology was needed to explain and justify the "new 
philosophy" of science. The observations of Galileo lead to 
an inertial theory of falling bodies which was combined with 
Kepler's calculations by Newton, using the new calculus of 
Lebinitz, to develop a comprehensive mathematical theory of 
physics (Brown, 1996; Losee, 1974). This work was defended 
and justified ontologically and epistemologically in the 
writing of Locke (Woolhouse, 1983). Thus the efforts of 
these philosophers culminated in a mathematical perspective 
which logically measured and ordered empirical observations 
in such a way as to predict their reoccurrence. The success 
of this practice suggested that there was an order in the 
universe that men could gain power over and use to their own 
ends. In a period of relative social chaos this was a potent 
balm. 
Important themes continue to emerge and be debated as 
the "new philosophy" developed over the centuries. Woolhouse 
(1988) agrees with Russell that perhaps the most significant 
debate is that between the rationalists and the empiricists. 
This same debate also centers around the division of the 
world into primary and secondary qualities which would later 
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be a central focus of Mead. In another form these debates 
would hold center stage in nee-positivism as well. 
Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Galileo 
The leading figures of the new philosophy of science 
were clearly Galileo and Newton. It was, however, Newton's 
Principia which embodied everything the new philosophy was to 
be. Much of the initial thought leading up to Newton's work 
in physics seems to revolve around Galileo, Bacon, Hobbes, 
Descartes, and Gassendi. 
Bacon was eager to establish a better system of 
knowledge through empirical methodologies relating more to 
experimentation (Woolhouse, 1988) .. He demonstrated why 
Aristotle's Organon was wrong and proposed a new (scientific) 
method (Losee, 1974). He was convinced that great progress 
was possible once traditional modes of knowing were left 
behind (Woolhouse, 1988). He advocated the separation of 
reason and revelation like Galileo and was clearly aware of 
the advantages this would have for science. He felt 
humanity's future salvation would lie in technological 
mastery of nature (Woolhouse, 1988). Faulkner (1993) insists 
that Bacon's greatest contribution was his influence on the 
European community with regard to the importance of science. 
His vision of the utopia it would lead to was 
the first modern or future oriented utopia, that is, 
the first to rely crucially on products from methodical 
research, and the first to organize science and society 
to satisfy desires for health, subsistence, security, 
and compassionate care (Faulkner, 1993:11). 
Bacon, who attained great prominence in England, had 
tremendous influence on scientific thinkers of his time. 
Galileo and Hobbes seem to occupy more of a middle 
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ground of the time. Hobbes appears to be a central player as 
he knew Descartes and Bacon personally (Flew, 1991). He also 
visited Galileo personally in his pursuit of a science of 
human behavior based on geometry; a physical mechanics 
(Woolhouse, 1988). Hobbes also knew Gassendi who was 
instrumental in rediscovering the work of Democratus 
concerning atoms (Woolhouse, 1988). Hobbes like Bacon was 
interested in method. 
Hobbes's references to previous lack of philosophical 
progress and the disputatious wrangling of the 
prevailing scholastic philosophy, and his distaste for 
ideas based solely on the foundation of authority, are 
all reminiscent of Bacon (Woolhouse, 1988:29). 
He admired the resoluto-compositive method of Galileo and 
Euclid's system of geometry. In the resolutio-compositive 
method of Galileo analysis involves deconstruction of a 
matter into its related parts, determining their cause and 
demonstrating the o.riginal cause of the matter through them 
(Woolhouse, 1988). 
Hobbes developed an analytic attitude toward thinking 
and saw it as a form of adding and subtracting (Woolhouse, 
1988). In this sense he anticipated Frege. His perspective 
was mechanistic with respect to behavior. His mechanical 
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psychology is very much in harmony with Descartes mechanical 
man, although he disagreed with him that mind was a separate 
phenomena (Urmson, 1995). Woolhouse (1988) says in the final 
analysis he is more interested in theory than method and the 
new philosophy was more than knowledge about cause and effect 
derived from senses. His disagreement with Descartes on the 
mind/matter division and his other publications won him a 
notoriety which extended into the realm of political 
philosophy (Brown, 1996; Woolhouse, 1988). Like Locke he 
extends the ideas of the 'new philosophy' into the realm of 
politics and influences European thought regarding law. 
Galileo was enamored with the mathematical approach with 
his interest in celestial geometry and clearly empirical 
observation was of fundamental importance to him (Losee, 
1974; Flew, 1991). What is often less mentioned is that he 
also involved himself with thought experiments (like 
Einstein) and emphasized the importance of "creative 
imagination" in his Method of Resolution (Losee, 1974:55). 
Perhaps his most significant consideration was advocating the 
division of the world into primary and secondary phenomena in 
Il Saggiatore (1623). This restricted the domain of 
scientific investigation which was to be reflected in 
Descartes dualism and Newton's physics (Losse, 1974). 
In a now famous passage he claimed that whenever he 
conceived of a material substance he hade to think of it 
as having certain properties, of being bounded with a 
distinct shape and size and in some specific place, as 
being in motion or at rest, as touching or not touching 
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other objects and as being one in a number or few or 
many. These properties, he said, he could not separate 
from an object by any stretch of the imagination. It 
was, however, different with other properties such as 
taste, color, sound, and smell. These are not 
properties one is compelled to regard an object as 
having and without our senses we would not have thought 
of them. So Galileo concluded that the latter qualities 
are not out there in the world but resided only in our 
consciousness and without living creatures they would 
not exist (Brown, 1996:47). 
This perspective moved science out of the Aristotelian 
universe and the realm of metaphysics (Losee, 1974). 
Descartes, Locke, Boyle, and a host of other thinkers would 
build around this idea (Mead, 1982; Brown, 1996; Losee, 
1974). The arguments about which realm verification should 
take place in would continue as central to science into the 
present. Mind would be associated with the realm of 
secondary qualities, yet problematically, mind was also the 
realm of mathematics. For this reason Galileo was not 
entirely empirical in the sense that Locke became (Losee, 
1974; Collins, 1967). 
By restricting the subject-matter of physics to 
primary qualities and their relations, Galileo excluded 
teleological explanations from the range of permissible 
discourse of physics (Losee, 1974:52). 
Descartes hoped to reduce all knowledge to mathematical 
laws (Flew, 1991). He thus shared with Galileo the belief 
that nature was based on mathematics (Sharratt, 1994). His 
perspective however did not emphasize empirical confirmation 
(Losee, 1974). Although his conceptualization of dual nature 
of phenomena was similar to Galileo's, there were important 
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differences. 
In a time of great intellectual confusion they 
constituted a group of contemporaries in dialogue with each 
other aimed toward a new system of philosophy that would 
guarantee certain knowledge of the truth. They were very 
diverse in their perspectives but they did seem to agree on 
some basic general points. This "new philosophy" would be 
atomistic, materialistic, mathematical, and lawful in the 
logical sense after the manner of geometry. It would be a 
philosophy apart from theology, metaphysics, and the dogma of 
the church. 
Descartes and the Mathematical Perspective 
Descartes influence on scientific thought lay in his 
emphasis on mind/matter dualism and mathematics (Flew, 1991). 
Descartes thought that a priori axioms could be developed 
from which all laws of material matter could be deducted 
(Cottingham, 1986; Losee, 1974). He was especially 
interested in physics and physiology and felt that all 
natural science was to be unified under mathematics which 
would clearly and distinctly indicate the truth of a belief 
(Cottingham, 1986, 1991; Losee, 1974). (This was contrary to 
the hopes of others to use sense data as the basis for 
experiment and confirmation.) It is not clear how adamant 
Descartes was on this point as he engaged in experiments 
himself and according to Cottingham (1986) had a hypothetico-
deductive idea of science. 
Descartes proposed that mind (or soul) was immaterial 
and not subject to physical laws (this could have been to 
avoid conflict with church doctrine (Brown, 1996) and that 
the body is a machine (Flew, 1991). In his Passions of the 
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Soul he saw the body as a machine which could be moved by the 
soul through the pineal gland by agitating "animal spirits" 
( F 1 ew, 19 91 ) . 
Descartes supported Galileo's distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities to some degree in that he 
felt physical reality was based essentially on extension 
which was an innate a priori concept (Cottingham, 1986; 
Losee, 1974). There are "modes" of extension such as size, 
shape, motion, position, duration, and number which are also 
innate ideas concerning objects. Other sensations of such 
things as color, sound, odor, taste, and hardness are not 
with certainty part of physical objects (Cottingham, 1986) 
According to this perspective knowledge of physical objects 
does not come from sensation. 
This is an important difference from Locke's later 
distinction between primary/secondary qualities and the list 
of qualities differs as well. Descartes did not believe in 
empty space either and differed with Newton on this point 
(Losee, 1974). Locke's distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities was in harmony with this notion because 
it implied a basic subject-object dichotomy. Primary 
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qualities included solidity, extension, figure, and mobility. 
Secondary qualities were due to powers of objects to produce 
in us ideas of color, taste, and smell (Flew, 1991; Mead, 
1982). For Descartes, physics and philosophy were one 
(Cottingham, 1986). Their premises were metaphysical in 
character. 
Descartes' influence on philosophy is profound, but his 
influence on science is curious. He sought to derive basic 
physical laws from metaphysical principles which Newton and 
others such· as Bacon (and Boyle) opposed. The.re was 
agreement his idea of mind-matter division, it worked so well 
with Democritus's vision, but the British Empiricists defined 
it differently. There is much confusion here. Hobbes also 
liked the idea of mathematical laws describing physical 
reality as did Galileo (Woolhouse, 1988). The exact nature 
of the relation between physical reality and mathematical 
laws as well as propositions was not clearly understood. As 
mentioned previously, it is the basis for confusion even into 
the present debates. 
Descartes popularized the atomic theory, the idea of 
mechanical man, and the ~ind matter dichotomy it drew its 
strength from. It was this dichotomy, which was originally 
established in agreement with Galileo, which created the 
problem of properly connecting mind and matter so mathematics 
and logic could serve as a basis for explanation. It left 
the Church (which so plagued Galileo as everyone was quite 
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well aware) in charge of metaphysics of theology, but gave 
over the realm of matter to science. This convenient 
division may have been political as well as philosophical 
(Brown, 1996; Sharratt, 1994). It seemed necessary to try to 
establish truth and certainty in secure and consistent things 
such as physical objects~ logic, and mathematics. They 
seemed to belong to the same category in this sense and it 
seemed reasonable to find that they had a fundamental 
connection which time would reveal. 
There were however many fundamental assumptions which 
were being overlooked at this time which Mead, Wittgenstein, 
Quine and others would notice. It was up to Newton, Kant, 
and Locke to develop the models and philosophy that would 
describe this relationship correctly. Eventually Mill would 
codify the whole program. A new method for establishing truth 
about matters physical would be defined along with a detailed 
but still flawed metaphysics. Other champions such as Frege, 
Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine would continue to emerge to 
patch up the bridge between mind and matter. 
Newton and Locke 
Isaac Newton, who formalized Galilean mechanics, 
attacked Descartes for not being empirical and inductive, 
even though Descartes had paid lip service to observation and 
experimentation (Brown, 1996; Flew, 1991). Newton was a 
member of the Royal Society (Brown, 1996). Newton believed 
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in absolute space and time and this depended on Galileo's 
division of primary and secondary (Losee, 1974; Brown, 1996). 
Newton's work, heavily in step with Francis Bacon and 
building on the work of Galileo and Kepler, had inspired much 
of Locke's efforts on primary qualities and highly influenced 
Kant as well (Flew, 1991; Palmer, 1964). In fact it quickly 
becomes apparent that Newton was the key player in 
legitimizing this perspective (Brown, 1996). The Principia, 
when it was delivered to the Royal Society, was a 
comprehensive detailed mathematical account of all motion in 
the universe, but it was very different from Descartes 
conceptualization. (Hawking (1988) notes that it was not by 
brilliant argument alone that Newton established his hegemony 
in Physics, it also involved a considerable amount of dubious 
political intrigue.) 
John Locke had established the philosophical groundwork 
for empiricism (Flew, 1991). Locke adopted and expanded 
Robert Boyle's notion that physical objects could be best 
understood in terms of the rearrangement of basic particles 
of matter (Collins, 1967). He also favored Boyle's approach 
to methodology (Yolton, 1985). He was skeptical of 
Descartes program of a natural philosophy and Collins 
conunents: 
Finally, he is able to discover in experience no 
connection between primary and secondary qualities. 
Hence no demonstration is possible in regard to the 
sensible qualities of bodies. This does not put an end 
to the advance of sciences, but it does force them to 
rely heavily upon the intrinsically less perfect, but 
humanly more proportionate, means of observation and 
experiment (Yelton, 1985:38). 
Locke's program was to clear the way for the acquisition of 
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scientific knowledge by providing a thorough account of human 
understanding from an empiricist perspective that also 
included the latest developments in science (this was later 
to be Mead's goal when Relativity emerged)(Yolton, 1985). 
His intention was "in clearing the Ground a little, and 
removing the Rubbish, that lies in the way to 
knowledge"(Yolton, 1974:120). Locke was emphatic in his 
rejection of formal logic as a tool for science (Yelton, 
1985) This became the basis for the more refined empirical 
arguments of Hume and Berkeley. 
Locke argued that mens' ideas do not come from innate 
knowledge, as was widely held at the time, but all ideas in 
the mind come from experience (experience is composed of 
ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection) (Brown, 1996; 
Woolhouse, 1983). Knowledge should come from observation and 
sense experience (Yelton, 1985). Most important, as 
mentioned above and which we will take up later as critical, 
Locke distinguished between primary and secondary qualities 
as had Galileo, Boyle, and Descartes (Collins, 1967; 
Woolhouse, 1983). Although Locke drew inspiration for his 
perspective by arguing against Descartes (Woolhouse, 1983), 
Locke agreed with Descartes that the fundamental unit of 
knowledge is intuition but differed by saying we could have 
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no certain knowledge of general truths about the world 
(Brown, 1996; Collins, 1967). This is perhaps because "In 
some passages, Locke held that an unbridgeable 
epistemological gap separates the 'real world' of atoms and 
the realm of ideas that constitutes our experience" (Losee, 
1972:97). For this reason he insisted that the best science 
could do was a collection of generalizations which would not 
satisfy the rationalist idea of truth. In this he lays the 
groundwork for the neo-positivists later on. 
Kant and Hume 
Losee (1972) explains that Hume agreed with Locke (and 
contrary to Descartes)that all ideas were ultimately derived 
form the senses but disagreed with Locke's ideas regarding 
truth. Hume believed Euclid was innately true (in agreement 
with Descartes) and could not be demonstrated true by 
empirical verification. On the other hand he held that 
statements about matters of fact must be established through 
empirical evidence. This lead him to a disagreement with 
Newton regarding the use of axioms, and interestingly enough 
a fundamental agreement with Einstein later on regarding the 
role of mathematics in science. He emphasized that causation 
cannot be established in any absolute sense and proposed that 
it was based upon habitual expectation. He also laid the 
groundwork for Mill's rules concerning cause and effect in 
his Treatise. He established that the form and content of 
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scientific laws are derived entirely from sense experience 
but "Probability is the only defensible claim that can be 
made for scientific laws and theories" (Losee, 1972:106). 
Kant believed that Hume was incorrect in believing that the 
mind merely manipulates ideas copied from sense impressions. 
He held that the transformation from sense data to ideas was 
a complex process involving the progressive application of 
organizing rules of experience innate to the human mind. The 
idea was that the innate organizing principle of mind were 
parallel to those in nature. Inconsistent rules were at odds 
with the "Principle of the Purposiveness of Nature"(Critique 
of Judgment, 1790) . In a sense he was recognizing that sense 
experience was theory laden, but with innate organizing 
principles which could be enhanced through reason. He 
admired Euclid and Newton and saw Newton's axiomatic method 
as fundamentally correct 
Kant's critique was an effort to settle the controversy 
over the legitimacy of metaphysics in the face of scientific 
thought. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) "Kant rejects 
both empiricism and rationalism. There are pure ideas of 
reason but only as regulatory principles in the service of 
experience" (Hoffe, 1994: 34) . 
Kant admits that all knowledge begins with experience, 
but it does not follow, as empiricism assumes,that 
knowledge originates solely in experience. On the 
contrary. even empirical knowledge proves impossible 
without sources independent of experience (Hoffe, 
1994:34). 
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A priori elements exist in all knowledge. In a sense Kant is 
between Descartes and Locke. Kant generates the analytic 
synthetic distinctions of a priori and a posteriori knowledge 
which will in the future be the battleground between Schlick, 
Wittgenstein, and Carnap, eventually ending in Quine's famous 
doubting of their value in his Two Dogmas of Empiricism. 
Kant is interested in a science of metaphysics however and a 
priori synthetic judgements, not just science proper. Kant 
finds mathematics and science both containing synthetic a 
priori elements. "they are still valid only under the 
assumptions of synthetic principles" (Hoffe, 1994:42) and 
that "all mathematical judgements are synthetic", not 
analytic. The Logical Positivists will claim this is 
nonsense as only logic and experience can be sources of 
knowledge. These arguments will be developed more fully in 
chapter two and five. 
Wundt, who adopted Kant's position, also attempted to 
develop a science of mental causality (Hilgard, 1987). 
Wundt, however, set up a laboratory to conduct his 
psychological experiments which so later influenced Durkheim 
(Durkheim, 1972). 
Mill 
Losee (1974) records the importance of John Herschel's 
theories of scientific method (and Whewells conclusions about 
the history of science) a crucial to Mill's formulations. It 
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was Herschel who developed the idea of the context of 
discovery and the context of justification as two distinct 
but important realms in science. He noted that some laws are 
derived from induction and others by hypothesis and that "A 
meticulous inductive ascent (in the Baconian sense) and a 
wild guess are on the same footing if their deductive 
consequences are confirmed by observation" (Losee, 1974:116). 
Herschel then defined the several conditions which would 
constitute justification including various instances of 
observational forms as well as the crucial experiment the 
Logical Positivists would utilize this distinction later. 
Mill argued against Whewell with regard to the 
importance of hypothesis and stated that every scientific law 
had been discovered by one of the five methods of induction 
which he espoused. Mill's method argued that the context of 
justification and discovery were both subject to the laws of 
induction. He also argued for the importance of proof of 
causation as a primary goal of science and utilized Hume's 
analyses to devise methods of verifying causation. Mill's 
arguments are flawed at many points. In spite of Mill's 
efforts, Losee notes that general agreement among 
philosophers of science is that "Mill failed to prove his 
case" (Losee, 1974:157). In spite of this methodologists in 
many sciences, especially sociology continue to utilize his 
schema and cite him as a final authority. 
It should be clear at this point that there was 
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considerable disagreement on how math, logic, intuition, and 
observation fit together. The underlying arguments were 
never really resolved. It was the general agreement on the 
components of the new philosophy and a universal distaste for 
religious dogma and metaphysics that gave an appearance of 
some unity to these efforts. That these men engaged in 
similar activities and debated their merits was novel in 
itself. Most of these men came from a privileged class and 
their findings had important ramifications associated with 
improved technologies in trade and war. 
Cottingham makes an important point with regard to the 
assumption that many in the 20th century make that science 
derives from some organized program of .development in the 
17th century which everyone had clearly agreed upon: 
A second potentially misleading aspect of the use of 
words like 'science' and 'scientific' in connection with 
the seventeenth century is that they suggest an agreed 
body of standards, procedures and practices in terms of 
which theories are tested, evidence assessed and 
experiments conducted. Yet in the seventeenth century 
there was no such corpus of rules; indeed, part of the 
achievement of thinkers like Descartes and Bacon was 
that they envisaged (though in very different ways) the 
possibility of developing an agreed methodology for the 
investigation of truth (Cottingham, 1986:2-3). 
As we have pointed out in this section, there was no 
clear program, but rather competing philosophies. It is 
important to summarize and clarify the ideas that were 
emerging as they will play a central role as points of 
controversy later. Central issues concerned causation, 
subject-object duality, the use of mathematics, intuition vs 
observation, and the division of the world into primary and 
secondary qualities. 
Primary and Secondary Qualities 
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Besides causation, the arguments concerning the division 
of primary and secondary qualities is of great importance 
for, as we shall see, it constituted a basic assumption more 
important to science than causation itself (As Russell was to 
later point out). 
1. This distinction set science apart from philosophy and 
theology with respect to the subject of its discourse. 
2. It allowed for quantification of subjects investigated. 
3. It allowed science to develop without threatening the 
entire domain of the Church. 
4. It allowed science to develop a degree of internal 
consistency and utility which philosophy and theology 
could not compete with in a world fervently engaged in 
war and trade. 
By limiting the range of its investigation science was 
able to focus on phenomena that were more consistent over 
time (Losee, 1972). The subjects of theology and metaphysics 
often involved events involving secondary characteristics at 
most or at least confused by them. Consistency was difficult 
to establish. The subjects of debate varied widely in 
definition from person to person and definitive analysis had 
to be based on faith or authority alone. This lead of course 
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to the relativism of the time. 
Events involving the primary qualities could be measured 
and quantified. This quantification allowed for greater 
control over the subject of investigation as well as the 
application procedures of evidence to publicly verify 
statements and procedures. It offered an independent measure 
of truth outside the domain of pure authority and faith. 
This had also been the domain of the Church and Galileo 
had felt their pressure to change his opinion based on 
authority and faith as well as Descartes (Cottingham, 1986). 
The new philosophers were well aware that the Church would 
constrict their efforts if it felt threatened. By giving the 
church the domain of secondary qualities, these philosophers 
were perhaps able to reduce their political liabilities. 
Summary 
There was no basis for the assertions of these 
philosophers other than personal belief. They argued from an 
ontology that they were unaware and which biased their 
perspective (although Hurne and Kant seemed to be exceptions). 
All of them had major problems in the details of their 
systems as a consequence. They did not recognize their 
ontological limits defined by their culture. They did not 
have this notion or possibility. 
These philosophers, enamored with their own ideas tried 
to credentialize them by associating them with important 
positions and societies of learning. Some ideas in math 
proved very powerful in terms of applications for war and 
trade. Technology developed largely independent of theory, 
academia, and associated laboratories. 
It should be clear from the foregoing that what became 
the positivism of Mill and Comte was initially considered a 
new form of philosophy engaged in for the purpose of 
determining truth: 
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1. These philosophies were only loosely associated and 
there was considerable difference concerning methods and 
ontologies. 
2. They became amalgamated under Newton, who followed 
Galileo's lead, into a form of rhetoric involving 
mathematics, observation, and axiomatic theory. 
3. The new approach was able to address only a limited 
domain of experience and that domain contained only 
elements which were measurable. 
4. .The new approach promised to expand its domain and 
establish truth once and for all. 
5. These philosophies provided power and prestige for those 
associated with them, 
There never was any comprehensive and final agreement 
among philosophers or the emerging scientific community 
itself regarding fundamental issues. Galileo and Newton had 
seemed to establish a new legitimate direction for 
exploration and it was assumed the details would work 
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themselves out. This assumption gave way to a focus on 
method and fact that became institutionalized. The truth of 
this matter became apparent when Relativity theory emerged 
and was verified through observation. 
Science rapidly became a revered institution which was 
associated with authority and truth. Its struggle with the 
church is a testimony to this observation. It became 
separated from philosophy, which had been its original 
foundation, and declared the realm of metaphysics, 
epistemology, and ontology irrelevant. The validity of 
science was in part established by conveniently forgetting 
that it was not logical and that its founding assumptions 
were suspect and never fully established. 
It is interesting to make note of this because it points 
to other validating factors at work, social factors. As 
thinkers focused on the material world more and more, that 
which was not easily measurable became delegitimized. This 
focus resulted in a cultural ontology, which in its demand 
for social order (and a new one at that) and its flight from 
the church, found science the best rational. It is a 
dialectic of an emerging cognitive perspective. 
Weber has commented on the emerging rationalism of the 
west and outlined the emergence of bureaucracy. It would 
seem that science was the penultimate rationale for this new 
bureaucratic reality. As the Church had defined the ontology 
of the middle ages, science defined the ontology of the 
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Science up to the time of Mill and into the late 19th 
century continued to struggle for a codified program of 
method based on a strong foundation of logic. As the 
preceding has made clear, no such consolidation emerged, even 
though modern positivistic science grew in th~ory and 
prestige. Disagreement continued to rage over proper method 
and the rational behind it (Losee, 1972). In the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries experiential science began to 
uncover information that cast doubt on the legitimacy of the 
entire program within the hard sciences (Frank, 1961; 
Heisenberg, 1971). Positivism came under serious criticism. 
Many in the scientific community rushed in to rescue what was 
left of old rationales and methods. 
The effort in this chapter is to review the crises in 
modern physics .and the key thinkers and the ideas associated 
with them. What follows is a focus on the development of the 
main problems and solutions associated with the rediscovery· 
of science's fragile foundations. This will set the stage 
for further discussions concerning the failure of this 
approach in sociology and alternative conceptualizations of 
reality and knowledge emanating from Mead which potentially 
resolve these conflicts considerably. 
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Positivism found its most influential and explicit 
advocate in the person of Auguste Comte in the 19th century, 
but has its roots in the works of Galileo, Francis Bacon, 
Hobbes, Sir Isaac Newton and the British Empiricist school of 
the 17th and 18th centuries (Flew, 1991). It argued 
optimistically that the only genuine way to obtain knowledge 
was through scientific methods. John Stuart Mill sharing 
Comte's enthusiasm, sponsored and supported his hostility 
toward metaphysics and theology, and himself embracing 
positivism laid out fundamental rules for experimental 
inquiry in his own work Logic in 1843. Together they 
established the what are often still the conventionally 
accepted methods for uncovering cause and effect. 
The outcome of these efforts was a loose alliance of 
consensus concerning the nature of reality and the best 
avenues of knowledge. Although they often disagreed on 
specifics, the focus of effort of these early scientists and 
philosophers toward knowledge was a program which was causal, 
mathematical, dualistic, empirical, experimental, and 
consensus oriented (institutional). J.S. Mill's effort to 
codify this approach in the 19th century reflects the general 
belief among leading thinkers of the time that it represented 
the best approach to knowledge (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Unfortunately the propositions of positivism and the 
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consequent methodology had no unified rational basis in 
metaphysics or philosophy and became justified on the grounds 
of its utility (Flew, 1991; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Mills, 
1959). C. Wright Mills in his book The Sociological 
Imagination ironically quotes a leading positivist, Percy 
Bridgman (who developed the idea of operationalism), to this 
effect: 
There is no scientific method as such, but the vital 
feature of the scientist's procedure has been merely to 
do his utmost with his mind, no holds barred (Mills, 
1959:58). 
Although, as Willer noted (1967), this is clearly an 
overstatement of the matter, it is presently acknowledged by 
many that there is a profound difference in the professed 
methods of science and the actual methods (Phillips, 1973). 
Science did appear to produce results which could be 
neatly systematized into formal bodies of knowledge such as 
physics and biology. Wundt's laboratory in Leipzig promised 
equally wonderful findings in psychology and inspired 
Durkheim in his efforts to develop a positivist methodology 
in sociology (Durkheim, 1972). According to Weber a form of 
public knowledge which lent itself well to 
institutionalization in the universities (Bendix, 1970). The 
weak foundations of this highly effective enterprise, 
however, became especially apparent with the development of 
non-Euclidean geometry and the publishing of Einstein's 
theory of Relativity in 1905. 
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The emergence of positivism did not reflect a logical 
and orderly growing consensus over clearly worked out 
principles but instead displays a rocky history with many 
failures and disagreements among its proponents. It was an 
aggregate of philosophical agendas attempting to control the 
experienced world (then in cultural turmoil) through 
prediction and explanation. It relied on the very dubious 
concept of causation. It accepted only what could be 
conveniently measured and disregarded all other.phenomena. At 
present it still fails to present a unified program and 
increasingly appears as what can be only described as a 
rationale and a faith. Heisenberg observes: 
once the main reasoning of classical physics had been 
accepted as the a priori of physical investigations, the 
belief arose, through an obvious though false 
extrapolation, that it was absolute, i.e. valid for all 
time, and could never be modified as a result of new 
experiences (Heisenberg, 1971: 22 ) .. 
The advent of Einstein's theory and Quantum mechanics 
clearly revealed major problems with Newton's physics which 
had been the anchor for positivism. The Vienna Circle 
appeared as a last gasp at legitimizing the mathematical 
reductionist program (Hume, Newton, & Descartes) and 
obviously disregarded the full implications of the new 
physics (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Now not only were there 
difficulties establishing a new unified theory of positivism 
(Popper's being the closest) but the very founding 
assumptions of causation and primary-secondary divisions of 
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experience so essential to the program were in question. 
Once the Michelson-Morely experiments supported 
Einstein's theory and non-Euclidian geometry became an 
uncomfortable reality to contend with, traditional 
positivistic science began to unravel. In the confusion that 
followed Ernst Mach attempted to redefine the positivist 
agenda. Philip Frank (1961) explains that the shift in 
emphasis by Mach from explanation to description was a 
critical factor in rescuing science. Causal explanation of a 
mechanistic universe was no longer a viable concept. Mach 
argued that all explanation was in fact description. 
He maintained that "explanation" by reduction to a 
system of cherished conceptions is pure illusion. If 
all the multitude of observable phenomena are reduced to 
mechanical or organismic phenomena, these special types 
of phenomena chosen as the basis of explanation are by 
themselves no more understandable than the phenomena 
that are to be explained. Mach claimed that there is no 
essential difference between an "explanation" and a 
"description"{Frank, 1961:18). 
For Mach, who was considered the founding father of the 
Vienna Circle, a physical law or explanation is merely an 
economic description of a class of phenomena {Hanfling, 
1981). Frank and his associates, lead by Moritz Schlick and 
basing their ideas on Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (1921), felt that the mathematical relationship 
between concepts in a scientific theory put them in a 
different category than ordinary descriptions involving a 
vague number of connections among vague concepts {Kraft, 
1969). They wanted to retain Mach's insight but expand on 
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it. At the base of this perspective was still the 
Empiricists' idea that all knowledge can be analyzed into 
items of sensation, but furthermore as Wittgenstein believed, 
"The meaning of a proposition is the method of verification" 
(Hanfling, 1981:7). Their program was to develop a method by 
which all meaningful statements "could be analyzed into 
suitable verification-components" (Hanfling, 1981:7). 
Anything unverifiable was metaphysics. 
Einstein's (1954) theory had established that time and 
space were not absolutes and that measurement itself varied 
based on the local geometries operating under different 
gravities. Not only was Euclid's geometry relative, but also 
mass, extension, velocity, time, space, and a·11 related 
primary qualities (Einstein, 1954). The consequence of this 
is that primary qualities could no longer be measured in 
absolute terms. The basis for Newton's physics was now gone. 
To make things worse for positivism, causality itself 
was called into question by the work of Heisenberg involving 
Quantum mechanics. Particle positions became a problem of 
multiple probabilities. His Theory of Indetermanancy 
undermined forever the idea of absolute causality as Hume had 
earlier intuited on a different basis. All the basic 
assumptions of science had been violated. As Frank has 
conunented: 
Two characteristic beliefs of nineteenth century 
science broke down during its last decades; these were 
the belief that all phenomena in nature can be reduced 
to the laws of mechanics, and the belief that science 
will eventually reveal the "truth" about the 
universe"(Frank, 1961:16). 
Frank and his associates, soon to be know as the Vienna 
Circle, found through Mach a basis in Kant and Locke for 
their new paradigm, although they believed that Kant was 
wrong about the immutability of the organizing patterns of 
the mind (Frank, 1961; Hanfling,1981). Frank explains that 
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non-Euclidian geometry proved this to be true. Much of their 
perspective however had been summarized earlier by Hume 
(Hanfling, 1981). 
Kant believed that mind can describe natural phenomena 
by using forms of thinking not provided by physical objects 
These forms (patterns of experience) "are provided by the 
human mind and not by the physical facts, they cannot be 
changed by the advance of scientific investigations" (Frank, 
1961:19). Frank believes this true to an extent, but 
recognizes that it implies the limits of knowledge are 
Euclidean geometry and Newton's laws (which Kant maintained 
are forms of organization intrinsic to the human mind) and 
lead back to medieval metaphysics. Frank reasoned therefore 
that the "forms of experience" were changeable. 
Poincare' provided the Vienna Circle with a way to 
reconcile description with postulates, and yet avoid the need 
for traditional explanation. Poincare' states that objective 
experience and mind are functions of each other. Together 
they constitute a system of experience. The symbols of a 
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logical system such as mathematics are arbitrary in that 
the "symbols have no meaning in the physical world"(Frank, 
1961:24). He recognized however that, "we construct only 
those systems that can be interpreted in terms of physical 
facts and that are therefore helpful for the formulation of 
natural laws" (Frank, 1961:25). The axiomatic system is a 
product of our free imagination, but it is well chosen when 
identified with observational conceptions which make it an 
economical description of observational facts (Kraft, 1969). 
The symbols can from this perspective be linked to observable 
facts-through measurement by simple physical methods. 
Structural systems may be logically arbitrary, but not 
psychologically arbitrary as people do not usually construct 
systems that do not relate to the objective .world (Frank, 
1961). 
Drawing on Poincare', the Vienna Circle decided that the 
18th century concepts of mass and force "can be interpreted 
as statements about sense observations"(Frank, 1961:29), they 
are not about a world behind appearances (ontological 
realities or metaphysical entities, but are "auxiliary 
concepts"- economical statements of observation). 
The Vienna Circle wished to combine the the work of Mach 
and Poincare' (Frank, 1961). Kraft explains that this is a 
radical shift for empiricism. The realm of logic and 
mathematics becomes dependent on its validity or truth value 
only in terms of internal coherence. The realm of 
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observational experience depends on verification by 
correlation with experienced phenomena. Duhem was a great 
influence on the Vienna Circle on this point because he also 
proposed that experimental verification is the culmination of 
a theory and not its basis: 
A theory of physics is not an explanation; it is a 
system of mathematical propositions deduced from a small 
number of principles the aim of which is to represent as 
simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible, a 
group of experimental laws (Duhem in Frank, 1961:26). 
A body of experiments only confirms the theory. For Duhem an 
explanation (rather than a description) beyond economical 
description was an excursion into metaphysics. In this he 
agreed with Mach. The structural logical system of a theory 
said nothing about the world of observable physical facts 
directly in the conventional sense. All that was required was 
a method of bridging the two. Frank and the others concluded 
that the laws of science were "arbitrary conventions about 
how to use some words or expressions" and this allowed Frank 
to use the concept of causality again but without the 
implications that it was an aspect of objective phenomena 
(Frank, 1961:21). Causality becomes an arbitrary logical 
convention in terms of an axiomatic system and if interpreted 
physically it becomes a statement of observation and not real 
in any absolute or physical sense. It is employed because it 
is an economic description in the sense that Mach had 
prescribed. A critical aspect of Logical Positivism at this 
point is to determine the precise way of bridging the gap 
between the formal system and physical reality. How should 
correspondence be established? 
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In sum, the discourse between these thinkers resulted in 
the presentation of the view that conventional concepts are 
to be discarded for a formal system of specially devised 
concepts, involving logical and primitive terms, whose 
meanings are derived from that system and are not dependent 
on physical phenomena for their meaning. The truth value of 
the formal system would then be established through 
measurements of sense experience confirming a correspondence. 
Truth was then not to be derived from sense experience, only 
confirmed by it. The Logical Positivists recognized two 
types of meaningful statements which were either verifiable 
by observation (synthetic) or by analysis of its truth or 
falseness (analytic) (Kraft, 1969). 
Correspondence 
Frank considers Einstein an excellent example of logical 
positivism. He developed his theory from very general 
abstract principles-it was a neatly developed structural 
system, the system must be interpreted and predictions of 
observable facts made: then verification through observation. 
Newton's theory could be verified with yardsticks and clocks, 
but Einstein's requires special procedures of interpretation: 
"The methods of measurement must be developed along with the 
conclusions from the principles of the theory" (Frank, 
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1961:30) ;- it becomes part of the theory. "These 
descriptions of the operations by which abstract symbols, . 
. are connected with observational facts are called today 
"operational definitions," according to a terminology 
suggested by P.W. Bridgman (Frank, 1961:31). This 
constitutes a greater gap between the structural system and 
experimental confirmation than ever before in science. An 
economic description of facts that now requires considerable 
operational definitions (very high level of abstraction 
related to its generality; also removes it from primary 
observation) . 
Schlick's position was fundamental to the positivist 
perspective and he stated that a cognition is true if the 
correspondence established between the system of symbols and 
the facts of the world is unique (Frank, 1961; Hanfling, 
1981). Traditional philosophy said truth was behind 
appearances and discoverable by reason. Schlick emphasized 
that truth is the establishment of correspondence itself, but 
since many worlds could fit the same system 
(underdetermination of theory), the correspondence must be 
unique although only in the direction from theory to 
verification. 
Reichenbach's perspective was sympathetic to this 
approach and saw geometry as a good example of such a system 
as Schlick advocated (Frank, 1961). It had axioms and a 
description of measurement- a system of axioms of 
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coordination (recall Hobbes). With this type of system every 
theory with nonobservational concepts must contain relations 
(implicit or explicit rules for) between these abstract 
concepts and observational concepts. The prescription for 
experimental verification was contained within the system of 
postulates. Together Reichenbach and Schlick formulated a 
verification theory which is based on Wittgenstein's 
interpretation of meaning. This theory defines the meaning 
of a proposition as derived from its method of verification 
(Hanfling, 1981). The focus of these contributions is 
consistently away from dependency in any way on sense data 
for anything other than verification. 
Schlick believed Wittgenstein could provide logical 
positivism with a sound symbolic logic system drawn from 
ideas of Russell and Whitehead's ideas concerning logic 
(Hanfling, 1981). Wittgenstein claimed problems of 
traditional philosophy were verbal problems. Ordinary 
language was not set up to deal with philosophical problems. 
(Frank claims James and Peirce also had the same conception 
of meaning as Schlick, Reinbach, Mach) As we have seen the 
Logical Positivists were already working in this general 
area. Carnap also joined the group to help with this effort 
(Kraft, 1969). 
Frege had defined meaning as reference (the same 
starting point as Russell and Wittgenstein) and truth value 
lay within the accuracy of reference (Flew, 1991). This 
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contributed to the idea of unique correspondence. 
Unfortunately this disqualified many mathematical statements 
{propositions) and indicated that they were neither true nor 
false, but meaningless. Wittgenstein avoided this problem as 
he did not base his perspective on a true-false dichotomy 
(Grayling, 1988). He was still interested in the limitations 
of factual discourse and made the distinction that some 
categories of statements were either true or false and others 
were neither and therefore meaningless (this still equates 
meaning with true/false dichotomy) (Ayer, 1985). 
Wittgenstein was interested in flagging the boundary between 
these two types of propositions as they were the source of 
major confusion (Anderson, 1986). In this manner he could 
indicate the domain of science and conveniently define other 
domains as meaningless. Therefore science is the only 
meaningful discourse. 
Carnap, in light of Wittgenstein's pronouncements, 
offered an example of Schlick and Reichenbach's "true 
cognition" with a system of symbols that indicated the world 
of facts uniquely in The Logical Structure of The World 
(Frank, 1961). It was also the final integration of Mach and 
Poincare' (Kraft, 1969). Carnap was interested in a criteria 
that would determine the verity of a statement by analysis of 
its symbols' form and the syntactic rules it employed (Kraft, 
1969). He also wanted to develop formal protocol statements 
into a meta-language that was internally consistent. Along 
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with Neurath he developed the "coherence theory" of truth 
where-in the truth of a statement is a matter of its 
coherence with other statements (Hanfling, 1981). Schlick 
felt that this went too far in disregarding the importance of 
verification through observation. Wittgenstein also felt that 
Carnap's program was impossible because any meta-language 
would have to have its own meta-language and so on ad 
infinitum (Kraft, 1969). Carnap answered this by saying his 
formal language was a sub-language described by general 
language itself (Kraft, 1969). Meaning was dependent on 
logical verification and truth on empirical verification. 
Meaningless statement are not verifiable in either case. 
Carnap declared metaphysics was meaningless because it 
could not meet the requirements of his system. Metaphysics 
has apparent logical relations, but synthetic elements which 
are unverifiable, even in any potential circumstance. It was 
not even verifiable in principle. 
The Vienna Circle felt through Carnap's work that: 
They had demonstrated logically that no scientific 
metaphysics is possible because metaphysical statements 
do not fit into the pattern ·that statements must have in 
order to be called true or false (Frank, 1961:44). 
This was a further refinement of Locke's effort to separate 
metaphysics and science and was in harmony with 
Wittgenstein's refinement of the correspondence program he 
and Frege were developing. 
Instead of building up the system of human knowledge 
upon concepts like "red spot" or "feeling of warmth," 
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one should use elementary symbols expressing concepts 
like "rock" or "table," and define "redness," or 
"warmth" as derived concepts" {Frank, 1961:45). 
(This is division of primary and secondary qualities on a 
higher level of abstraction) Carnap had attempted to work 
out the new language of exact correspondence, but innumerable 
problems plagued his efforts. The consequence of his system 
was that math and logic were meaningless. He also found that 
many important propositions become invalid under this 
criteria. Worse yet, two synthetic sentences could combine 
to become meaningless. 
Frank is careful to emphasize that there are no primary 
philosophical propositions, philosophic activity is to 
clarify statements of the special sciences- it is auxiliary. 
The new physics had forced the positivists back into 
philosophical speculation concerning the unfinished business 
over assumptions, but they kept it at arms length. It was to 
remain in its early projected role of edifying scientific 
discovery. 
The Position of Logical Positivism: A Summary 
Much of the discussion Frank and others offer concerning 
the development of logical positivism demonstrates the 
eclectic and patchwork nature of its evolution. It draws 
support from many diverse authors. Although many of the 
important problems of classical physics are finally 
addressed, many of the solutions still present major 
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problems. Much of the discussion is confusing because many 
important issues are glossed over. Often more questions are 
raised than answered. The received position of Logical 
Positivism will consequently be summarized to clarify the 
approximate implications of all these contributors and their 
complex arguments. Although the implications of Einstein's 
theories eroded the concepts of absolute time and space and 
called into question causality, the logical positivists 
continued to pursue a program to support causality. They 
continued to define the world in terms of subject and object. 
They continued to find a means to justify experimental 
designs through a new form of operationalism. In spite of 
their repeated glaring failures and the lack of experimental 
support for their assumptions they continue to this day in 
the form of social scientists those who are not aware of 
their failure such as Zetterberg, Lazarsfeld, and 
Stinchcombe. 
The Logical Positivists focused on the procedures of 
justification or the ~context of justification" as 
Reichenbach (1966) refers to it. It is the measurable realm 
of primary qualities which Locke and the traditional 
positivists had focused on. Although they acknowledged the 
importance of the context of discovery (where Einstein did 
his thought experiments), they regarded it as a domain which 
could not be analyzed and so they would not analyze it 
(Bechtel, 1988). The realm of secondary qualities is ignored 
once again. There appear to be three critical features to 
I 
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their perspective (Bechtel, 1988): The verifiable theory of 
meaning, the deductive-nomological method of 
explanation(which is related to the hypothetico-deductive 
model of justification), and the axiomatic view of theories. 
The Verifiability Theory of Meaning 
As we h~ve seen the Logical Positivists felt that the 
conventional meanings of words were imprecise and lead to 
meaningless questions. They discarded the classical notion 
that ideas were causal products of experience and replaced it 
with the notion that sentences and words were vehicles of 
meaning. This meaning was dependent on the set of conditions 
that demonstrated its truth and thus verified its meaning. 
Although many sentences could be verified by direct 
observational experience, it was necessary to formulate rules 
for verifying more abstract sentences with these 
"observational sentences" and this was to be done with 
symbolic logic and often in the form of "if, then" 
statements. This results in analytic statements not 
dependent on experience for verification. Unfortunately it 
was quickly discovered not possible to translate all concepts 
into these terms and despite valiant attempts by Carnap the 
problem was never fully resolved. 
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The Deductive Nomological Model of Explanation 
Statements of scientific laws and antecedently known 
empirical facts are deductively employed to arrive at a 
description of an event which serves as an explanation for 
it. There is a symmetry between explanation and prediction 
such that their identity is determined solely by whether they 
are stated before or after the event. These deterministic 
explanations provide a specific consequence every time 
initial conditions satisfy the law statements. Hempel 
proposed that this procedure could be applied to statistical 
relationships to allow for inductive-statistical explanations 
( this only works with events whose probability of occurrence 
exceeds .50) (Bechtel, 1988). 
The procedure for deriving scientific laws was termed 
the "hypothetico-deductive method." In this instance a 
hypothesis would be proposed and operationalized in the 
"context of justification." If the predicted outcome was 
verified, then the hypothesis was determined to be confirmed 
providing further support for a general theory or as Willer 
argues establishing the hypothesis as a specific theory. One 
of the difficulties here is that the definition of scientific 
law is hard to establish in formal terms. "If, then" 
statements often cannot contain enough information to provide 
a satisfactory law. Another difficulty is Hume's assertion 
that an inductively derived statement has no guarantee of 
continued support in the physical universe. The "Raven 
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Paradox" suggests that "if, then" statements are tautological 
in that they often only seek to examine what is proposed. 
The Axiomatic Account of Theories 
A theory is a "structured network of statements from 
which one could derive specific laws" (Bechtel, 1988:28). 
The model for theories as can be seen from Franks arguments 
is Geometry (recall Hobbes). Laws would be axioms derived 
from assumptions and postulates. All good theories could be 
axiomized and this would lead to larger general theories in 
science 
The Alternative of Karl Popper·· 
Karl Popper was at first considered sympathetic by the 
Logical Positivists, but as he observed their line of 
development he became aware that the difficulties their 
program embroiled them in were insurmountable (Hanfling, 
1981). Science was supposedly inductive, involving empirical 
observations made through experimentation which are logically 
analyzed. Unfortunately it was clear to those who carefully 
considered the matter that no extension of observations of 
empirical phenomena can result (is logically sufficient to 
establish) in an absolute induction (an unfortunate by-
product of Hume's efforts) (Flew, 1991; Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). Science, ironically, had to survive by faith in the 
uniformity of nature. 
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Popper advocated the acceptance of this paradox and 
stated that all generalizations were tentative and subject to 
falsification and that theory was always subject to revision 
(Kraft, 1969; Bechtel, 1988). Looking on the brighter side 
he rationalized science as, therefore, a democratic approach 
to knowledge in which theories are constantly subject to test 
and question (Bechtel, 1988). Science can only be a loose 
body of theories. He proposed his famous hypothetico-
deductive approach as the solution (Anderson et al, 1986). 
This solution was more effective than the Vienna 
Circle's. They attempted to add the mathematical 
developments of 20th century (especially Russell and 
Wittgenstein) to systemize empiricism in support of Hume's 
perspective. Mathematics and logic are considered meaningful 
though tautological (Flew, 1991). They explicate the 
meanings of things, but they do not say anything about how 
things in the world are specifically. Frege and Russell 
failed to show that mathematical truth was a part of logic 
and therefore as certain as our knowledge of logical truth 
(Bechtel, 1988). Arguments continue as to whether 
mathematical objects exist independently of thought and so 
mathematical truth is intuitively known (self-evident) as 
Kant proposed (Anderson et al, 1986). In summation of this 
condition Heisenberg explains: 
Yet, having said this, we probably understand now, 
better than before, that there exists apart from the 
phenomena of life, still other aspects of reality, i.e. 
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consciousness and, finally, mental processes. We 
cannot expect that there should be a direct link 
between our understanding of the movement of bodies in 
time and space, and of the processes of the mind, since 
we have learnt from science that our mental approach to 
reality takes place, at first, on separate levels which 
link up, so to speak, only behind the phenomena in an 
abstract space (Heisenberg, 1971:93). 
It is instructive to note that this analysis is all 
within the confines of a belief system. and its related 
cognitive sensory set that makes a strong distinction between 
knower and known, between subject and object, and between 
mind and matter. It is an attempt to redefine the boundaries 
that had initially set science off as a consistent and 
reliable program of knowledge apart from the relative world 
of secondary qualities and the metaphysics that dominated it. 
In fact metaphysics has become a part of modern physics once 
again. Hawking (1992) describes the distinction between 
quarks as metaphysical in nature. The Vienna Circle had 
hoped to maintain some of the traditional cartesian 
boundaries and build new connections, bridges, between the 
two realms. 
(It overlooks Mead's distinction that mind and matter 
coemerge in an ongoing dialectic as social reality once mind 
itself emerges from the physical universe (the world that is 
there and pushes back). Social objects (which are always the 
limits of human knowledge) are as much mind as matter.) 
Strangely enough the work of Wittgenstein later in his 
life and the work of Quine begin to touch upon this primary 
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secondary problem, but continue to overlook it. The 
cognitivists such as Simon, Hanson, Lakatos and Laudan, 
however, are acutely aware of the problem (Bechtel, 1988) 
They perhaps to fail to utilize it to their advantage because 
of their apparent lack of knowledge concerning physics. 
Later Wittgenstein 
The importance of the contributions of Wittgenstein and 
Quine are in terms of sociology of knowledge. These 
philosophers and the congnitivists wrestle with the 
epistemological and ontological ramifications of the issues 
that undermined the Logical Positivists in the final analysis 
(Bechtel, 1988). It is one of the theses of this work that 
this failure and the problems and solutions of Wittgenstein 
and Quine point to a more fundamental problem; the division 
of primary and secondary phenomena. Their struggle not only 
defines the failures of Logical Positivism, but points out 
the weakness of assuming this division and the related 
Cartesian dualism. 
The main distinction between early and later 
Wittgenstein is that the distinction between sense and 
nonsense statements is no longer based on correspondence but 
on conventions of usage (Grayling, 1988) This approach 
becomes central to his Investigations: 
It is this that makes Wittgenstein's later work look as 
if it might be much closer to sociology than some other 
philosophies because it places major emphasis on the 
institutional and collective nature of language 
(Anderson et al, 1986:191). 
Wittgenstein explains that generalization and 
explanation are not the same thing or "Indissolubly 
associated" (Anderson et al, 1986:181). All intellectual 
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questions are not necessarily resolved by generalization and 
language is used in social interaction for other purposes 
(Grayling, 1988). Craving for generality leads to an 
attitude about science- that it is the only legitimate form 
of explanation (recall Carnap). "All that people think they 
want from a generalization can be obtained from the careful 
description of particular cases" (Anderson et al, 1986:181). 
Wittgenstein feels that instinctive use of language is 
the correct employment of it (compare this with Frank), but 
when we reflect on our use of words we often lose our way 
because it is primarily a nonconsciouss or natural process 
(Grayling, 1988). We distort it through self conscious 
efforts. "It is the problems of philosophy that originate in 
confusions about language" (Anderson et al, 1986:183). They 
have little to do with matters of fact. 
When we are making "instinctive" use of the language we 
are right in our employment of it. Trouble begins when 
we start to reflect on language, to reflect on the use 
of words, for then we become self-conscious about 
something that is properly done in unself-conscious 
fashion (Anderson et al, 1981:182). 
The mature thought of Wittgenstein saw correspondence as 
an erroneous basis for knowledge and an incorrect formulation 
for explaining the way language works (Grayling, 1988). The 
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basis for Logical Positivism is conceived as erroneous. This 
new perspective moves him close to Mead in that it places an 
emphasis on usage (interaction) as the basis for meaning. It 
also moves him closer to Quine's work which focuses on 
language as a whole as the source of meaning. Truth and 
meaning become a function social interaction rather than 
scientific investigation. This relativism mirrors the 
failure of absolutes in physics. Heisenberg (1971:25) notes: 
Thus contemporary science, today much more than at any 
previous time, has been forced by nature herself to pose 
again the old question of the possibility of 
comprehending reality by mental processes,. 
(Heisenberg, 1971:25). 
The problem of correspondence is the re-emergence of the 
problem of dualism introduced by Descartes and by Galileo's 
primary secondary distinctions. This reflects the breakdown 
of subject-object dichotomies in Quantum mechanics as well. 
As the domain of science expanded, the boundaries of its 
infancy, primary characteristics, dissolved. Quantum 
mechanics operates in a realm of the abstract. The 
illegitimacy of secondary characteristics as the domain of 
science becomes questionable. The program of science is no 
longer truth and meaning becomes a function of human 
interaction. 
Quine 
Hard line empiricism expects all knowledge to be gained 
directly from experience; the overriding constraint on them 
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is to "eradicate the role of subjective interpretation in the 
acquisition of knowledge" (Anderson et al, 1986:143). 
For our knowledge to be independent of our theories we 
must be able to estimate the fit between the theory and 
the world, which is only possible if the world actually 
does have an independent existence and organization 
which we can come to know about (Anderson et al, 
1986:143). 
True description would capture that existence. He still 
champions science as the best system we have; a better 
language could make it more precise. 
Is language interpretive? Sociologies of knowledge 
suggest that knowledge systems are culturally anchored and 
relative. Theories, categories, methods are a consequence of 
socio-historical events. This relativism challenges Quine to 
redefine empiricism and realism. Quine's empiricism focused 
on the logical structure of language. He begins with the 
assumption that there can be no philosophy "which is 
fundamental to science" (Anderson et al, 1986:146). 
Quine was much influenced by Pragmatism and the idea 
that the value and truth of ideas finds their ultimate test 
in their utility in assisting us in our relations to the 
world (Bechtel, 1988). Economy of conceptualization is 
therefore of considerable importance to him and he pursues 
simplicity. Ontologies with fewest entities is the best 
(Bechtel, 1988). Quine is a relativist- there is no single 
right answer to the question "what is there" (Anderson et al, 
1986). Meanings are not things. There are only physical 
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phenomena and no mental phenomena. 
Quine saw the task of traditional epistemology as futile 
and felt that psychology could better address it- but a 
behaviorist type psychology. 
The essential problem is to understand how, from very 
minimal input of stimulation that the human organism 
receives from the physical environment, it is possible 
for us to construct our very rich and complex theories 
of that world (Anderson et al, 1986:153). 
Evidence for theories must come through the senses, but: 
"Physical objects are conceptually imported into the 
situation as convenient intermediaries" (Quine, 1953:44). He 
denies that certainty can be sought from the two key dogmas 
of empiricism- there is no distinction between questions of 
fact and questions of meaning (Quine, 1953). In contrast to 
Frege, Quine believes that meaning resides in whole languages 
and not in sentences i.e.in its entire ontology (Quine, 
1953). Some beliefs require few changes in the web of 
meaning, and some require re-spinning the whole web (such as 
2+2 doesn't equal 4) ( Anderson et al, 1956). The difference 
between analytic and synthetic is one of degree only (recall 
primary secondary qualities) and "it is becomes folly to seek 
a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold 
contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which 
hold come what may" (Quine, 1953:43). There are no 
statements immune to revision (how about objects?). We tend 
to adhere to ontologies rather than facts. The difference 
between the analytic and the synthetic is often the degree to 
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which we are willing to revise our language and the range of 
that revision (Quine, 1953). The analytic is often more 
difficult to alter. We can accommodate the facts by 
manipulations of our theory. Translating ontologies is 
nearly impossible (and argues against the progression of 
knowledge in science and favors Kuhn's theory of revolutions) 
(Anderson et al, 1986). We often can't distinguish the true 
in fact from the true in meaning. 
According to Quine theories are underdetermined- the 
facts may fit many theories. We must however judge the 
adequacies of other ontologies from our own which is 
invariably scientific. Although Quine was admirable in his 
effort to have science face its inadequacies, he did not 
encourage us to inspect and question them from an ontological 
perspective. Whether he felt that we could not is another 
question beyond our present scope. The cognitivists clearly 
disagree with Quine (if only implicitly) by the very nature 
of their research which like Quantum mechanics points the 
objective empirical finger back at us. Science altered the 
cognitive bias of our Euro-American culture once with Newton 
and there is no reason to doubt that we can do it again in a 
manner congruent with our scientific investigations. Science 
is trying to transform itself. (Quine believed social science 
were unreal because they are unverifiable (Bechtel, 1988). 
Heisenberg's insight is an interesting commentary on the 
work of Wittgenstein and Quine: 
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On the one hand the experimental questions which we ask 
of nature are always formulated witµ the help of the 
plain concepts of time and space. For indeed we possess 
only a form of speech adapted to the objects of our 
daily environment and capable of describing for instance 
the structure of some apparatus of measurement. Our 
experiences, too, can only be made in time and space. 
On the other hand, the mathematical expressions suitable 
for the representation of experimental reality are wave 
functions in multi-dimensional configuration spaces 
which allow of no easily comprehensible interpretation. 
(Heisenberg, 1971:15). 
Summary: Old Dogs and New Physics 
In the 1920's the science of physics, assaulted on all 
sides by phenomena it could not explain, was in a state 
of disarray. The models of the atom that had been 
devised by the best physicists of the time failed to 
provide an adequate accounting for the simultaneous 
wave-particle nature of radiation, including visible 
light. .At the international Soloway Conference held 
in 1927, Heisenburg provided proof of the proposition 
that it is impossible to determine both the mass and 
the momentum of a particle other immediately and forever 
indeterminate (Lincoln & Guba, 1985:97). 
This flew in the face of logic and counter to many of the 
fundamental assumptions of the methodologies employed in 
positivism. The Logical Positivists attempted to adjust for 
these findings but confronted innumerable barriers. Diesing 
observes: 
By the mid-1950's, all the original distinctions of the 
Vienna Circle had become unclear, and all the original 
certainties had collapsed. The distinctions between 
logical and empirical, analytic and synthetic, theory 
terms and observation terms, meaningful and meaningless, 
even science and metaphysics, had become differences of 
degree, circumstance, interpretation (Diesing, 
1991:19). 
Eventually Carnap died and so did the logical positivist 
program (Diesing, 1991). Popper abandoned most of this 
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program and presented a new version of cartesian doubt which 
is also popular today (Diesing, 1991). It is instructive to 
note that classical physics remains alive and well-employed 
to this day. The ramifications of Einstein's and 
Heisenburg's works have never been fully acknowledged by the 
scientific community in general (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Palmer (1964) remarks that it took only fifty years for the 
public to absorb the Newtonian perspective, yet the 
inconsistencies in positivism remain begrudgingly 
acknowledged on a limited scale and unresolved (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985) . 
The thing that is remarkable about scientific theories 
is that the inconsistencies are walled off and do not 
appear to affect the theory other than very 
locally. . (Wimsatt in Lincoln & Guba, 1985:17). 
Lincoln and Guba (1985), as well as others, have 
codified many of the weaknesses of positivism exposed above: 
The problems with axiomatic arguments, the arbitrary division 
between observer and observed, the weak assumptions behind 
cause and effect, the limited validity of generalization. 
They have reviewed in detail the underdetermination of theory 
and the unavoidable theory-ladeness of facts. There may be 
some truth in the fact that, as Kant asserted, that 
positivism reflects innate categorical biases and that these 
biases stubbornly resist efforts to transcend them. 
Physicists, however, have developed mathematical systems to 
investigate events occurring beyond the realm of these 
categorical limits. Heisenburg acknowledges that these 
systems must be imported back into social dimensions to be 
meaningful. Frank was correct in this sense to attempt to 
move theory beyond meaning in the conventional sense. 
In addition to the inherent weaknesses in Logical 
Positivism Godel's Theorem demonstrates the fruitlessness of 
trying to reduce any mathematical analysis to one consistent 
set of propositions (Flew, 1991). Bell's Theorem rules out 
the assumption that spatially separated events can be 
considered independent (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Werner 
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle struck at the heart of 
subject-object dualism as well as causality (Heisenburg, 
1971). 
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The method of science has resulted in conclusions that 
call into questions many aspects of those same methods and 
the perspective that claims to justify them. What kind of 
rational method denies validity of its own findings? Is this 
much different than the problem Galileo met with? When 
rational men repudiate and ignore their own evidence it seems 
likely that strong cultural beliefs supporting powerful 
political agendas are at work. In considering the pedigree 
of positivism, it should be obvious that it is a perspective 
with considerable investment behind it. To abandon it might 
imply cultural revolution. Scientific revolutions as slow as 
they may be in coming may have to await cultural shifts in 
belief systems (Kuhn, 1962). 
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After several centuries of working its way into our 
language and culture, many investigators believe positivism 
has come to dominate the way we see our world both physically 
and conceptually {Focault,1970; Leyotard, 1991; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985; Alexander, 1982; Phillips, 1973). Cartesian 
dualism lies at the heart of our Euro-American cultural 
perspective {Damasio, 1994; Flew, 1991; Mead, 1982). It 
informs our symbols, our dialogue, and our- acts {Leyotard, 
1991; Alexander, 1982). It generates a certain style of 
meaning (Mills, 1959; Burke, 1965). Connected with the way 
we process information is the fact that it is the perspective 
of authority {Leyotard, 1991). It validates and legitimates 
forms and channels of information (Bendix, 1970). It is the 
source of our military technological power. To abandon it 
threatens not only our self, but perhaps our security as a 
nation and a society. How are we to extricate ourselves and 
confront what our own methods are telling us about reality? 
Gergen (1991) suggests that our technology may not provide us 
with a choice and is in fact forcing us to alter our 
fundamental cultural definition of self. 
One aspect of our problem is often overlooked, however. 
As Gergen and others have noted, Newtonian physics, though 
invalid at the quantum level of analysis, was used to 
calculate trajectories for the moon shots. This is no small 
statement. As a society we entrusted human life to these 
equations, even though their validity is in fundamental 
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question. Although we could have used Einstein's equations 
to perform the more precise calculations, the specialists 
explain that it would be like using a sledge hammer to kill a 
fly (Gergen, 1991). At our everyday level of physical 
operations Newtonian physics are sufficiently accurate and 
simple to use for most tasks, and Einstein (1954:231) 
comments that the resulting differences in calculations are 
almost too minuscule to acknowledge in many instances: 
The new theory of gravitation diverges considerably, as 
regards principles, from Newton's theory. But its 
practical results agree so nearly with those of Newton's 
theory that it is difficult to find criteria for 
distinguishing them which are accessible to experience 
(Einstein, 1954). 
Efficiency inspires the retention of Newtonian mechanics in 
the engineers repertoire. We should not throw the baby out 
with the bathwater. Positivism has a place, but not in the 
driver's seat. 
The next chapter will seek to explore in more detail 
these assertions that positivism is a cultural bias linked to 
political and economic concerns for power. 
CHAPTER 3 
POSITIVISM, TECHNOLOGY, AND CULTURAL DOMIANTION 
Basic assumptions or metaphysical beliefs underlie our 
system of ideas and they, "represent the ultimate benchmarks 
against which everything else is tested. ." (Lincoln & 
71 
Guba, 1985:15). Over the centuries the arguments of the 
great philosophers forged these assumptions and they found 
consensus in a perspective grounded in the scientific 
community. Locke's arguments for empiricism and a "public 
knowledge", Descartes' mathematics, Newton's physics, Comte's 
positivist perspective, and Mill's logic laid the foundations 
for a methodology which reflected these assumptions. The 
assumptions and the methodology became known as the 
positivist paradigm and more popularly as science. 
Part of legitimacy of this perspective was perhaps 
derived from its ability to supply a technology and a 
rationale for that technology through the associated 
philosophies of realism (Palmer, 1964). Those economic or 
political entities that employed this technology and the 
associated mathematics (especially Newton's calculus for 
deployment of accurate mortar and cannon) gained the 
upperhand in trade and war, and at the same time they found a 
justification for exploitation of resources in the rational 
behind the technology (Bendix, 1956; Braverman, 1974; 
Marx,1988; Marglin, 1982; Thompson, 1982; Weber, 1965). 
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As trade grew in Europe during the 14th and 15th 
centuries, the European community competed voraciously to 
expand their trading partners and colonial acquisitions 
(Boorstin, 1983). Navigational charts and all information 
regarding coastlines and ship routes were frequently 
considered a state secret and divulging it was treason 
(Boorstin, 1983). Explorers like daGamma, Balboa, and 
Columbus traveled between kingdoms seeking support for their 
ventures and their services frequently went to the highest 
bidders. Central to their efforts was navigation. 
Navigation relied upon a coordinate system of latitude and 
longitude developed by the Greek cartographer Ptolemy and had 
been revived in the 14th century (Hale, 1971). The primary 
difficulty for European navigators in utilizing this system 
was a lack of mathematical expertise, good navigational 
equipment, and a clock that would operate on board ships 
(Hale, 1971; Brown, 1996). Without the clock, it was 
difficult to compute with any accuracy longitudinal 
positions. On incident almost cost the English their entire 
fleet in 14 and inspired a national competition to devise a 
ship worthy clock (Boorstin, 1983). 
The Dutch on the other hand had taken to utilizing 
mathematicians as teachers aboard all their ships in an 
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effort to improve navigation (Boorstin, 1983). Frequently as 
not, it was as navigators that many mathematicians made their 
livelihood. Mathematics became increasingly associated with 
expanding trade routes and consequently with state concerns 
for security and power (Hale,1971). Navigation was also 
critical to successful naval campaigns by the reigning powers 
(Boorstin, 1983). As the discipline of mathematics gained 
status and importance in circles of authority so apparently 
did the growing legal concept of evidence. 
The idea of objective observation became increasingly 
popular and the Italian Machiavelli, enamored with the idea, 
attempted to observe the behavior of successful rulers in his 
writing of The Prince (Palmer, 1964). In his effort to be 
scientific, objective, and non-moral he was perceived to be 
immoral (Treasure, 1985). The idea of natural law and 
natural rights began to absorb Europe (Brown, 1996). Locke 
was highly influential and his "Essay Concerning the Human 
Understanding" 1690 encouraged the idea that certain 
knowledge or truth was derived from experience and not innate 
ideas as Descartes had argued (Yolton, 1985). He wrote other 
political treatises that were highly influential as well. 
Natural law came to be used to justify diverse political 
situations. Hobbes was highly influential in this arena with 
his work Leviathan in 1651 (Maland, 1983). Brown (1996) 
explains that the Enlightenment in general appealed to 
natural law rather than divine law as the guide to human 
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behavior. 
English law began to emphasize evidence near the end of 
the 17th century as judges lost their free discretion and 
rules of evidence became equally applied to all cases. As 
early as 1650 hearsay evidence was no longer allowed in 
courts and confessions under torture disqualified. 
Observation and natural law became a part of legal systems 
(Treasure, 1985). Too a growing educated middle class the 
ideas of social contract, evidence, and natural law seemed to 
harmonize with their interests. 
With respect to evidence, math, and military power 
Palmer maintains: 
The fact that knowledge could be used for practical 
purposes became a sign or proof that it was true 
knowledge. For example, the fact that men could aim 
their cannon and hit their targets more accurately in 
the seventeenth century became proof of the theory of 
ballistics which had been scientifically worked out 
(Palmer, 1964:264). 
Palmer adds that calculus "which allowed an exact treatment 
of curves and.trajectories, reinforced by technical 
discoveries in the working of metals, led to an increased use 
of artillery" (Palmer, 1964:270). He comments that armies in 
1750 used twice as many cannon per soldier as armies in 1650. 
This naval and military technology gave Europeans a 
considerable advantage over other peoples of the world 
(Treasure, 1985; Palmer, 1964). 
It is important to note however that science was also a 
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popular notion and it did not in fact contribute that much to 
technology. Maland notes: 
Technological progress continued to depend upon the 
development of empirical methods by practical men, and 
science probably gained more from technology than she 
gave in return, at least before 1750 (Maland, 1983:11) 
This is significant because technology is so often 
associated with scientific theory, yet in reality it usually 
precedes theory in its early development and may even do so 
today. It is sobering to consider that some of the major 
inventions of the 20th century were developed through trial 
and error efforts of men of little education such as Edison 
and Marconi. 
In the 15th century it was the Church that inspired 
Spanish explorers to spread the gospel and bring wealth to 
their kings (Treasure, 1985). Later in the 19th century 
Social Darwinist philosophy, as well as scientific realism, 
which grew out of this perspective, provided a further 
justification for the existence and implementation of this 
imperialistic agenda in spite of the best efforts of the 
church to halt its encroachment on its own authority (Palmer, 
1964). At the same time the Church, captive to its own 
ambivalence, enjoyed its own form of religious hegemony while 
riding on the same wave of technological superiority as the 
countries it thrived in colonized the planet (Palmer, 1964). 
Social Darwinism is one of the most powerful 
perspectives in the 19th and 20th century Euro-American 
industrial cultures. Survival of the fittest was seen as 
grounded in the scientific theory of evolution and it 
justified employing the technical might of Europe in 
subjugating other people in its pursuit of power and 
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resources (Palmer,1964). "Faith in 'modern civilization' had 
become a kind of substitute religion. Imperialism was its 
crusade" (Palmer, 1964:622). It spawned the Eugenics 
movement in England and America and culminated in the Nazi 
rational for the final solution (Palmer, 1964; Hughes, 1961). 
It was the.basic rational for the exploitation of English and 
American entrepreneurialists (Bendix, 1956). It is 
instructive to note that Carnegie referred to Spencer as 
"dear master" in his letters to him (Ritzer, 1992). The 
positivist ideology under the rubric of science became a 
fundamental cultural perspective which persecuted those who 
did not adopt a scientific perspective (Leyotard, 1991). The 
subject-object division implicit in this perspective became 
the cognitive basis for perception and consequently all 
investigation. 
It seems clear from the study of history that this 
positivism gained pre-eminence because of its association 
with power and authority (Bendix, 1956; Braverman, 1974; 
Marcuse, 1971). Its strongest proponents were in the 
industrial revolution's fastest growing centers, especially 
England and Germany (Palmer, 1964). Its legitimacy appears 
to have been grounded in this industrial power as much as was 
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the Church's in the political power of Rome and Constantine's 
decrees. 
Royal Societies were attended by the landed gentry as 
well as funded by governments in order to support the growth 
of this precious resource (Treasure, 1985; Maland, 1983). 
The association between science and power and authority was a 
continuous evolution that brought them ever closer together 
in the public mind (Boorstin, 1983). Eventually, science won 
greater legitimacy with regard to power and authority than 
the Church itself. The ideas of science were themselves 
invested with the power and authority of Pope and King. The 
tenants of positivism and their implications by association 
became the hallmarks of learning, power, and authority. 
Justification for political action became couched in 
scientific terms of evidence. Its most perverted 
manifestation took the form of scientifically justified 
genocide performed by doctors in Nazi Germany (Hughes, 1961). 
Emotion, sentiment, and morality had little authority within 
this arena (Comte, 1988). 
Comte and the Politics of Positivism 
Comte and Mill were two of the most outspoken advocates 
of Positivism as a philosophy and a social perspective 
(Swingewood, 1984). They were highly influential and their 
writings well know. Swingewood (1984) explains that Comte 
built his positivist perspective on the failure of the 
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empiricists of the Enlightenment to develop a conception of 
society that transcended the idea of aggregate of atomistic 
individuals. He sees Saint-Simon as crucial to this process 
with his concepts concerning civil industrial society and 
class hierarchies. He also finds the work of deBonald and 
deMaistre with their emphasis on society as an organic 
harmonious whole as an important contribution. Of Comte he 
notes: 
J.S. Mill, who corresponded with Comte, argued that 
his influence in the development of social science was 
greater than his actual achievements and that while not 
creating sociology as a science Comte's work 
nevertheless made it possible (Swingewood, 1984:41). 
Comte's attempt to explain social phenomena through 
empirical positivist perspective and the rejection of 
metaphysics places him at the beginning of the story of 
positivism in sociology and the founder of its positivist 
movement. He was enthusiastic over Condorcet's ideas of 
social evolution as a consequence of natural law and saw 
positivism as a philosophy that rejected the Enlightenment 
but embraced science as the solution to mans evils. 
All competent thinkers agree with Bacon that there can 
be no real knowledge except that which rests upon 
observed facts (Comte, 1988:4). 
Unlike the empiricists such as Locke, he did not believe 
sense data alone was sufficient for building knowledge: 
For if, on the one hand, every positive theory must 
necessarily be founded upon observations, it is, on the 
other hand, no less true that, in order to observe, our 
mind has need of some theory or other (Comte, 1988:5). 
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In this statement Comte is moving beyond the empiricists in 
recognizing the theory ladenness of facts to some extent. In 
his repudiation of empiricism and the idea that knowledge 
cannot be based on collecting facts he also supports the idea 
that we must include "laws which connect all social 
phenomena"(Swingewood, 1984:46). He insists on the 
importance 
that all our knowledge must be founded upon 
observation, that we must proceed sometimes from facts 
to principles, at other times from principles to 
facts . . (Comte , 19 8 8 : 2 3 ) . 
The emphasis on this pattern will be restated by Durkeheim 
and all positivists up into present time. Yet no clear 
program will ever emerge. Comte was at the time was 
optimistic concerning his program and he believed natural 
static and dynamic laws of social development were shaping 
history. They needed to be uncovered and codified, but first 
investigators required a guiding framework: 
We have seen that the fundamental character of the 
positivist philosophy is to consider all phenomena as 
subject to invariable natural laws. The exact discovery 
of these laws and their reduction to the least 
possible number constitute the goal of all our 
efforts; (Comte, 1988:8). 
He cites Newton as a good example of such an effort. Comte 
felt that mankind was entering a new phase of history where 
all knowledge would be unified as sciences under the positive 
philosophy. He selects the era of Bacon, Descartes, and 
Galileo as the period when positivism (mental revolution) 
began: "It was then that the spirit of the positive 
philosophy began to assert itself in the world" (Comte, 
1988: 11) . Inevitably it would lead to a new order that was 
based in logical and scientific rationality: 
We may look upon the positive philosophy as 
constituting the only solid basis of the social 
reorganization that must terminate the crisis in which 
the most civilized nations have found themselves for 
so long (Comte, 1988:28). 
Comte's vision, like so many other sociologist's to follow, 
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was one of a social science elegantly ordered by mathematics. 
It is also evident that, in thus placing mathematical 
science at the head of positive philosophy, we are 
making only a further application of the same principles 
of classification (Comte, 1988:66). 
Mill was highly influenced by Comte and agreed with his 
basic sociological principle, the theory of stages, the 
distinction between dynamics and statics, the historical 
method of analysis, and the concept of consensus 
(Swingewood, 1984:51). 
He also agreed there was no fundamental difference between 
methods in the social and physical sciences. 
Mill argued that social science consisted of the 
empirical laws of sociology, demonstrated in statistical 
studies and surveys, the laws of psychology, derived 
less from empirical studies than philosophical 
reflection and finally, linking the sociology and the 
psychology, the laws of ethology, the fundamental laws 
governing human nature: (Swingewood, 1984:52). 
Spencer, on the other hand attempted to distance himself from 
Comte's positivism (Swingewood, 1984). 
The idea of objective rules of procedure and scientific 
efficiency accompanied and promoted the development of 
bureaucracy (Weber, 1960). Rationalism and the scientific 
perspective both derive from the enthronement of reason over 
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emotion in the Enlightenment. Europe was recovering from 
plague, centuries of war, and witchcraft trials. Rationalism 
and science seemed to offer salvation from the excesses that 
preceded this period (Palmer, 1964). At the same time growth 
of trade and industry encouraged specialization and technical 
skills (Weber, 1960). Governments became large and unwieldy. 
Weber (1960) describes the evolution of bureaucracy under 
these conditions and its progressive association with power 
and authority. As industry developed in the nineteenth 
century into concerns like Standard Oil exploiting mass 
economies of scale and the huge rail systems that serviced 
them, managerial bureaucracy grew also (Chandler, 1992). 
Science invaded business management in the form of Taylorism 
(Taylor, 1967) and bureaucracy became the primary form of 
industrial management in the twentieth century (Bendix, 
1956). Science and academia were absorbed into the 
bureaucratic organization of society. The perspective of 
positivism and its peculiar brand of rationalism not only 
pervaded academic thought but also the organization of 
everyday life in society at large (Marcuse, 1971). 
Education 
Brown (1996) tells us that the growth of protestantism 
resulted in a strong anti-clerical movements among the laity. 
The laity was encourage to learn to read and think for 
themselves. A wide variety of religious parties and sects 
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developed especially in England and some became associated 
with political radicalism. Groups like the Quakers developed 
their own sophisticated metaphysics. Lay philosophers emerged 
who were not clergymen and not trained at the universities. 
The training of clergy (as well as doctors and lawyers) 
was a major part of the business of universities 
throughout this period and, for some of them, through 
much of the nineteenth century as well (Brown, 
1996:5). 
The idea of academic freedom was unknown in the 17th century. 
Places like Oxford and Cambridge were not usually associated 
with free thinking and students were required to subscribe to 
the Thirty Nine Articles, the doctrines of the Anglican 
church. 
Brown (1996) further reports that private houses, clubs, 
and salons or even coffee-houses and taverns were the place 
for the exchange of free ideas. Universities were both 
theologically correct and intellectually conservative places. 
The French led by Descartes also began to publish works of 
philosophy in the vernacular. French became the vehicle of 
philosophy in Europe. These works were subject to censorship 
laws however, but in England these laws lapsed in 1695 and 
were never renewed (Brown, 1996). Still philosophy became 
part of everyday life and the great philosophers of the 
period were widely read and discussed in native tongues. 
As Weber (1965) makes clear in his work on 
Protestantism, it provided a perspective for work and profit 
which directly influenced people but also lead to the need to 
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educate lawyers to support a stable legal system for the 
purposes of trade. The universities provided this service 
and not the service of the development of new ideas. In the 
future they will expand this service to include scientists. 
Weber addressed the problem of the relation of science 
to academic perspective in his work Science as Vocation 
(Bendix, 1970). He saw it as the endeavor of an intellectual 
aristocracy and an attempt by western man to eliminate magic. 
"Scholarship has become part of increasingly large academic 
and research enterprises" (Bendix, 1970:90). Scholars are 
progressively influenced by other institutions they do not 
control and specialization has separated them from the means 
of their own production. 
Engineering, medicine, and other technical professions 
base themselves on scientific results, but are directly 
concerned with purposes extraneous to science. 
Politicians often resort to the testimony of scientists 
and professionals in the hope that political decisions 
can be based entirely on knowledge and thus be 
greatly facilitated (Bendix, 1970:91). 
Inquiry is often driven by concerns extraneous to it. 
Parelius and Parelius (1978) document the growing 
relationship between corporate concerns and education since 
the late 1800s. Progressively the concerns of educators have 
been primarily to meet the labor requirements of industry. 
The early close collusion, behind the official· political 
veneer, of business and industry in the early formation of 
the American educational system in Massachusetts is clearly 
documented by Bowles and Gintis (1977). Bureaucratic 
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criteria for accountability and evidence drives its demands 
for outcome evaluations with respect to academic funding of 
studies. The outcomes criteria it utilizes is based on 
scientific perspective. As the following will show, business 
expects educational outcomes to be measurable in traditional 
scientific terms and expects courses to be designed to meet 
the needs of a scientifically oriented managerial 
bureaucracy. Political bureaucracy is organized along 
similar lines. Any endeavor not justifiable from this 
perspective is of questionable validity and definitely not 
worth funding. Utilitarian standards are used to evaluate 
academic work. A research projects value with regard to 
profit {rather than truth) becomes the final criteria for 
funding. 
Research 
Blalock (1982) has acknowledged the bias that funding 
organizations can insert into the consideration of research 
projects by social scientists: 
a strong emphasis on quantification may result in an 
overemphasis on one set of substantive problems at the 
expense of others; for instance, we may be financed to 
study those whose behaviors· the sponsoring agent would 
like to control {Blalock, 1982:18). 
In 1917 the United States Public Health Service was one of 
the first organizations to act as such a sponsoring agent. 
Their study comparing performance and fatigue in a Ford plant 
was carried out by Philip Sargent Florence, not technically a 
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sociologist and later a professor of commerce (Madge, 1962). 
Industrial psychology was growing in England at the time and 
Henderson and Mayo were beginning their experiments at 
Harvard. It is interesting to note that what drove these 
studies was practical interests in industry. The Hawthorne 
Studies (1927-1939) involving Elton Mayo must also be 
considered in this respect, as they centered around a General 
Electric Plant. 
The research behind the renowned work An American 
Dilemma was sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation and was one 
of the first large scale fundings of research in sociology 
specifically (Madge, 1962). The work behind An American 
Soldier by Stouffer was funded by the Army, and although 
manned initially by Army personnel, employed civilian 
advisors. These advisors included Stouffer of Harvard, 
Likert from the Department of Agriculture, and McNemar, from 
Stamford. Stouffer managed to gain considerable autonomy for 
the researchers and his "Research Branch" grew quite large 
and influential (Madge, 1962). The social psychologists 
Dollard, Guttman, Cantril and others were brought into the 
project (Madge, 1962). They completed almost three hundred 
surveys over a five year period. The Carnegie Corporation 
again funded the Social Science Research Council to support 
Stouffer in codifying and publishing the material. Madge 
reports that 
86 
the Research Branch was determined to quantify its 
results, and the decision was therefore taken to develop 
simple type questionnaire which could, as a general 
rule, be filled in by the soldiers themselves (Madge, 
1962:296). 
This had less to do with Stouffer than with the precedent 
which had its origins in pencil and paper IQ tests that had 
been used extensively in the Army since World War I (Bowles & 
Gintis, 1977). It was a method easily employed by the Army 
as a bureaucracy and it was familiar, non-threatening, and 
convincing. It was particularly bureaucratic in terms of 
efficiency because a small staff could carry out a large 
program (Madge, 1962). 
Madge (1962) reports that they used Market researcher 
techniques of the 30's in their questionnaires. Kendall, 
Lazarsfeld and Merton used this data to further develop their 
own methodological perspectives. Guttman perfected his 
design of scales and began using Spearman-Thrustone type 
factor analysis while working for the Army (Madge, 1962). 
Hyman in his enthusiasm concluded that the 
explanatory survey follows the model of the laboratory 
experiment with the fundamental difference that it 
attempts to represent this design in a natural setting 
(Madge, 19~2:301). 
Lazarsfeld became a consultant in the last years of the war 
(Madge, 1962). Rather than Scalogram analysis he developed 
latent-structure analysis which bears a close relation to 
statistical theory of factor analysis. In 1950 he published 
Measurement and Prediction. 
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Some critics, The New Republic in particular, observed 
that science was being used "to sort out and control men for 
purposes not of their own willing" (Madge, 1962:320). Alfred 
M. Lee commented: 
If managerial problems for industry and the military 
are to continue to dominate the research of the leading 
social psychologists and sociologists, the value 
orientation of the managerial technician rather than 
the value orientation of the social science educator 
will dominate what evolves and is called social science 
(Madge, 1962:320). 
What is overlooked here is that this not only influences 
research projects, but shapes methodologies which come to 
dominate academic institutions and as Mills, Philips and many 
others have commented it drives research selection. 
Kinsey's research, he was a Zoologist was sponsored by 
Indiana University at first. It was then then sponsored by 
the National Research Council's Committee for Research on 
Problems of Sex and largely funded by the Rockefeller 
Foundation (Madge, 1962). He utilized a behaviorist 
perspective and a taxonomist approach as his previous major 
work was on gall wasps. This type of approach assumes the 
importance of a statistically well developed sample size and 
rigorous statistical method. 
From the historical record there appears to be an 
obvious pattern of relationship between government and 
corporate interests and the major researchers and 
methodologists in the field of sociology. Other researchers 
have specifically focused on the relationship between 
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academic professionals and these sponsoring organizations. 
Silva & Slaughter's (1984:40) analysis of academic 
experts and their associations finds 
Leading academics forge links with political economic 
elites able to deliver resources for the 
institutionalization of social science within the higher 
education system. We see academics as able to procure 
resources by using their expertise outside the 
university and demonstrating to possible clienteles the 
uses of social knowledge. The way social scientists 
served the powers-that-be included their work on the 
trust and labor problem, their work on municipal reform 
and imperialism, and their work with foundations. We 
argue that academics as experts linked the economy and 
the state, and in return for this mediation received 
resources, on the one hand, and responsible positions 
with some power, on the other hand (Silva & Slaughter, 
1984:40). 
Silva & Slaughter (1984) review the history of the ASA and 
other social science professional organizations and their 
relation to state and private funding institutions. In their 
investigation of foundations such as Carnegie and Rockefeller 
they noted that the expectation of foundation managers was 
rooted in their 
· experiences organizing capitalist production and 
distribution" and they "assumed that idea-workers could 
predictably create their commodities in much the same 
way that other skilled crafts could (Silva & Slaughter, 
1984:248). 
The Social Science Research Council, as it turns out, was 
mandated to coordinate research expectations between funders 
and grantees. Lazarsfeld in Mathematical Thinking in the 
Social Sciences enthusiastically reports: 
The Social Science Research Council, with the help of 
the Ford Foundation, has inaugurated a series of 
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training seminars, with the double purpose of giving 
mathematical instruction to social scientists and 
injecting social science materials into college courses 
in mathematics (Lazarsfeld, 1954:4). 
Lazarsfeld, however, nowhere states their purpose. The 
implicit assumption is that math is good and that the 
foundation is rescuing an ailing science. From Silva & 
Slaughter (1984) we know that the Social Science Research 
Council was created to assure the foundations interest in 
getting the type and form of information it wanted. The 
foundation 
used its resources to organize and rationalize existing 
knowledge-production groups already approaching the 
issues of the day from the ideological position 
favorable to their shared elite interests (Silva & 
Slaughter, 1984:250). 
The graduate students of the training seminars may as well 
have been navigators on board the Dutch ships being 
indoctrinated by state financed mathematicians. 
Statisticians and economists of international repute 
early in the 1900's were called in to develop guidelines for 
form and content of projects to be developed for foundations 
such as the Carnegie and Sage foundations (Silva & Slaughter, 
1984). The Rockefeller Foundation, especially famous for 
having its administrators closely allied with active 
industrial management, wanted a bureau to report on social 
problems relating to rail rates, labor disputes, tariffs, etc 
(Silva & Slaughter, 1984). Although Silva and Slaughter 
focus on ideological issues, it is clear from their report 
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that foundation officials were from disciplines that depended 
on quantitative reports and surveys for analysis related to 
industrial concerns. Thus the overriding format expected of 
research reports was quantitative in nature and reflected 
bureaucratic rational as Weber pointed out. 
Marcuse summarizes this process in terms of Weber's 
perspective quite well: 
the specifically Western idea of reason is reified in 
a system of material and intellectual culture 
(economics, technology, way of life, science, art), 
which is fully developed in industrial capitalism, and 
this system tends towards a specific type of domination 
which has become the destiny of the present epoch-
totalitarian bureaucracy (Marcuse, 1971:135). 
In this instance "reason" is positivism in the sense that 
Comte argued above. Since science in the form of positivism 
has become the "religion of modern times" we find: 
(l)Progressive mathematization of experience and 
knowledge, which, arising from the natural sciences 
and their brilliant success, affect the other sciences 
and the way of life itself; (2) insistence on the 
necessity for rational experiment and rational proof in 
the organization of science and way of life; and (3) the 
result of this organization, which according to Weber is 
the birth and establishment of a universal organization 
of expertly trained officials: this organization becomes 
"an absolute clamp on our whole existence"(Marcuse, 
1971:135). 
It would seem that trade (and industry), rationalism, and 
science are so intertwined that Weber is probably correct in 
finding, at bottom, rationalism as the defining issue since 
it stands in contrast to dogrnaticism and scholasticism of 
medieval Europe. But the rationalism at work here is that of 
the empiricists and the positivists that has grown up in the 
service of trade and industry as defined by state interests. 
Conclusion 
What I have tried to outline is fairly rough in form, 
but it is a further explication of Weber's theses regarding 
rationalism. Positivism, under the rubric of science, is a 
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specific type of extreme rationalism that has informed all 
institutions of Euro-American culture. It has generated a 
cultural cognitive bias that has oriented trade, industry, 
state politics, and science in a concerted program of 
domination and control of all realms of the human universe. 
As Comte predicted, it has become a major organizing 
principle of human endeavor. Alexander, citing Koyre', 
reports that this bias is likely rooted in our language 
itself and derives from the Greek language (Alexander, 1982) 
Taking this into account we might argue that positivism is an 
overemphasis on this aspect of our language, as European 
languages did not focus on this division prior to the 
enlightenment. Between the institutionalization of this 
perspective and its pervasiveness in our very language we 
perhaps have an explanation for the continued favored 
position of the positivist perspective in sociology. 
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CHAPTER 4 
POSITIVISM IN SOCIOLOGY 
Having reviewed the history of positivism and 
established its general shortcomings one is lead to the 
question concerning its continued use. Chapter three 
attempted to establish an explanation for this in terms of a 
social phenomena rather than a psychological or purely 
philosophical argument. This chapter returns to the specific 
shortcomings of positivism as they relate in particular to 
the field of sociology. The chapter will examine the claims 
of Vaughn, Sjoberg, and Reynolds in light of this new 
information and corroborate their accusations in greater 
depth. 
It is useful at this point to recapitulate what we have 
established so far and add clarification from other sources. 
Positivism has divided experience into two realms of primary 
and secondary qualities and assigned the phenomena of mind to 
one and the phenomena of sense objects to the other. It 
proposes initially that causality is a fundamental aspect of 
physical reality and later attempts to assign it to the 
mathematical realm, retaining it through reification. It 
assumes a correspondence exists between mathematics and the 
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physical order. It assumes that basic patterns of the 
physical universe are eternally repetitive and can be 
described by concepts codifiable into mathematical form. It 
asserts that these laws can be operationalized and 
inductively verified through observation. This verification 
process proves correspondence between concepts and physical 
events exists and that a unique pattern of descriptors 
corresponds to a unique pattern of events. This verification 
process provides evidence of proof that the postulate tested 
is true. 
It has also come to light as a consequence of modern 
physics that causality is questionable in any absolute sense, 
that Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle reveals the division 
of observer and event observed is an arbitrary distinction 
and consequently so is the primary/secondary distinction of 
experience. Shrodinger has provided powerful arguments to 
support this position as well (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Hume 
long ago provided serious doubt concerning induction, Quine 
argued that theories are underdetermined and facts are value 
laden. Hesse's discourse on positivism has established that 
the naive realism and correspondence theory of truth are 
unrealistic and an examination of positivism has revealed the 
weakness of nomological deductive methods (Raven's Paradox). 
Godel's theorem indicates the limitations of axiomatic 
arguments and formal languages with respect to coherence. 
There is more of this damaging criticism but this should 
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suffice since any one of them seriously disqualifies the 
program. The most damaging consequences come from within 
physics itself, which Heisenberg attempted to make very clear 
early in the century. 
Sociological Implications of Positivism 
Bailey (1987) argues that the major division in 
sociology has its two-fold roots in the perspectives of Weber 
and Durkheim. Sjoberg and Nett (1968) notes a similar 
division and relate it to the relationship between 
assumptions concerning theory and methods used on data. 
Fundamental to this division is the relationship between the 
researcher and his/her data. Without explicit awareness of 
Galileo and the British Empiricists role in this (as well as 
Descartes') they have acknowledged a primary theme of this 
dissertation. I will develop this distinction in greater 
detail in a later chapter, but intrinsic to it is the idea 
that Verstehen (direct understanding) makes it possible and 
necessary for the scientist to derive information differently 
in social science than in the hard sciences. I will not focus 
on Weber at this point as my concern is with the positivists. 
Durkheim and Method 
Durkheim espoused a method and perspective consonant 
with positivists and consequently "is often taken to have 
been a positivist" (Hammersley, 1995). He saw little 
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difference between natural and social science, as did Comte, 
with regard to method and believed "that the methods of 
science applicable in the field of the natural sciences are, 
nevertheless, valid within the social field" (Catlin, 
1950:xiii). Unlike Comte, Durkheim applied his ideas of 
positivism in a method, and in this sense he is the first 
positivist methodologist in sociology. It is presently 
Durkheim who is most honored for his scientific approach, 
especially his rudimentary statistical analysis of suicide 
(Catlin, 1950; Madge, 1962). Durkheim set a precedent which 
has been imitated to the present and it is frequently claimed 
the greatest precedent in sociology (Catlin, 1950). Some 
critics have suggested that sociology has focused on the 
statistical aspect, ignoring Durkheim's scholarship and use 
of that scholarship (Sorokin, 1956). 
Durkheim felt universal social laws were behind social 
phenomena or social facts in the same way as universal 
physical laws were behind physical phenomena (Durkheim, 
1950). Like Comte, he advocated an intellectual hygienic 
approach to research in which all previous notions and biases 
were to be eradicated before approaching the research 
problem. "All preconceptions must be eradicated"(Durkheim, 
1950:31) to scientifically develop concepts as Descartes and 
Bacon agreed must be done. As with all other positivists who 
follow in his path defining phenomena "is the first and most 
indispensable condition of all proofs and verifications" 
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(Durkheim, 1950:34). Observation is a crucial part of the 
research method but 
sensation may easily be subjective. It is a rule in the 
natural sciences to discard those data as sensation that 
are too subjective, in order to retain exclusively those 
presenting a sufficient degree of objectivity (Durkheim, 
1950:44). 
Durkheim, then, subscribes to the subject object division 
that Descartes suggests: 
Social life consists of free currents perpetually in the 
process of transformation and incapable of being 
mentally fixed by the observer, and the scholar cannot 
approach the study of social reality from this angle 
(Durkheim, 1950:45). 
These currents crystalize in the form of rules and moral 
regulations which may be objectively studied. "Scientific 
propositions ... " should be accompanied by reasons to explain 
them and not considered sufficient in themselves" (Durkheim, 
1950:60). Method cannot rely on casual observation and 
the true experimental method tends rather to substitute 
for common sense facts-decisive or crucial facts, which, 
by themselves and independently of their number, have 
scientific value and interest, as Bacon has pointed out 
(Durkheim, 1950:79). 
Social facts depend on causality for their value 
according to Durkheim regardless of what Hume argued. "Since 
the law of causality has been verified in the other realms of 
nature. ."then". .we are equally justified in claiming 
that it is equally true in the social world:" (Durkheim, 
1950:141). To explain social phenomena "we must seek 
separately the efficient cause which produces it and the 
function it fulfills" (Durkheim, 1950:95). Unlike modern 
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sociologists his perspective discounts multiple causation as 
a valid concept: "A given effect has always a single 
corresponding cause" (Durkheim, 1950:128). He is definitely 
against multivariate analysis and with regard to 
experimentation insists on "the impossibility of all 
artificial experiments" (Durkheim, 1950:130). 
Most of Durkheim's positions will be reiterated again 
and again by positivist oriented methodologists up to the 
present and this gives it a timeless quality. Given the lack 
of progress based on this method, we should however wonder 
why it has not been more critically reviewed. 
At present, the majority of quantitative methods which 
dominate the discipline of sociology are derived from 
positivism. Mills (1959:57) notes "What they have done, in 
brief, is to embrace one philosophy of science which they now 
suppose to be The Scientific Method." Mills (1959:58) quotes 
Bridgman to the effect that "there is no scientific method 
and that scientific procedure is to do the utmost with the 
mind and no holds barred." Mills consequently develops a 
detailed argument against Lazarsfeld's notion of sociologists 
as methodologists who do not require traditional scholarly 
knowledge of the area they plan to inquire. Mills (1959:57) 
argues that this approach to method not only drives and 
confines the line of inquiry but is itself not derivative of 
"the classic lines of social science work." Sjoberg and Nett 
(1968) echo these findings. Phillips (1973) emphasizes the 
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role method plays in defining research problems as well as 
Bendix (1970), Weber (1960), and many others. Sociology has 
minimized the value of a great deal of other types of 
research as well as research approaches for the positivistic 
method largely modeled on Durkheim's lead. 
Willer (1967) supports Mill's analysis, but with a 
different emphasis. Willer notes that during a major portion 
of this century the methods which have tried to mimic 
positivism have disregarded key problems involving induction, 
deduction, and the nature of scientific laws. It is ironic 
that the strongest advocates of this perspective write widely 
used texts including Lundberg, Zetterberg, Willer, Cook, 
Stanley, Campbell, Bailey, Babie, and Blalock. Their texts 
cite Frank, Reichenbach, Duem, Carnap, Bridgeman, Mills, etc. 
It is a confounding and ironic fact that sociology embraces a 
this methodology and perspective which has a limited basis in 
modern science. 
Historical Review of Social Science Methods 
One can find innumerable books on the history of theory, 
but they contain little discussion on the theory of method. 
Method is presented as a given in method books as if it is 
derived from some non historical source. There is little on 
the history of method and little concern for the theoretical 
consequences of method, except for Blumer. Phillips (1973) 
comments that he is not concerned with where the rules come 
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from even though he critiques them. In this discourse we are 
interested in where the rules come from. At present, 
although they are presented as God given in graduate schools, 
as Phillips (1973:84) notes, "These rules are not God-given, 
but represent some degree of consensus within the 
sociological community." Their justification seems grounded 
in their apparent sanctioning by the hard sciences. 
In reviewing the history of methods it is apparent that 
major positivists played a minor role in social theory, but a 
major role in method development. Some of the most 
important of the positivist methods were developed during the 
World War II (McKinney, 1957; Madge, 1962). Positivists are 
not even considered in most theory books and when they are it 
is always Comte and Durkheim. The methods of Coleman, 
Lazarsfeld, Guttman, Likert, Bogardus, and others are as 
positivist in rhetoric as the writings of Lundberg, and more 
persuasively effective because they are congruent with the 
existing cultural bias regarding science and progress. These 
are the methods that dominate the discipline today (Phillips, 
1973). The perspective that dominates in present sociology 
emerges from a type of research and research report format 
which has become institutionalized. McKinney (1957) reports 
that in 1931 the Social Science Research Council brought out 
Methods in Social Science which was considered a milestone in 
methods books. As we noted in the previous chapter, this 
council was mandated by industrial concerns. 
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Much of perspective derives from method (Phillips, 
1973) . It is legitimated by method. The method defines 
sociology as a science (Lundberg, 1961). It is the 
undiscussed background of ideas behind method, which is 
positivism, which defines method. This is why our focus has 
been on positivism as a cultural bias. Many methodologists 
apparently are unaware of where their ideas come from, and 
many seem reluctant to discuss it (see Coleman or 
Lazarsfeld). Positivism and intellectual hygiene make it 
irrelevant to them as it is not an empirical process. 
In reviewing the positivist role in sociology I hope 
to identify the main constituents and their chronology. In 
the sections after I will further clarify some of their key 
ideas and the role they play in defining sociology. This is 
important because it is easy to disregard the role implicit 
positivist assumptions play in the positions of those who may 
be overlooked as positivists because of the myopia of 
cultural bias. This can lead .to a misconception of the range 
of positivist influence. Specifically I propose to show that 
it is through method especially that the positivist 
perspective has most been promoted. By contrasting this 
analysis with the background developed so far, it is hoped 
that the subtleties of the positivist bias will be further 
explicated with respect to sociology. 
McKinney (1957) argues that the major methodological 
trend can be described along several continuum including 
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empiricism-rationalism, nee-positivism-anti-positivism, 
induction-deduction, quantitative-qualitative, and 
nomothetic-idiographic. The empirical-rational division, as 
maybe recalled, was a central division in philosophy 
according to Russell and Woolhouse, but the positivist 
perspective seeks to overcome this division and so it is not 
a category of concern for us (Woolhouse, 1988). Likewise 
induction-deduction are a point of controversy within 
positivism (Losee, 1972). What is of interest is the overt 
controversy over quantitative-qualitative and positivism-
verstehen. Modern sociological divisions seem to form around 
these lines with the nomothetic perspective including the 
positivistic and quantitative categories (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). 
McKinney (1957) observes that nee-positivism formally 
enters into sociology with the definitive volume produced by 
Lundberg entitled Foundations of Sociology in 1939. McKinney 
explains that it was contested by many because of its 
advocation of the use of causality and the procedures of the 
hard sciences in sociology, but supported by others like 
Mciver in his book entitled Social Causation (1942). 
Apparently its greatest opponents were the verstehen 
theorists who included Blumer, Hughes, Loomis, Maciver, 
Merton, Parsons, Redfield, Sorokin, Becker, and Znaniecki 
(McKinney, 1957). Since many of these individuals utilize 
the concept of causation, it was clearly not on this basis 
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that they rejected Lundberg, but because, according to 
McKinney, they emphasized an ideographic perspective. It 
appears that McKinney's analysis confuses the issue with 
regard to positivism. As will become clear, Merton, Mciver, 
Parsons, and Loomis were working within the positivist 
paradigm to some degree. It is important to observe that 
other researchers such as Stouffer and Merton spoke out 
against such an extreme position in the 40s, but nevertheless 
continued to build a positivist methodology. 
McKinney (1957) claims that the extreme position on 
quantification in the 20s and 30s has died down and that it 
is considered an essential technique of research on par with 
conceptual equipment. In the 90s this is obviously not the 
case, but the received position of mid-century sociology is 
well articulated in his following statement: 
The success of natural science may be attributed to the 
objective character of its data and the quantitative 
treatment of its results. Hence, if sociology is to 
emulate that success, it must change its ways of getting 
and handling data. This means that sociology must 
develop techniques that secure objective social data 
suitable for quantitative treatment by statistical means 
(McKinney, 1957:201). 
Many reacted against this by pointing out the 
differences in sociological data, esp. Sorokin, Maciver, 
Willer, and Znaniecki. Others refused to go along with an 
"either or" approach such as Ogburn, Thomas, Thurstone, and 
Stouffer. Becker, Blumer, Hughes, Parsons, and Wirth were 
among those who denied that the behavior of men could ever be 
quantified. Quantification could not help in the 
understanding of society (McKinney, 1957). 
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The middle-range group, Angell, Becker, Guttman, 
Lazarsfeld, Loomis, Merton, Stouffer, and Suchrnan, saw these 
extremes as based on false assumptions. They saw 
quantitative to qualitative as a research continuum and not a 
dichotomy. 
Becker's account is instructive in that it offers not 
only a good account of the introduction of positivism into 
modern sociology, but also the confusions regarding it are 
implicit in his perspective. Less explicit influences of 
positivism come in the form of another perspective emerging 
from psychology and which I will consider next. 
As we have seen from Comte, positivism advocates a 
mathematical approach to analysis. One of the early avenues 
which positivism covertly manifests itself prior to Lundberg 
and his close associate Dodd is through the use of 
mathematics in statistical analysis and through sociometry. 
McKinney (1957:201) observes: "Conspicuous in the 
methodological thought of the twenties and thirties was the 
belief that sociology could become a natural science through 
statistical procedure." 
Around World War I the use of statistics in sociology 
was confined almost entirely to descriptive forms (Larson, 
1968). However, during the 20s and 30s generalizing forms of 
statistics became increasingly popular as advances were made 
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in that field (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). It became extended 
to more qualitative subject matters such as Dorothy S. 
Thomas's Social Aspects of the Business Cycle (1925) which 
involved longitudinal analysis (McKinney, 1957). Inferential 
statistics made it possible to generalize about entire 
universes of phenomena through the use of sampling theory and 
probability logic. Campbell and Stanley (1963) note in 
particular the important work of How To Experiment in 
Education by W.A. McCall in 1923. It foreshadowed the more 
explicit advances presented by Fischer's Statistical Methods 
for Research Workers (1925) in which he proposes pre-
experimental equation of groups through randomization 
(Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Accidental or volunteer sampling 
was the norm in the 20s and 30s (McKinney, 1957). Summarizing 
measures of association such as coefficients of contingency, 
coefficients of correlation, and linear and curvilinear 
correlations began to be used in the 20s as well (McKinney, 
1957:216). Most of the research was one-variable-at-a-time 
and true multivariate techniques would not appear until after 
World War II (Campbell & S,tanley, 1963) . 
In the 30s, due to depression, the government began 
funding large demographic studies which began to use more 
systematic and random designs (Sjoberg & Nett, 1968; Larson, 
1968). Stratified sampling also evolved in the 30s in 
particular under studies conducted by departments of 
Agriculture, Labor, Commerce, and the Census Bureau (Larson, 
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1968; Lundberg, 1961; McKinney, 1957). Quota sampling in 
opinion polls and market research became popular in 30s and 
40s (Lundberg, 1961). World War II in particular focused 
statistical research on the military (Mills, 1959; Sjoberg & 
Nett, 1968; Madge, 1962). The departments of Agriculture, 
Labor, and Commerce also encouraged the development and use 
of systematic and random sampling techniques in the 30's 
(McKinney, 1957). 
In the 40s, R.A. Fisher introduced analysis of variance 
and covariance which have come to be used extensively with 
ordinal data and surveys (McKinney, 1957). Fisher advocated 
focusing on the rejection of the null hypothesis based on 
probability which is in line with Popper's arguments (Sjoberg 
& Nett, 1968) but did not advocate the logico-deductive 
method (Sjoberg & Nett, 1968:278). These developments also 
led to regression analysis which has dominated research for 
several decades, especially since the advent of the PC. 
Sociometry was also an important positivist approach 
introduced by Moreno in the 30s (Larson, 1968). Larson 
(1968) says it opened up to objective investigation the area 
of inter-personal relationships. These developments reflect 
a growing interest in the use of statistics to do research 
and the major methods texts such as Lundberg's Social 
Research and Odum and Jocher's An Introduction to Social 
Research reflected this interest (McKinney, 1957). Larson as 
editor of Sociometry was in continual contact with Stouffer, 
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Lazarsfeld, Dodd, Moreno, Loomis, Cottrell and many others, 
and they represented a concerted effort to develop positivist 
techniques (Larson, 1968). 
The development of scales was also of critical interests 
to positivists because it allowed them to treat attitudes in 
an objective manner. Bogardus presented the first successful 
efforts followed by Thurstone's ranking scales in "Attitudes 
Can Be Measured" in 1928. By the late thirties Likert would 
contribute major advances in this area and would join Guttman 
in further refinements through research funded by the Army. 
It is important to note the role of large government agencies 
in the development of these particular types of research 
methods as they are most useful to large bureaucracies as 
evidence for policy decisions. Madge (1962) places most of 
the major development in positivist methods around World War 
II and research related to the war effort. 
Although there was much research of major methodological 
importance to sociological method in the 20s such as the work 
of Thomas and Znaniecki, it was not quantitative in the 
positivist sense and did not interest the government (Madge, 
1962). The work of the Chicago school in the 30's also 
involved some use of statistics and census tracts, but it 
also was not positivist in orientation (Madge, 1962). The 
majority of the methods books have not however been written 
by these researchers, except for Znaniecki, but by those who 
are interested in causality, the objective nature of social 
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phenomena, mathematics and logic as organizing principles, 
and the use of statistics. The authors include Lazarsfeld, 
Rosenberg, Festinger, Blalock, etc. It is also these types 
of texts that are used to train graduate students. 
Another covert entry point of the positivist perspective 
is through theorists. Of special interest is the theoretical 
perspective of Talcott Parsons who McKinney and many others 
would not place in the positivist camp. It is important to 
recall, however, that Parsons was highly influenced by Pareto 
(not to mention Durkheim) and drew heavily from his ideas. 
Pareto conceived of sociology as a logico-experimental 
science to be governed by scientific cannons and derive 
propositions through classic positivist procedures 
(Schermerhorn & Boskoff, 1957). Parsons was heavily invested 
in perspectives drawing on positivist assumptions. Most 
contemporary theorists agree that his perspective dominated 
sociology for a major portion of the twentieth century 
(Ritzer, 1992). If this is so, then positivist assumptions 
dominated sociology as well in theoretical areas. 
It is of particular interest is that Becker's (1957) 
text overlooks the fact that all parties mentioned were 
drawing from the positivist tradition which had already 
infiltrated science in general and sociology in particular 
through Comte and Durkheim. We have already noted in chapter 
two that positivism was an ongoing effort to integrate the 
mathematics of the rationalist perspective without succumbing 
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to the idea of innate knowledge. The Logical-Positivists had 
consequently accepted the context of discovery as irrational 
and part of the scientific process in general, as had 
Whewell, and acknowledged the innate nature of knowledged to 
some degree. They had planned on using logic and deductive 
verification as the main realm of activity for science in the 
context of discovery. The point here is that McKinney's 
categorizations betrays his limited knowledge of the subject 
and explains why this categorical distinction is so weak. 
Almost all of the above researchers were drawing on the 
positivist model which accommodates both rationalism and 
empiricism. This is why I proposed that the positivist 
verstehen dichotomy was more realistic. Weber and Blumer 
both reject the positivist perspective both in theory and in 
method and they both are acutely aware of the important 
relationship between method and theory (Weber, 1960; Blumer, 
1969; Sciulli, 1988). 
As mentioned above, interpretive or verstehen sociology 
was the leading source of opposition to neo-positivists. 
They made a distinction between the nomothetic and 
ideographic which culminated in Weber's ideal types as a 
substitution for mechanical laws. The focus was on 
understanding through knowledge of subjective motivation and 
causality was imputed only on the level of meaning (Mckinney, 
1957). The foremost representatives of this perspective 
according to McKinney are Blumer, Hughes, Loomis, Maciver, 
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Merton, Parsons, Redfield, Sorokin, Becker, and Znaniecki. 
Their emphasis is on theory, the concept of system {Blumer 
turns in his grave), structural functional perspective, 
motivation and a means to test it, and an emphasis on 
qualitative research. This may be somewhat true of Merton, 
Mciver and Parsons, but they are all committed 
methodologically and/or in terms of many pasic assumptions to 
positivism. This after all was part of Blumer's argument 
against Parson's determinism {Blumer, 1969). 
The tendency of sociologists is to regard these 
complexes as entities operating in their own right with 
their own dynamics: Each is usually seen as a system, 
composed of given parts in interdependent arrangement 
and subject to the play of mechanisms that belong to the 
system as such. Structural functionalism, which is so 
popular today, is a good example {although only one 
example) of this view {Blumer, 1969: 57) . 
Becker's divisions, although instructive of an older 
perspective in the discipline, do not accurately describe the 
situation or provide really mutually exclusive categories. 
Bailey (1987), and many others it seems, is really more 
accurate when he suggests the neo-positivist/verstehen 
controversy is most prominent in the present 
qualitative/quantitative division which emerged from this 
dichotomy and continues today. Sjoberg and Nett are in 
agreement. With the present emphasis on methods at most 
universities, the empirical vs rationalist divisions in 
theory and their influence on the history of method are 
obfuscated. 
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In more recent times the work of Zetterberg has been 
heralded as the most exhaustive and definitive work on 
positivism (Phillips, 1973; Alexander, 1982). It must also 
be noted that Willer has often been overlooked. Zetterberg's 
work though self-avowedly neo-positivist is still often less 
technical and thorough than Stinchcornbe (1968) under the 
general editorship of Merton. Interestingly enough he is 
only briefly mentioned in Alexander's (1982) critique of 
positivism. Other volumes by Lazarsfeld and Blalock also 
slip by unnoticed as primers in positivism. They rarely cite 
the sources of their ideas concerning methods. 
Behaviorism 
Behaviorism is clearly positivistic in the extreme and 
was in fact so extreme that it proved unproductive in 
sociology in spite of optimism in the 20s and 30s with 
regards to experiments (Ritzer, 1992; Mckinney, 1957). 
Behaviorism is interesting in that it represents an 
implicitly positivistic view. Drawing on the experimental 
tradition in biology and the laboratory psychology of Wundt 
and Pavlov, it was later refined by Watson, Thorndike, Hull, 
Skinner, Toleman, and others (Hilgard, 1987). Miller and 
Dollard represent its highest expression (Hall & Lindzay, 
1985) . 
Operant conditioning theory of Skinner in particular 
views the subject of its experiments as a "black box" which 
111 
cannot be looked into and which may be evaluated only through 
its overt physical responses (Hall & Lindzay, 1958). It 
operationalizes all its variables and builds axioms based on 
a cause and effect model of stimulus-response (Domjan & 
Burckhard, 1986). Its ultimate focus is general prediction 
and control of behavior in a deterministic sense (Hall & 
Lindzey, 1985). Consequently it makes most of the key 
assumptions about measurement and causality that are central 
to the positivist paradigm. It attracts those researchers 
committed to these assumptions and who produce research 
reports based on the rhetoric of positivism and outlined in 
the APA writing manual. Because behaviorism is centered 
around the experiment, it is through its theory of method 
that it is grounded in positivism. Thus it introduces the 
theory of positivism in an implicit fashion into the research 
of early social psychologists and indicates their positivist 
bias. 
The influence of positivism through behaviorism enters 
into sociology through social-psychology starting at the turn 
of the century with Triplett concerning "Social Facilitation 
Effects." Allport followed in his wake in the 20's in the 
same area of interest. Sherif did experiments in the 30s on 
conformity, followed by Asch, Lewin on autocratic and 
democratic atmospheres, Hovland & Levin on persuasion in the 
40s and 50s, and Milgram in the 60s (Lippa, 1990). Mayos 
experiments in the 30's were more natural in nature and not 
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laboratory experiments in the same way as Allport's or Asch's 
(Scott, 1992). 
These experiments were highly influential in the field 
of sociology and gave experimentation an air of 
respectability, but there were too many subjects which could 
not be approached by experiment and Hyman eventually 
concluded that the survey is the sociological experiment 
(Madge, 1962). The logic of the experiment was applied to 
the survey situation. As the survey method developed and 
began to dominate the discipline, the logic of the experiment 
became a common rhetoric in methods books (McKinney, 1957). 
The work of Homans also brought the positivist 
behavioristic perspective into sociology. Ritzer (1992) 
reports Homans was an avid follower of Skinner's work, knew 
him personally, and employed his operant conditioning to 
develop his basic propositions. These six propositions were 
axioms which defined the basic laws of human social behavior 
and were codified and defended in his work Social Behavior: 
Its Elementary Forms(1961). 
McKinney (1957) claims that Mead represented a modest 
type of behaviorism and Ritzer (1992) places him with 
"radical behaviorists." This designation is profoundly 
incorrect and consistent with Becker's improper analysis and 
categorization of this perspective if we are to believe 
Miller, Cook, Blumer, and others specializing in this area. 
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The Emergence of Positivist Methods In Sociology 
Positivist methodology is associated with a theory and a 
philosophical perspective which we have explored in chapters 
one and two. Experimental design is a direct outgrowth of 
this perspective and its accommodation in sociology reflects 
the migration of positivism into the field. Chapter three 
attempted to explain the legitimating influence this had on 
sociology. Lundberg's work, Can Science Save Us (1961), 
clearly reflects the concern many sociologists had regarding 
sociology's legitimacy as a discipline, its value to society, 
and the importance of having the public discern sociology as 
a science in the traditional positivist sense. 
The effort to import the techniques of the hard sciences 
into sociology has resulted in many controversies and 
problems too numerous to cover here, however, I shall attempt 
to review some of the more outstanding problems and issues. 
I shall also briefly explore some of the key ideas given 
emphasis by different authors with respect to positivism in 
sociology. Much of it sounds like a recapitulation of 
Durkheim. 
The authors are ordered into that categorical aspect of 
positivism that I see them most representing. The categories 
cover issues of statistics, experimentation, mathematics, 
causality, and the social variable. In each area I attempt 
to outline the major problems which positivism encounters 
through these authors. 
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Statistics 
The main problem with statistics according to many 
methodologists is one of measuring variables (Blalock, 1982; 
Sjoberg & Nett, 1968; Bailey, 1987). Scaling of variables 
along a continuum became a preoccupation since the 20s and 
five general types emerged by the 50s (McKinney, 1957). In 
chronological order they are social-distance scales, rating 
scales, ranking scales, internal-consistency scales, and 
latent structure scales. The Guttman attitude scale led to 
work in the 40s by Wallin, Schuessler & Strauss, Riley, and 
others which paved the way for the wide spread use of 
attitude surveys today (McKinney, 1957). 
Statistics became so much a basis for research that by 
the 50s Sorokin was sounding the alarm that a new 
sociological phenomena was appearing in the discipline and 
degenerating scholarship- the "statistical omnibus 
researcher"(Sorokin, 1956:17). 
The new and growing belief is that when one masters 
routine statistical method, he becomes competent to do 
research on any problem in any field, including the 
fields which he has not studied at all. The 'omnibus-
researcher' has already become an institution in 
psychosocial research and teaching and is widely used by 
government, business, and research institutions 
(Sorokin, 1956: 17). 
As recently as the 1980's some universities have encouraged 
their sociology Phd candidates to first get a masters in 
statistics! (Vaughn, Sjoberg, & Reynolds, 1993). The general 
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knowledge of graduate students in the fifties generally did 
not go beyond standard textbooks, statistics, and basic 
research procedures (Sorokin, 1956). Sorokin (1956) noted 
that 37% of references in 129 introductory texts of the 
period were from other introductory texts. 
With regard to hypothesis testing, Selvin (1957) 
persuasively argued that conditions in social research are 
not suitable to employ statistical tests. Surveys attempting 
to sample populations may give variations in results as high 
as .30 as a result of question arrangement alone (Warde, 
1995). Returns on survey are rarely above 50% when 
statistical validity demands a 95% return rate (Warde, 1995). 
Sorokin (1956) has in detail demonstrated the dubious value 
of correlation in sociological studies. Sjoberg and Nett 
(1968) emphasize the difficulty in being sure that indicators 
are accurate and Bailey (1987) explains that there is no way 
to verify this except by argument. 
Sorokin (1956) documents the dubious application of the 
idea in the works of L.M.Termsn, J. Bernard, E.W. Burgess, 
and L.S. Cottrell with respect to survey questionnaires. He 
notes that Stouffer's techniques often involved asking 
questions without resort to any other process of 
verification. 
Their acceptance of the combat performance variable is 
an "operation" of pure, unadulterated faith in the 
infallibility of evaluations made by largely unknown 
army authorities (Sorokin, 1956:39). 
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Sampling is another major problem in statistical 
analysis. Sample sizes are not large enough to account for 
all the influence of ~11 uncontrolled variables, all relevant 
variables may not have been included in the design, and some 
variables are too intertwined with others to be controlled. 
Kish (1968) has dismissed Selvin's critique as 
unrealistically idealistic stating that he overlooked the 
fact that not all hypothesis require the control of all 
variables (Sjoberg & Nett, 1968). Willer (1967) has argued 
that sampling in survey research is a dubious enterprise 
since it is impossible to be sure you have given all items in 
the sampling universe an.equal chance. of being selected in 
social research. Further, in sociology we are sampling 
finite populations: 
Its fault is that it results in population parameters, 
not conditional universals, and thus results in 
knowledge which cannot be replicated, is isolated in 
that it is limited to the population, and therefore 
cannot be added to other knowledge to form general body 
of empirical knowledge (Willer 98-99) ." 
If, as Peirce (1967) says, that a random sample can only be 
drawn from a finite collection, then universal laws cannot be 
established in sociology because they will be based on finite 
sets. Willer (1967:99) further argues that surveys are not 
capable of generating a body of consistent findings through 
replication: 
Since population surveys are concerned with parameters 
which are constantly changing over time (attitudes, 
statuses, etc.}, changing in directions not wholly 
determinable and sometimes not at all determinable by 
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the results of the survey, any replication would yield 
different results because it would require sampling a 
different population (Willer, 1967:99). 
Finally, over dependence on statistics often leads to 
"data dredging" in which investigators just look for 
interesting patterns in their data without any theoretical 
purpose or position to drive their research (Phillips,1973; 
Zetterberg, 1965). Zetterberg notes quoting Churchman: 
One cannot take a set of data, make certain distribution 
hypotheses about their populations, and proceed to a 
statistical test; one cannot do so and expect a 
meaningful answer will result. To paraphrase Kant, 
statistical teats without theory are blind: no general 
results can be asserted, no predictions made unless one 
assumes that the statistical hypotheses are 
consequences of a general theory within which 
predictions can be made independent of specialized 
restrictions. . (Zetterberg, 1965:139) 
A general framework of meaning is required to drive the 
tautological procedures of statistics. 
the current lack of consensus that exists within the 
social sciences, as well as the frustrating slowness of 
genuine knowledge accumulation in these fields, sterns 
from our failure to face up to some very difficult and 
fundamental issues that are inherent in the scientific 
method (Blalock, 1982:9). 
Blalock also stresses the idea that statistics is not 
sufficient for knowledge without close attention to theory 
and assumptions. He too sees measurement problems as 
fundamental to sociology. At the heart of this dilemma lies 
the problem of variable definition and he acknowledges the 
advantage of the physical sciences in dealing with 
homogeneous and stable variables with consistent attributes 
across contexts. Multicollinearity generates a major 
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problem. Measurement conceptualization problems lead to over 
readiness of investigators to select "whatever remotely 
connected indicators he or she can locate and then merely 
announces that these will serve as measures of some highly 
abstract theoretical construct" (Blalock, 1982:19). Such 
efforts are difficult to criticize constructively. 
Blalock (1982) maintains that too much emphasis on 
quantification can lead one to avoid certain research 
problems, especially if they require funding from sponsoring 
agencies. Individuals may evade theory questions which are 
difficult to operationalize. This leads to inconsistent and 
biased investigation of theories. Blalock (1982:24) agrees 
with Lundberg and Zetterberg that a major problem "is the 
question of how one goes about formulating reasonable general 
propositions, which contain concepts or variables that are 
appropriate to a wide variety of circumstances." This is the 
same issue that Durkheim wrestled with a century before him. 
The lack of progress should hint a~ deeper problems. 
To a degree Blalock recognizes this in his 
acknowledgement of the problem of auxiliary measurement 
theories. It is difficult to devise reliable strategies for 
connecting the right indicators to the associated postulates. 
Blumer (1969) has made a strong point of this as well. 
Blalock summarizes this problem for his approach in the 
following: 
if we want our theories to be generalizable across a 
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variety of settings or with respect to a variety of 
phenomena, then we obviously need to conceptualize our 
variables in such a way that propositions that contain 
these variables can be applied across such settings and 
diverse phenomena {Blalock, 1969:29). 
In establishing indicators for concepts under investigation 
researchers can never be sure they have a legitimate 
indicator. 
Stinchcombe (1968) confidently presents a positivist 
perspective involving definitions of causality, crucial 
experiment, facts, and a heavy dose of statistical theory. 
He presents formal languages and axiomatic transformations of 
the positivist type {if x, then y). Stinchcombe (1968:31) is 
heavily invested in causality which he defines: 
A causal law.is a statement or proposition in a theory 
which says that the exist environments in which a change 
in the value of one variable is associated with the 
change into the value of another variable and can 
produce this change without any change in other 
variables in the environment {Stinchcombe, 1968:31). 
Stinchcombe's presentation is every bit as detailed as 
Zetterberg's with regard to theory and postulate derivations 
as well verification procedures. He goes into far more depth 
with formal language, outlines appropriate statistical 
procedures and gives detailed examples of how various 
research projects interpret sociological variables 
objectively. His work is based around Logical Positivist 
concepts but he is reluctant to discuss the issues. 
Concerning problems with his methodological theories he says, 
we have tried to leave aside philosophical and 
epistemological problems whenever we could. Our purpose 
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has not been to outline the ultimate justification for 
scientific belief, but to outline how scientific belief 
systems operate in practical fact, so we can use this 
knowledge in constructing social theories (Stinchcornbe, 
1968:56). 
Apparently his method is a statement of faith and one wonders 
just where he does justify his approach. 
Experimentation 
Experimentation was optimistically seen as a possibility 
for future sociologists in the 20s and 30s (Campbell & 
Stanley, 1963; McKinney, 1957). This helps to explain the 
popular nature of positivism. Many attempts at 
experimentation were conducted with dubious results. A 
review by Odum & Jocher (1929) and also by Brearly (1931) 
revealed a great deal of confusion in the field at the time. 
Eventually Hyman (1961) states the logic of the experiment 
was considered applicable even if the experiment wasn't and 
Stouffer agrees: 
. the heart of our problem lies in the study design 
in advance, such that the evidence is not capable of a 
dozen alternative interpretations. . Basically, I 
think it is essential that we always keep in mind the 
model of a controlled experiment, even if in practice we 
may have to deviate from the ideal model (Stouffer, 1950 
in McKinney, 1957:224). 
This of course assumes the validity of the experimental 
method and its underlying assumptions as well as a unified 
approach to phenomena outside the field of sociology. 
Sorokin (1956) protests that the weaknesses of 
Bridgeman's operationalism, especially with respect to social 
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phenomena, are irrelevant and meaningless unless performed 
for the sake of disproving certain ideas. It often narrows 
the field of inquiry to absurdity: 
Experimental verification of the same hypotheses by the 
use of different operations yields equally fragmentary 
results and a different set of notion. As a result, in 
a study of the same problem there would be as many 
different results and concepts as there are different 
operations. None of them can give a general formula, 
concept, or uniformity valid for all the different 
operational manipulations used. Thus, the concept of 
the pressure of gas, operationally measured by the 
ordinary U-tube, is different from the concept of the 
pressure of gas as measured by an ionization gauge, 
since the operations are quite different. The concept 
of temperature would be different, if defined only 
through operational measurement by different 
thermometers (Sorokin, 1956:34). 
Experimentation for the Logical positivists involved the 
crucial step of defining variables in terms of how they are 
measured. Bridgeman in the US has developed a similar 
approach and it became known as operationalism (Mills, 1959; 
McKinney, 1957). Sorokin (1956) comments that operationalism 
would require abandoning many of the elements of traditional 
scientific research that have lead to physics. 
Experimental method deals with a few crucial cases as 
opposed to statistical methods. Ideally only two cases are 
required. "Like a small aggregation of atoms or particles in 
quantum mechanics, a small aggregation of experimental 
psychosocial phenomena may be "lawless"(Sorokin, 1956:185). 
Sorokin notes that extrapolation beyond cases studied into 
assumptions of universal uniformity cannot be done. 
Replication is required. 
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The failure of sociology to implement the positivist 
experimental design has lead to the concept of the 
constructed type and the quasi-experimental design (Stanley 
and Campbell, 1963). Willer argues along with innumerable 
others from Durkheim to Zetterberg that" experimental 
manipulations are only possible in contrived and artificial 
conditions" that are meaningful only for the non-social 
sciences. He nicely states the problem: 
For ethical as well as economic reasons, the range of 
behavior which can be created in the social experiment 
is limited (by size of group, strength of sanction, 
time, etc.), so limited that experimentation must be 
classified as a very specialized method which cannot 
perform alone the same function for the social sciences 
as it has for some physical sciences (Willer, 1967:3). 
Scaling 
Sorokin (1956:122) complains scaling is "unrestrained 
quantification of qualitative data." Sorokin's argument is 
that much of Guttman's scales applies to phenomena which do 
not have quantified qualities ie they are not measurable in a 
physical sense (primary qualities). Thus subjective ranking 
is the result. It is more likely to introduce error in the 
form of bias based on researcher opinion. He observes that 
Guttman's measures of fear (used to justify his use of 
scales) involves categories of physiological response which 
are neither scalar in intensity or in the time order of their 
appearance. Lazarsfeld is likewise chastised for assuming 
latent continuum structures or classes which are inferred 
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from data on survey: 
Lazarsfeld has neither mathematical, nor logical, nor 
empirical grounds for his postulation that all or many 
manifestly nonscalar items represent in reality a scalar 
continuum, and that when all the latent classes of this· 
continuum are considered, the apparently discontinuous 
or nonscalar items become continuous and scalar 
(Sorokin, 1956:128). 
Bidgeman's operationalism though of dubious value with 
respect to experimentation in sociology, was promoted by 
Lundberg in Logical Positivist form. Lundberg adopted the 
Logical Positivist attitude toward imprecision in concepts 
and considered sociology on a disastrous course because of 
this imprecision (Lundberg, 1961). However many have noted 
that operationalism limited the use of concepts useful to 
sociology severely, especially Mills and Sorokin. In the 
following section we will address this issue in more detail. 
Mutability of Variables 
The social variable has been difficult to control, 
measure, and define in traditional positivist terms. The 
problem is compounded by the nature of sociological 
phenomena. The relationship between the subjects of 
sociological investigation are not simple as with atomic 
particles and molecules. The connections between 
sociological variables are far more complex. Bailey 
acknowledges this as mutability and hopes to control for it 
with systems theory and further developments in statistics. 
Network theorists attempt to use computer simulated models 
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(Knottnerus, 1994). For Lundberg, Zetterberg, Blalock, and 
many others in the positivist tradition this is the major 
stumbling block. To account for and attempt to control all 
the variables involved seems to many highly unreasonable 
(Durkheim, 1950; Mills, 1959; Shibutani, 1986 to name a few). 
This is recognized as an absurdity in physics and has been 
comment on by Hawking in his Cambridge Lectures (1994) as an 
unreasonable endeavor mathematically and probabalistically. 
The definition of variables alters rapidly over short 
periods of time and may vary from observer to observer 
radically as even Lundberg (1961) notes. This variation in 
definition means that the object's relatiOnships to whole 
categories of phenomena may alter instantaneously at a 
moments notice. This mutability of social object makes 
control an unmanageable proposition, and according to Willer 
(1967:99) means "that for survey work replication is 
impossible". 
With respect to survey work variable mutability 
frequently invokes the rational of operationalism. Sorokin 
exclaims that it is ironic that Dodd imports concepts, 
definitions, and formulae from physical sciences and does not 
operationally derive them from procedures of his own. 
When Dodd, Lundberg, Burgess, Stouffer, and others, turn 
to a study of human values, they do not show any trace 
of using operational method for either their 
classification of values, or the construction of their 
definitions or for discovering the characteristics and 
interrelationships of their subject matter. Instead, 
they use, often in rather unskilled fashion, traditional 
Aristotelian logic and other common methods of 
scientific investigation with a special penchant for 
the questionnaire-interview technique and 
statistical "measurements" (Sorokin, 1956:49). 
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Sorokin uses examples from the 30s, such as F.S. Chapin, 
E. Greenwood, and draws on examples of Hovland, Lumsdaine, 
and Sheffield in the 50s in his critique of surveys. He 
explores the works on group dynamics form the book by 
Cartwright and Zander. Sorokin (1956) observes that many 
sociological experiments consist of a matched comparison of 
an experimental with a control group or observation of the 
same group before and after treatment. It is clear that in 
comparing experimental with control groups the two groups are 
never really matched. He argues that none of the designs 
meets Mill's criteria of "inductive inference according to 
the methods of agreement or difference or concomitant 
variation, etc" (Sorokin, 1956:176). 
Even if matched along many of the standard demographic 
characteristics, such as age, sex, race, they still remain 
very different with respect to innumerable other variables 
such as "ethical and legal convictions, aesthetic values, 
scientific preferences, philosophical outlook, temperament, 
emotionality, prevailing moods, favorite sports, food and 
drinks,. ."(Sorokin, 1956:177). Each individual defines 
his catholicism or race differently and these differences are 
not accounted for. Gross similarities cannot account for the 
profound differences within these similarities. 
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Alexander (1982:7) characterizes Zetterberg's effort as 
the "most elaborate attempt" at inductive theorizing in 
sociology. Zetterberg (1965) utilizes a logical positivist 
scheme for developing sociological terms. Following Carnap 
he divides propositions and axioms into primitive and 
operational terms and manipulates them according to the 
familiar "if x, then y" rules. Interestingly he also 
advocates procedures for rejecting the null hypothesis in 
terms that agree with Fischer and Popper. Yet Popper's 
approach was based on a rejection of Logical Positivism. 
Zetterberg (1965:52) does acknowledge that terms cannot be 
borrowed from physics and biology for sociology as Lundberg 
advocates and argues "The mainstream of sociological thinking 
on this issue" agrees with this position. 
The primitive terms (extra-logical) Zetterberg (1965:45) 
wishes to use "represent a combination of observable human 
beings and their actions" and reflect aggregate rather than 
individual behavior. Terms such as social beliefs and social 
norms will become building blocks of theory in conjunctions 
with formal operators of logic. He cites Lundberg's 
suggestions on categories for social properties. 
Zetterberg is eclectic in his approach, and does not 
reflect on the contradictions in perspectives he wishes to 
combine. Furthermore if he was aware of Kant's arguments 
regarding a priori and a posteriori he would realize that his 
conception of data versus concept is highly dubious. As 
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Alexander notes: 
The sharpness of this perceived separation is 
demonstrated in practice by Zetterberg's insensitivity 
to the impact of nonempirical elements in the very 
examples which he chooses to illustrate his argument 
(Alexander, 1982:8). 
Zetterberg disregards the entire history of the controversy 
between Whewell and Mill concerning the context of discovery 
and attempts to inductively derive all hypothesis. Alexander 
(1982:8) also observes this (one wonders if Alexander knows 
the history of these arguments) "only propositions that have 
been inductively derived from observation can lead to a real 
theoretical explanation." Here we seem to have strong 
evidence for Mills's argument that many proponents of this 
approach are ignorant of its background and history. 
Lundberg's Foundations of Sociology spends a great deal 
of time emphasizing the objective nature of language. At 
times he sounds like Durkheim. In fact much of Lundberg's 
conceptualizations agree with Mead, and Lundberg is well 
aware of this agreement. It is a prerequisite in order for 
him to propose objective measures in the form of surveys. 
Adler (1968:37) noticed that Lundberg confuses his audience 
by referring "on the one hand emphasized that words were just 
words and nothing but words. On the other hand, he asserted, 
that words or 'symbols .. are the data of sociological 
science'." 
His most important program is to argue for a technical 
language of terms in sociology which can be manipulated in 
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the Logical Positivist sense. In this he shares much in 
common with Zetterberg. His conceptualization begins however 
with the assumption that a problematic dichotomy exists to 
begin with. This is the cartesian bias he carries like so 
many others. Like Carnap and Frank he plans to begin with 
experience and sees words as indicators corresponding to 
experience. It is a correspondence model of the universe. 
This is not Meadian in conception, but cartesian. 
Lundberg also supports Carnap's and Wittgenstein's 
hypotheses regarding the meaninglessness of certain types of 
analytic statements. In spite of his interest in this area, 
he never reviews Carnap's or Wittgenstein's ideas and the 
problems the logical positivists encountered in developing 
them. In this sense, as Sorokin has argued along with Mills, 
we begin reinventing the wheel (only this time a flat tire) 
due to academic amnesia. We know the Logical Positivist 
program is full of inconsistencies and contradictions that by 
their own rules invalidate the system. This was Godel's 
Theorem. A coherence theory of truth cannot be true. 
Lundberg (1961:7) feels words like will, feeling, 
motives, values, etc "are the phlogiston of the social 
sciences." He would used "operationally defined terms of 
such character that all qualified observers would 
independently make the same analysis and predict the behavior 
under the given circumstances" (Lundberg, 1961:9). This is 
in response to Mciver's program of social terms. He argues 
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that in human discourse "all data are known to us through 
human responses and we infer both the existence and the 
characteristics of any phenomena from these responses" 
(Lundberg, 1961:13). In his effort to define the objective 
aspect of symbolic events the he states 
The alleged greater tangibility of certain physical 
events resides not in the events, but in our more highly 
objectified methods of responding to them (Lundberg, 
1961:13-14). 
Lundberg is quite specific concerning the symbol/event and 
says that "It is our response which gives it meaning" 
(Lundberg, 1961:18). 
The correct response for a positivist is to collect 
evidence. The sociologist merely demands sensory evidence of 
thoughts and imaginings; only better technic is needed to 
study these phenomena. Having said that objectivity lay in 
the response to symbols Lundberg (1961:14) explains "to the 
extent that numbers of individuals use the same word to 
designate similar behavior phenomena it is conventional to 
designate the phenomena to which they respond as objective." 
Consensus confers objectivity: "Both an iron fence and a 
taboo will keep men from touching an object. " (Lundberg, 
1961:17). This set of arguments, however, leaves doubt as to 
whether objectivity is in the method or in consensus. One 
senses he is attempting to reconcile Mead and operationalism 
and Adler considers this a major error on his part. It 
sounds like a veiled argument that the objective method 
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should be ratified through consensus, without explaining why. 
Lundberg argues we need to explicate postulates and 
axioms which we use implicitly in everyday life and verify 
them as we do naturally. He proposes judging their value 
through "their s~lf-consistency, the possibility of logically 
deducing from them theorems capable of empirical 
verification, and their compatibility with the general 
framework of science" (Lundberg, 1961:22). This is obviously 
the application of coherence and verification theory from 
logical-positivism. He believes they should be organized 
into "if,then" propositions. He argues that we need to select 
significant categories of human behavior and define them in 
terms "that lend themselves to operational representations of 
relationships" (Lundberg, 1961:57). 
To Lundberg human behavior is movement (a system of 
energy) in a social field of force and he wants to provide a 
mathematical framework to describe that space: 
the time is ripe for the systemization of the whole 
field of general sociology in quantit.ative 
symbols ... which can be manipulated according to the 
already established and tested rules of mathematics 
(Lundberg, 1961:125). 
By the fifties positivism had dominated sociology, but 
hidden under the theoretical umbrella of Structural 
Functionalism. Lundberg acknowledges this dominance for 
which he has worked so hard. He quotes Timasheff (1950) "the 
school dominating present day sociology at least in America 
is the nee-positivist one." and "It is best represented in G. 
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Lundberg Foundations of Sociology (1939). ."(Lundberg, 
1961:83). In the best tradition of positivists who believe 
that intellectual hygiene is possible and that positivism is 
objective and value neutral he declares "Science as such is 
non-moral" (Lundberg, 1961:28). 
Mathematics 
Early in the century Lundberg's close associate, Dodd, 
attempted to establish a fully mathematical basis for 
sociology. Dodd's Dimensions of Society was his formalistic 
attempt to accomplish this feat. Unfortunately a notable 
mathematician, E.T. Bell, reviewed his work and found that 
for the most part there was no mathematics in the book, only 
a translation to "an esoteric set of symbols had been 
accomplished" (McKinney, 1957:203). Dodd's S-theory reduced 
concepts to a symbolic shorthand employing mathematical 
symbols. After his review, Bell commented, "There is no more 
pathetic misapprehension of the nature and function of 
mathematics than the trite cliche' that mathematics is a 
shorthand. ." (Sorokin, 1956:107). Kurt Lewin had excited 
many of the mathematically naive but easily impressed 
associates of his field when he utilized the same approach by 
trying to import geometry into psychological terms (McKinney, 
1957) . 
These shorthands are not in fact even formal languages 
because they do not follow the rules of logic. Sorokin 
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(1956) notes that Dodd's formula was derived form Lundberg's 
who appears to indulge in the same pseudo-mathematics. 
Sorokin finds similar problems with Zipf's arbitrary 
categories for ranking cities to derive patterns of 
uniformities which harmonize with his theory: He complains 
that the juggling of figures in this fashion is becoming a 
time honored practice. 
By the 1950s Lazarsfeld (1954:3) was still announcing 
"Even the most ardent optimist would not claim that 
mathematics has yet led to important discoveries in the 
behavioral sciences." He continues to argue that no one has 
presented a valid argument why they shouldn't. Citing 
Thurstone's efforts as well as Guttman he is extremely 
optimistic that it will prove as valuable to sociology as to 
the physical sciences. 
Quite incorrectly and in apparent ignorance of 
Wittgenstein, Russell, and Carnap's difficulties Lazarsfeld 
(1954:4) states "There is no idea or proposition in this 
field which cannot be put into mathematical language, II 
It seems obvious that Lazarsfeld has more homework to do. His 
idea is to explore the thinking in behavioral science and 
find effective ways to translate it into mathematics, yet he 
appears to consider previous attempts as unworthy of detailed 
review. Although Lazarsfeld's program is self-admittedly 
exploratory and hopeful, forty years later little has emerged 
from it. In spite of this, Lazarsfeld has had a profound 
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influence on sociology through his development of statistical 
methodology involving multivariate analysis. 
Coleman (1964:3) complains one of the reason there "has 
never been such a simple correspondence between mathematical 
structures and the structures of relations between elements 
in most of social science." has been that "no generally 
useful and easily measurable set of elements (or concepts) 
has been posited in most social science." This is a 
reiteration of Lundberg's thesis in the 20s. He further 
states that verbal theories are "so vaguely stated or so weak 
that it is difficult to translate them to mathematical 
language, and once translated they fail to show an 
isomorphism with powerful parts of mathematics" (Coleman, 
1964:3). Zetterberg could not agree with him more. Quite 
correctly, Coleman has noted this problem is largely due to 
the fact that "sociology has kept to the richness-and 
ambiguity-of ordinary language. . (Coleman, 1964: 3) . He 
does not want to contemplate the fact that these ambiguities 
may be crucial to social theory and that social theories and 
formal language may be incompatible (Fuzzy sets do not work 
with binary logic, and we shall pursue this later). 
Coleman (1964) sees five areas for math to be of 
important service in sociology: the combination of a number 
of observations to provide a measure for some hypothetical 
construct (scale analysis of an attitude), quantitative 
empirical generalizations which are related to results in a 
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law, a language for theory, and development of predictive 
models (not theories) to efficiently utilize data in applied 
research. Coleman develops ideas for each of these 
substantive areas of proposed application. Much of it 
reflects the work of Logical Positivism. 
The mathematics presented in most Logical Positivist 
proponent's repertoire involve elementary operations of 
formal logic to explain the pattern of development of 
deductive and inductive inferences made from observation or 
between axioms and postulates. The presentations in both 
Willer and Zetterberg are idealistic constructions of how the 
process should work. They do not reflect any practical 
reality, and Carnap has already demonstrated their 
limitations. The authors consistently seem unaware, or worse 
utilize them out of wishful thinking. 
Mathematics in sociology is employed more in the form of 
statistical analysis in sociology at present. As discussed 
above, it is a tautological system which is a valuable tool 
when used in limited domains with expert training. Too 
often, as Blalock has noted, it is misused and abused by 
those who know only enough to employ it. 
Problems with Causality 
Many authors have pointed out that the complexity of 
causes in any one given social event makes it impossible to 
explicate any clear sequence of events, there is almost an 
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infinite regression of causal sequences associated with any 
one event. 
Any event that is explained in this manner is being 
lifted out of a very complicated context. If all the 
antecedent events are provided in sufficient fullness to 
make possible some kind of calculation of consequences, 
they become so numerous that they are unlikely ever to 
recur in that combination (Shibutani, 1986:28). 
Blalock refers to this as "multicollinearity problem" 
(1982:15) 
Willer (1967) accepts causality unquestioningly, as 
does Blalock (1982). Lundberg (1961) uses it unabashedly as 
does Zetterberg (1965). Stanley and Campbell (1963) at least 
acknowledge its limitations and attempt to justify it, albeit 
on very shaky arguments. Sjoberg and Nett (1968:27) find 
that it is "often well-nigh impossible, to avoid the 
assumption that some kind of cause-and-effect relationship 
does exist." Most of these methodologists believe it is 
fundamental to science itself. To their credit they attempt 
to justify its use with a rationale and acknowledge that it 
has been questioned. They note a huge body of literature 
exists on the subject but frequently refer the reader to 
Carnap who is profoundly biased ori the subject as a leading 
exponent of Logical Positivism. It is interesting to note 
how many recognize its weakness in light of the new physics, 
yet adopt the logical positivist analytic convention 




We have sought to show that the concept of causation is 
derived from experience, the primary experience of 
living in an environment. It is the concept of primary 
relationship, so that, even if we regard it as 
illusory, we cannot analyze the concept itself into any 
simpler one (Mciver, 1942:68). 
Mciver's book is a 400 page defense of causation that says 
nothing new with regard to preceding arguments other than 
causation is a useful idea and we are justified in using it 
based on that alone. 
Sociological methods text frequently do not mention the 
controversy even within sociology over the validity of the 
concept of causality. Bailey (1987) in a standard methods 
text, like others, cites Hume, but instead of justifying the 
validity of causation he recognizes its failings and suggests 
that it is a useful convention rather than a reality (Bailey 
sees causality as residing in empirical phenomena and "not 
strictly a logical concept" however as we previously noted 
the logical positivists had abandoned the use of causality as 
a physical phenomena and attempted to use it as a logical 
device for theory. They arrive at a similar attitude however 
in using it as a convention.) 
To sample everyone's position and rationale with respect 
to causation and methods is beyond the scope of this work, 
but those who have done so report that causation is very 
alive and well in the social sciences (Vaughan, Sjoberg, and 
Reynolds, 1993). The main point to be made here is that most 
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programs of research methodology feel that causation is 
crucial to the concept of science, even though physics denies 
its validity. The rationales developed by even the most 
informed methodologists writing textbooks ignore the problem 
because it is crucial to positivist methodology. As Lincoln 
and Guba (1985) have noted it is compartmentalized and walled 
off. McKinney's (1957:195) claim that the outcome of early 
argument concerning causation was the "the virtual 
elimination of the 'cause as force' notion and the 
substitution of a very broadly expanded version of causality" 
appears to be accurate today. 
Conclusion 
Partly as a reaction against Sorokin's effort to write 
grand theory, one of his students, Robert K. Merton, 
formulated a strategy that has become widely accepted by 
contemporary sociologists. Merton entered a plea for 
"theories of the middle-rang"(Zetterberg, 1965:17). 
This became the main theoretical defense of methodologists 
who wished to pursue positivist methodologies without deeper 
examination. By ignoring that the emperor has no cloths, 
they have managed to deeply institutionalize the process of 
social research in the positivist tradition. Today this 
program continues with unabated optimism. 
It would seem important to at least make a cursory 
evaluation of this programs results. Zetterberg (1965) 
remarks that Merton's program of theories of the middle range 
had resulted in Berelson and Steiner's An Inventory of Human 
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Behavior (1964) which lists of the findings of all the 
research to that point in the form of 1045 propositions. He 
mentions that only between five and fifty of these 
propositions would constitute a law from the positivist 
perspective. The perfect empirical collection of unrelated 
postulates. 
Another advantage of Merton's program is that it has 
kept the theorists out of the way with regard to methodology. 
It is this separation which has allowed methodologists to 
pursue their program without deeper critical analysis. Hill 
remarks: 
Despite the score·of years that has elapsed since the 
first edition of Merton's analysis, there continues to 
be less relationship between theory and research than 
most sociologists believe to be necessary to a 
respectable science (Hill, 1970:13). 
Blalock as late as the 80s acknowledges the sterility 
of the 
deployment of positivist methods; 
A very common stance that may be taken-one that is 
certainly based on a degree of realism about the current 
state of our knowledge- is that our theories are at 
present so tentative and our research so exploratory 
that it is premature to pay too much attention to 
careful conceptualization or precise measurement until 
we have discovered a reasonably small set of explanatory 
variables on which we may pin our hopes (Blalock, 
1982: 13) . 
The list of researchers who find the progress of 
scientific sociology disappointing includes a long list that 
extends from Zetterberg to Phillips. In light of the 
foregoing it is difficult to comprehend why any researcher 
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would want to devote time to this methodology or attempt to 
apply it to sociology, yet it is the dominant approach. We 
must again fall back on explanations involving cultural bias 
and legitimation. 
It is useful to mention at this point that the 
combinations and permutations of logical positivism, 
Popperism, and Millism seem endless and each methods book has 
its own formula. what seems universal about them is a 
distinct lack of awareness with regards to the failings of 
each of these perspectives arid the history of science in 
general. Mills (1959) is well supported in his allegations 
in this regard. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CONCEPT OF SYSTEMS 
Having reviewed the impact of positivism in sociology I 
find it necessary at this junture to turn to an entirely 
different topic which will be further integrated in the next 
chapter. The topic now at hand to be considered is systems 
theory. There is much confusion and disinformation within 
sociology regarding this concept and it requires considerable 
analysis to clarify how this condition arose. Bailey (1994) 
in particular has commented on the confusions regarding 
systems in sociology and has done an excellent job in 
contributing to clarification on many issues. 
Since I intend to review Mead's use of the concept of 
systems in the next chapter, it is important to provide a 
brief review of the history of systems theory in sociology. 
This will provide a solid background for better understanding 
this review of Mead and enhance the definition of his 
position with regard to other theorists of the past. 
The Concept of Systems 
The concept of system has been used extensively in 
sociology since its inception in the works of Comte. Herbert 
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Spencer is probably the person most responsible for 
developing the concept fully and in retrospect very thorough 
in his treatment of it (Turner, 1985). Although modern 
systems theory is far more sophisticated, the fundamental 
concepts remain the same (Bailey, 1994). 
Systems theory, known today as General Systems Theory 
(GST), and the concept of system are not the same thing and 
often confused in scientific literature (Buckley, 1967; 
Collins, 1988; Bailey, 1994; Berrien, 1968). System as a 
concept is generic and can be applied in almost all contexts 
(and has been). Its full fruition as an evolving concept 
resides in GST (Bailey, 1994). Most sociologists appear to 
have used the concept or theory at least partially and fused 
either into their own perspective (Collins, 1988; Buckley, 
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There have been combinations and permutations of systems 
theory as applied by many influential and leading theorists 
of sociology over its history since Comte but to a large 
extent it has become highly associated with functionalism. 
Having fallen into considerable disfavor, functionalism seems 
to have taken the concept of systems with it (Buckley, 1967). 
This has also alienated it from symbolic interactionists who 
draw heavily from Mead, who based his perspective on the idea 
of systems in his Philosophy of the Present (Miller, 1973). 
It is hoped that further clarification will resolve some of 
the confusion and restore the value of the concept somewhat 
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in the eyes of sociologists in general. 
Social Physics 
According to Buckley (1967) the term system came into 
use in the study of social physics in the 17th century and 
its appearance is dated at around the first decade of that 
century in the English language. Society was seen as a 
system analogous to an astronomical system in which people 
were objects that orbited in interrelations in balanced 
opposition to each other. There were forces of mutual 
attractions and repulsions in this conceptualization and the 
entire mechanistic system was based on natural forces that 
could be measured and calculated. This model contained 
definitions of moral space, position in social space, 
attraction and inertia, social pressures, and a system in 
equilibrium: 
hence arose "social static" or a theory of social 
equilibrium analogous to statics in physical mechanics, 
and "social dynamics" involving motion or change as a 
function of time and space expressible by various 
mathematical curves (Buckley, 1968:8). 
Buckley observes that the terms utilized in astronomical 
mechanics were originally imported from their social settings 
and everyday experience and then ironically re-imported back 
as social theory with their new form of respectability. 
It was clearly this social physics which inspired Comte 
and this astronomical metaphor was also utilized in Spencer's 
re-exploration (re-invention of the wheel) of systems theory. 
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Sorokin (1928), commenting on this pattern of rediscovery, 
notes that the revival of this perspective in the late half 
of the nineteenth century did not acknowledge (or perhaps 
know directly about) the 17th century version. Buckley 
(1967) refers to this as the mechanical systems model and 
portrays Pareto, Homans, and Parsons as the inheritors of 
this perspective. 
Comte: A Trend Setter in Organismic Systems 
Comte developed his social physics in 1822 (Ritzer, 
1992) and it is clear he was attempting to model sociology 
after the hard sciences. This was a trend that was to 
continue into present times and that was to generate many 
problems for sociology as it sought to become a legitimate 
science (Sorokin, 1956). Perhaps the greatest confusion 
would develop over the term "system," leading to the rise and 
fall of one of the most influential and misleading theories 
in sociology known as the functional systems theory of 
Talcott Parsons. 
It is interesting to note that Comte is the first 
sociologist to employ the term "system" and it is likely a 
term he imported from his readings in the physics and biology 
of the era. Not only did Comte consider society in terms of 
statics and dynamics, but he stressed the "systemic character 
of society - the links among and between the various 
components of society" (Ritzer, 1992:16). This approach was 
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very compatible with his focus on the larger units of 
analysis such as the family as basic units of society rather 
than the individual. 
Comte developed an organismic perspective of society 
that was to be highly influential in later sociology. 
According to Ritzer he employed his metaphor to identify 
correlates to biological phenomena such. as cells and 
circulation. Ritzer (1992:4) notes organicism was his "most 
influential concept". Society was viewed by Comte as an 
organismic system that functioned in a manner similar to 
biological organisms. This analogy was applied by Comte as 
rigorously as Goffman appears to have applied the dramaturgic 
analogy in recent times. Comte's system theory was 
mechanistical~y organismic reflecting Descartes perspective 
of man the machine. 
Spencer & Durkheim 
Herbert Spencer's self-training in biology inspired him 
to adopt the organic perspective (Turner, 1985). Durkheim 
incorporated much of this perspective as well in his 
arguments against Spencer. Spencer's Social Statics, 
published in 1852, reflects his roots in Comte, although he 
argued that Comte's evolutionary theory did not deal enough 
with the real world (Ritzer, 1992). Spencer made a 
philosophy of science out of the organic analogy, the 
culmination of which is presented in his First Principles, 
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published in 1862. The Synthetic Philosophy, published 
later, "was a general systems approach to social reality" 
(Turner, 1985:31). 
Spencer developed the concept of "equilibration" and 
discussed different forms of structures as they manifested 
around his conception of the first law of thermodynamics. 
His third form of equilibration is described using the solar 
system as an example and sounds very similar to social 
physics. 
Any system of bodies exhibiting, like those of the Solar 
System, a combination of balanced rhythms, has this 
peculiarity; -that though the constituents of the 
system have relative movements, the system as a whole 
has no movement. The centre of gravity of the entire 
group remains fixed. Whatever quantity of motion any 
member of it has in any direction, is from moment to 
moment counter-balanced by an equivalent motion in some 
other part of the group in an opposite direction and so 
the aggregate matter of the group is in a state of rest 
(Spencer (1892) in Bailey, 1994:95). 
Bailey notes that this conception of equilibrium system is 
also very similar to Le Chatlier's conception in 
thermodynamic theory as it evolved around 1888. 
Spencer was informed by a specialist in the field at a 
dinner party that his "ultimate equilibration" was in fact a 
description of maximum entropy (system disintegration) 
according to the second law of thermodynamics (Bailey, 1994). 
Apparently this problem was never resolved by Spencer and 
remained a serious flaw in his First Principles (Turner, 
1985; Bailey, 1984). 
This error concerning entropy was partly due to the fact 
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that Spencer was not formally a trained scholar in the 
traditional sense and derived most of his knowledge of 
science from conversations at English men's clubs where "he 
listened to and questioned some of the leading scientists of 
his time in his daily afternoon visits to various clubs in 
London" while spending time with researchers and professors 
who engaged him in conversation (Turner, 1985:12). 
Spencer's concept of system was as highly developed as 
any modern perspective in the sciences represented by those 
such as James G. Miller (Turner, 1985;1991). It could be 
characterized as mechanistic and closed systems in its 
conceptualization in First Principles, but Turner argues that 
Spencer was sensitive in its application to the emergent 
nature of social systems. Buckley (1967) notes that 
Spencer's perspective was not specifically organismic, but 
organic: 
Here let it once more be distinctively asserted that 
there exist no analogies between the body politic and a 
living body, save those necessitated by that mutual 
dependence of parts which they display in common ... 
The social organism, discrete instead of concrete, 
asymmetrical instead of symmetrical, sensitive in all 
its units instead of having a single sensitive centre, 
is not comparable to a particular type of individual 
organism, animal or vegetal (Spencer in Buckley, 
1967:11) 
Turner (1985) echoes this analysis in his argument that 
Spencer was more concerned with structure than function. His 
systems perspective along with his error concerning 
equilibrium was to be later adopted by Pareto and eventually 
Parsons, but his emphasis on structure places him in the 
organic systems model (Buckley, 1967). 
Since much of Durkheim's ideas were in reaction to 
Spencer, he used many of Spencer's concepts of 
structure(developed in his First Principles, 1862 and 
Principles of Sociology, 1874-1896), function, and social 
wholes as well as Spencer's idea of system (Turner, 1985; 
1991; Ritzer, 1992). Because Durkheim read Spencer, it is 
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clear that he was aware of Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy as 
it applied to sociology in his work Principles of Sociology 
(1855). Spencer, as we have mentioned confused equilibrium 
and entropy. Durkheim and others seem to have consistently 
overlooked this critical point, but Durkheim's overall 
perspective reflected a more organismic aspect than Spencer's 
and did not depend on an idea of equilibrium (Lukes, 1972). 
However, Durkheim saw the concept of emergence as crucial to 
his perspective and it must be acknowledged that this brings 
him very close to the process systems perspective of Mead and 
Cooley (Ritzer, 1992; Buckley, 1968). Parson's (1948) and 
Wolff (1960) both commented on the similarity between his 
later work and Mead's, especially because of his focus on 
collective representations. 
Pareto 
Pareto's version of systems theory was partly borrowed 
from his flawed understanding of thermodynamics, particularly 
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as espoused by Gibbs around 1874, who focused on equilibrium 
(Bailey, 1994). However, Gibb's theory was a model for 
generating theory for empirical confirmation and equilibrium 
was used as a mathematical concept. Pareto mistakenly 
assumed it was an empirical reality and applied it to social 
events in his effort to develop a sociology like the physical 
sciences. This is interesting in that according to Buckley 
(1967) Pareto was a trained engineer. 
Pareto used an isolated system model to represent an 
open-system society, assumed a reversal of process that did 
not exist in physical systems, and he confused empirical and 
hypothetical definitions of boundary openings. Bailey 
(1994:100) finds that Pareto altered classical theory 
concerning thermodynamic equilibrium in at least six ways 
that invalidated its application. Pareto clearly attempted 
to develop a mechanistic closed systems theory that he could 
apply to social process. 
Parsons and the Harvard Crowd 
The idea of society as a system of interrelated parts, 
with boundaries and equilibrium was "explicitly entertained" 
by N. Bukharin, P. Sorokin, F. Znaniecki, and K. Lewin 
(Buckley, 1967). These perspectives likely came from either 
Pareto and or Spencer as the concept of equilibrium is 
especially peculiar to their perspectives. 
Parsons, Homans, and Miller were highly influenced by 
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Harvard psychologist L. J. Henderson, who read Pareto and 
admired his works. Henderson assumed Pareto understood 
equilibrium, became a "true believer," and promoted the 
notion as a given around Harvard beginning in the 1930s. 
(Bailey, 1994; Parsons, 1981). He also wrote a book entitled 
Pareto's General Sociology. Paul Samuelson, an economist at 
Harvard, also tried to implement Henderson's agenda but 
failed to develop a workable mathematical model. 
Parson's functionalism was based on the notion of 
equilibrium generated by Gibb and Pareto. Pareto and Parsons 
both "considered equilibrium to exist empirically" (Bailey, 
1994:89). Alexander (1990) also notes that Parsons 
"conflated" the concept and reified it. For Parsons 
equilibrium was synonymous with social order and integration. 
Bailey (1994:92) explains that it was "never meant to be 
applied to open systems.such as social systems" by those in 
thermodynamics who used it as a mathematically abstract 
criterion such as absolute zero on isolated systems. Parsons 
also misunderstood the meaning of the concept, as did 
Spencer, and assumed it meant homeostasis rather than a state 
of total entropy (which is its real definition) (Bailey, 
1990; 1994). 
Buckley (1968) points out that homeostasis in organisms 
operates within very narrow limits, whereas societies do not. 
Parsons adaptation of this organismic version of equilibrium 
implicitly supports the notion that the existing order is 
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life supporting and beneficial and tends to "overemphasize 
the more stable, overdetermined, and supported normative 
aspects of the social system at the expense of other, equally 
important aspects without which dynamic analysis is 
impossible" (Buckley, 1968:15). Functional prerequisites is 
also an outcome of the organismic aspect of this model 
(influencing Parsons by way of anthropology) and allows 
teleological assignment of values to social objects which 
they would not otherwise have. 
Radcliff-Brown drew his system perspective from 
Durkheim. Turner (1991) explains that Radcliff-Brown 
believed Durkheim originally developed this perspective and 
Radcliff-Brown saw social systems in terms of how they met 
integration needs in the same way Durkheim did. However he 
attempted to avoid teleological problems by replacing 
integration with "necessary condition of existence" (Turner, 
1991:43). All requisites were reducible to one criterion. 
But he next reintroduced integration as a contingency for 
survival(organismic functionalism). 
Malinowski and other anthropologists had used the 
concept of systems but in a more tentative and abstract 
manner emphasizing the whole-parts aspect of systems theory. 
Malinowski (Turner, 1991) reintroduced Spencer and had a more 
sophisticated requisite levels approach than Radcliff-Brown. 
Turner (1991:47) notes, "Malinowski drew the rough contours 
for modern sociological functionalism." His criterion for 
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system functioning was survival, which is in fact closer to 
the notion of equilibrium and the complete entropy it 
implies. Malinowski introduced a hierarchy of systems level 
from the biologic to the symbolic and gave different systems 
independent identities at each level with only constraint 
powers to other levels (Turner, 1991). This is more of a 
general systems approach, but still violates it with 
requisite needs at each system level. 
Parsons had the support of these theorists who were 
employed in social analysis at the same time. Parsons also 
enjoyed the atmosphere of growing enthusiasm of Von 
Bertalanfy and other scientists who were concurrently 
developing General Systems Theory. Von Bertalanfy (1968) (a 
German biologist) was widely influential in the development 
of this interdisciplinary perspective and published his 
formal work General Systems Theory in 1968, even though he 
had been working on it since the 1930's. James G.Miller 
coined the name "systems theory" in 1952 and established the 
Society for General Systems Research in 1954 (Bailey, 1994). 
Pioneering articles were presented by Miller in 1955 and 
Bertalanfy in 1962 (Von Bertalanfy, 1968). 
In view of the foregoing it should be clear that 
equilibrium theorists predate systems theorists in the modern 
formal sense of GST and Parsons is really a member of this 
former category. His theory is not a systems theory, but an 
equilibrium theory stressing functionalism. Parsons utilizes 
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the systems concept, but synthesizes it with other concepts 
which are inapplicable from a classical physics GST 
perspective. Bailey (1994:116) notes that the functionalists 
associated with Parsons such as Merton, Aberle, and Davis 
were not system theorists either. Parsons failed to develop 
clear concepts for a systems theory, show satisfactory 
empirical analysis, or develop a consistent mathematical 
model (Buckley, 1967; Bailey, 1994). It appears that Parsons 
was more interested in adopting a concept from the hard 
sciences to support his theories. 
Homaris initially used equilibrium after studying with 
Henderson (as did Miller), but both dropped the concept of 
equilibrium from their perspectives early on. Although 
Bailey wishes to discredit Parsons as a true systems 
theorist, it must be kept in mind that Parsons' ideas were 
similar to Spencer, by way of Pareto, and Turner makes a 
convincing argument that Spencer was the first systems 
theorist as we identify the concept today. It was Parsons 
total misapplication of systems theory that discredits his 
standing and his theory. 
Parsons could be considered a mechanistic closed ended 
system theorist initially but the inclusion of cybernetics 
later on began to edge him toward a more emergent perspective 
(Bailey, 1990). Norbert Wiener, who had published 
Cybernetics in 1948, influenced Parsons with an analogue of a 
homeostatic biological systems model for control engineering. 
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Turner (1991) notes that at this point in his theoretical 
development Parsons reintroduced the evolutionary aspects of 
Spencer and Durkheim which he had earlier dismissed, 
resulting in a grand perspective very similar to Spencer. 
This synthesis of evolution and systems concepts would 
seem to place Spencer, Mead, and Parsons in the same 
analytical arena. It should not be surprising then that Rose 
found functionalism and interactionism to be identical except 
for a difference in emphasis on process (Reynolds, 1993). It 
should be recognized, however, that Mead came to a very 
different conclusion than Spencer and Parsons because of his 
familiarity with the new physics and the epistemology of 
science (Miller, 1973). Parsons was familiar with the work 
of Whitehead and Mead, but overlooked their fundamental shift 
in perspective away from a classical physics perspective 
(Parsons, 1968). It may be that a careful review of Mead's 
analysis may have saved Parsons from well founded critiques 
accusing him of teleology, tautology, determinism, and 
atemporality. 
In the last analysis much of Parson's problems come from 
some of his fundamentally false assumptions concerning 
physics and science. 
In sum, it becomes increasingly clear that mechanical 
and socio-cultural system are very different types of 
systems with basically different organizing principles 
and dynamics (Buckley, 1968:11). 
Clearly the examples of Spencer, Parsons, and Pareto shows 
the dangers of borrowing conceptual schemas from other 
disciplines without really understanding those disciplines. 
Comte was the first with organicism, Spencer with 
equilibration, Pareto with conflation, and Parsons with 
confusion of entropy, homeostasis, and equilibrium. 
Niklas Luhmann's General Systems 
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Luhmann's approach is based around a systems environment 
model which strives toward complexity reduction. However in 
his model complexity reduction attains the status of a 
functional requisite if only implicitly. Turner (1991:95) 
notes that the "basic functional requisite in Luhmann's 
analysis is thus 'the need to reduce the complexity of the 
environment in relation to a system of interrelated actions." 
The teleologies that emerge from a functional requisite 
approach is wedded to a system format that is still very much 
like Parson's. Hence it is not a pure, or general systems 
approach. It is a functional approach to structure. This 
again reflects a fundamental confusion concerning the 
implications of the concept of system and the historical 
problems related to systems theories. 
Mead, Cooley, and the Loyal Opposition 
Buckley (1968) has categorized this group as process 
models of systems theory. He also includes Albion W. Small, 
R.E. Park, and E.W. Burgess. Buckley sees their version of 
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systems theory as anticipative of Cybernetics as opposed to 
the organic and organismic models. He observes that systems 
as a model is not explicitly developed among these theorists, 
however an analysis of Cooley's writings tends to cast doubt 
on this statement with respect to Cooley in particular. 
Cooley in his work Human Nature and the Social Order 
explicitly uses the concept of system and in a manner which 
suggests he has an understanding which is very similar to 
Mead's. Cooley discusses social life as a canvas made up of 
square inches: 
but if you should look at these one at a time, covering 
the others, until you had seen them all, you would still 
not have seen the picture. There may, inall such cases, 
be a system or organization in the whole that is not 
apparent in the parts. In this sense, and in no other, 
is there a dif fere.nce between society and the 
individuals of which it is composed; a difference not 
residing in the facts themselves but existing to the 
observer on account of the limits of his perception 
(Cooley, 1956:38). 
In review, Cooley's perspective would fulfill most of the 
criterion of a closed-ended organismic system of an emergent 
nature based on symbols and information. 
Mead based his emergent systems perspective on the 
latest findings in physics and especially with respect to 
Relativity theory (Miller, 1973). Although stated in the 
more formal scientific rhetoric of his time, the following 
quote, in terms of systems perspective, compares favorably 
with the previous one by Cooley: 
The social act is not explained by building it up out 
of stimulus plus response; it must be taken as a dynamic 
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whole - as something going on - no part of which can be 
considered or understood by itself - a complex organic 
process implied by each individual stimulus and response 
involved in it (Mead, 1934:7). 
Mead, like Cooley, tends to focus on the informational aspect 
of human relations, but for Mead language is a real as 
objects (Miller, 1973; Mead, 1934). 
Elements of systems theories in both Cooley and Mead 
are: organic whole, dynamic whole, each part dependent on the 
other, (part implies boundary as does whole), and a process 
or something going on. Mead addresses systems and emergence 
specifically as fundamental to his perspective and Miller 
argues that it is at the very foundation of his entire 
perspective (Miller, 1973). For Mead a totally deterministic 
and predictable universe was impossible and emergence was a 
fundamental phenomena which allowed change and evolution to 
manifest. 
However, I have defined emergence as the presence of 
things in two or more different systems, in such a 
fashion that its presence in the later system changes 
its character in the earlier system to which it belongs 
(Mead in Miller, 1973:43). 
According to Miller (1973), Mead was very familiar with 
Spencer. Mead's lectures (from 1914) include discussions of 
Spencer and Cooley both. Mead was clearly familiar with both 
Spencer's and Cooley's conception of system and did not argue 
against them in this respect. Mead was very occupied with 
evolution as was Spencer. Mead, however, does not explicitly 
employ systems theory in a structural analysis, since his 
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main concern is with the emergence of mind, self, society, 
and the implications for epistemology and ontology. However, 
it is clear that it is the basis for his entire ontology. 
Systems and New Systems 
Collins (1988:46) has to date presented the simplest 
definition of system: "A system is anything that has parts 
which are connected to each other." He is quite accurate in 
his assertion that system is a general concept of 
considerable value in all areas of analysis. We can find 
this term employed to denote social processes by most major 
theorists. Several important social theorists have used the 
concept as a sort of metatheoretical basis. Most of these 
efforts represeht a subdomain or aspect of General Systems 
Theory (GST) as it has evolved and been defined by modern 
systems theorists such as Von Bertalanfy and Miller. 
GST as a perspective is more comprehensive and more 
accurately grounded in classical physics than most specific 
sociological variants. GST provides a detailed analysis of 
systems as entities with boundary relations or interface, 
inputs and outputs, feedback and feedforward processes, 
information relationships, tension levels, open and closed 
characteristics, morphostasis and morphogenesis or emergence, 
and finally entropy and synergy (Buckley, 1994; Bailey, 1967; 
Berrien, 1968). Bailey identifies as many as ten types of 
systems. 
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It is instructive to review Buckley's definition of a 
system as it reflects quite well GST and its position with 
respect to positivism: 
The kind of system we are interested in may be 
described generally as a complex of elements or 
components directly or indirectly related in a causal 
network, such that each component is related to at least 
some others in a more or less stable way within any 
particular period of time (Buckley, 1967:41). 
Note that he includes "causal network" in the definition. 
This places him squarely in the same tradition as Bailey. 
Conceptually, different theorists view the basis of 
systems theory from different perspectives. Parsons clearly 
overemphasized homeostasis as both Buckley and Collins point 
out. Spencer tended to focus on evolution and morphogenesis 
(Collins, 1988). To be more in harmony with modern 
theoretical developments, process should be emphasized. 
Mead's definition focused on emergent pattern and feedback 
involving an observer (Miller, 1973). Positivists tend to 
disregard the observer in contradistinction to this (Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985). In this respect Mead anticipated quantum 
mechanics, but this is probably because he was familiar with 
relativity which laid the groundwork for it. 
General Systems Theory attempts to account for all 
categorical variations of systems analysis and integrate them 
in all scientific fields of endeavor at all levels of 
analysis (Bailey, 1990; Turner, 1991). This is very similar 
to Spencer's agenda and although GST may be more 
sophisticated in their terminological distinctions, Turner 
(1985) would argue that conceptually they do not differ 
dramatically. 
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Some of the most recent efforts to explicitly develop 
systems theory in sociology have been pursued by Buckley 
(1968), Berrien (1968), and especially Bailey (1990; 1994). 
Bailey refers to these as "New Systems Theory." These 
efforts tend to align themselves with the General Systems 
theorists. Bailey makes it clear that Parson's functional 
concepts of system utilized the old physics and presented 
problems to him as theorist. Bailey's social entropy theory 
was a response to this dilerruna. However, Bailey's 
recognition of the problem only goes so far as to trade 
equilibrium for entropy. He becomes caught in the classic 
Cartesian dualism which haunted the old physics. He chooses 
sides in Miller's (1978) distinction that systems are 
primarily of two kinds: 
Spencer-Comte debate). 
abstract and concrete {recall the 
Bailey (1994) sides with concrete 
systems. He then proceeds to develop a mathematical social 
systems model and attempts to reconcile GST with Alexander, 
Collins, and Giddens. With the advent of Chaos theory and 
computer analysis the potential for Bailey's theory to 
transcend the arbitrary dichotomies of classical physics may 
prove very fruitful. Such a theory no doubt would be forced 
to reconcile itself with Mead's analysis. 
It should be clear at this point that Mead's conception 
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of emergent systems is a step beyond the positivist approach 
to systems theory. Mead had the advantage of Einsteins's 
theories, but we must remember that Parson's and others since 
him have had this advantage as well. They failed to take 
into account the significance of Mead's work or the 
implications of quantum mechanics. Parsons and most of his 
contemporaries were still working with a Newtonian 
conceptualization of reality. Their efforts were essentially 
reformulations of Spencer's work, as Turner urges us to 
consider (Turner, 1985). The theories of Von Bertalanfy and 
Miller are also based on simple causality and the older 
models of physics. Mead's system theory was integrated with 
the new physics. 
Conclusion 
In reviewing some of the major social systems theories 
we have reviewed the distinctions which were presented by 
Buckley. The mechanical models, the organic models, the 
process models, and the functional models all represent 
partial aspects of a fully developed systems theory. Other 
distinctions can be made such as between organismic and 
organic models, but these constitute fine points for which 
there is no room in this paper. For Buckley and Bailey these 
are all precursors to GST. 
There are several other themes which emerge. The first 
is that the concept system and system theory are two 
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different things. The concept has been used widely, but 
systems theory has only partially been employed by most 
theorists with many variations. The second is that the 
systems theory of classical physics was a limited systems 
theory and incorrectly employed by several important 
theorists such as Spencer, Pareto, and Parsons. The third 
point is that Mead was more precise in his application of 
systems theory and its relation to the new physics. The 
fourth, that GST reflects the old physics even though it is 
considered the definitive systems theory by sociologists 
explicitly employing systems theory today. A proper use of 
systems theory would need to reconcile itself to the new 
physics, and only Mead appears to have done such an analysis 
so far. The fifth point is that there is a development of 
organismic/organic emergent systems theory within the 
sociological tradition which revolves especially around 
Spencer, Durkheim, Mead, and Parsons. These men appeared to 
build upon each others work with respect to this theme. It 
is a mystery why Parsons disregarded so much of Mead's 
analysis even though he was familiar enough with it to write 
a paper for Kurt Wolff on the similarities between Durkheim 
and Mead (Parsons, 1948). In the same manner Parsons had 
access to Spencer's work but chose to focus on Pareto 
(Parsons, 1968). 
A final important point which becomes clear is the 
danger of applying this concept without a full understanding 
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of its history, combinations, and permutations. Sociological 
theory is full of well intentioned efforts based on a 
misunderstanding of physics, mathematics, and the 
epistemology of science (Sorokin, 1956). These efforts often 
gain wide audiences of the uninformed who are guided more by 
bureaucratic titles and credentials than sound research and 
scholarship. This research suggests that we can now add 
systems theory to this list of misunderstandings. Hopefully 
we shall remember our mistakes. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MEAD AND SYSTEMS 
In reviewing the early history of positivism several 
points have become clear. Science, contrary to popular 
opinion, was not a universally agreed upon enterprise. Its 
definition has varied from practitioner to practitioner, the 
rationale supporting its practice varied greatly, and was 
riddled with undiscussed assumptions. The "new philosophy's" 
exact form varied from the mathematical idealism of Descartes 
to the hard experimental empiricism advocated by Bacon and 
Boyle. In between was Newton's Principia which was favored 
by Locke and Kant. 
Science became a varied aggregate of mathematical 
postulates, theoretical laws, and various experimental 
practices. The enthusiasm of Comte and Mill to codify and 
extend these practices to all domains of knowledge was 
admirable but flawed. Mill's arguments are riddled with 
problems (Losee, 1972). The efforts of the logical 
positivists to rescue traditional concepts of science has 
been demonstrably flawed as well (Bechtel, 1988). The 
mathematical and technological developments that occurred 
contemporaneously with scientific efforts gave the illusion 
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that science somehow was their source. These technologies 
gave power to those who had the resources to use them. 
Science, technology, math, the novel, industry, medicine, 
bureaucracy, and a host of other developments emerged in 
concert with science and largely as a consequence of 
rationalization. It has never been entirely clear exactly 
what science is! Like good poetry, art, or cooking it is a 
host of practices that are categorically related. 
With regard to sociology in particular we have traced 
the influence of positivism on academia and research. We 
have explored how the method and rhetoric of research are 
defined by the industrial and trade sectors and legitimated 
through funding. We have established that a cognitive 
cultural bias generates a context which has consistently 
encouraged a positivist methodology regardless of theoretical 
innovation. We have also discussed the underlying weakness 
of the theory behind that methodology as it has been 
presented by various leading methodologists within sociology. 
This of course begs the question concerning what are the 
alternatives. 
The qualitative methodological tradition has provided a 
strong alternative which has continued to grow in 
sophistication in the later half of this century (Cook, Fine, 
& House, 1995). Unfortunately some of these traditions are 
based on the cognitive cultural bias of positivism as well. 
Glasser and Struass (1967) represents one such important 
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effort. Glasser and Strauss (1967), however, concede their 
position is compromised by limitations of their method with 
regard to verification processes. Herbert Blumer on the 
other hand presented a research program grounded in the 
epistemology of science of George H. Mead. This small but 
enduring tradition in sociology continues to produce powerful 
social research not dependent on positivistic 
conceptualizations. 
My thesis in this section is that Mead and Blumer's 
program is the best present alternative existing in 
sociology. I propose that most of the criticism that has 
been marshalled against this perspective is political in 
nature or grounded in the positivist cognitive cultural bias. 
This is not to say that this perspective has no failings 
outside these criticisms. There are problems with the 
present form of Interactionist theory and method which have 
legitimately been criticized and are not due to this bias. 
What follows is a review of these two categories of 
criticism. Following that will be the proposition that the 
weaknesses in SI are derived from a failure on Blumer's part 
to fully explicate the systems aspect of Mead's theories. 
Systems theory, as I propose it, would allow us to 
extend and refine Blumer's method and perspective in a way 
that would include critical theory and a limited version of 
positivist methodology. Although some, such as Stover (1977) 
have commented on convergences between systems theory and SI, 
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none except Buckley (1967) have proposed that Mead had an 
explicit systems perspective. Consequently I have reviewed 
the history of systems theory within sociology to provide a 
background and perspective for better understanding what Mead 
proposes and how it is similar or different to previous uses 
of the concept of systems. I will review Mead's writings in 
some depth to explicate and clarify his position in this 
regard. I will reserve the impact of these issues with 
regard to Blumer for chapter seven. 
The Positivist Bias as Source and Weakness of Critiques 
Symbolic Interactionism has continued to survive as a 
perspective in sociology since Mead laid the groundwork for 
Blumer's perspective and method. It has been consistently 
criticized for different failings but continues to thrive. 
Denzin (1992) recognizes three basic waves of criticism 
beginning in 1963. He divides these criticisms into five 
categories of: theory and method, the astructural bias, 
politics, the neglect of emotions, and textuality; His 
economical analysis reflects a similar but more comprehensive 
and in-depth analysis by Reynolds (1990). 
Denzin (1992) notes that one block of critiques argue 
that SI avoids historical, economic, institutional, and 
political issues, citing Block (1973), D. L. Smith (1973), 
Ropers (1973), Wagner (1964), Day and Day (1977), A. Rose 
(ed.) (1962), and Zeitlin (1973). Reynolds (1990:137) argues 
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that SI is apolitical, ahistorical, noneconomic, and that it 
is "depicting (or constructing) a social world that is overly 
quaint or exotic." Kanter (1972) complains that it cannot 
deal with real issues of power. Shaskolsky (1970) argues 
that interactionists have bought into the American myths of 
freedom and democracy. Huber (1973) charges it is 
subjectivistic and commonsense (not science) sociology and 
that it could only operate in liberal climates. Lichtman 
(1970) perceives it as an idealist perspective that ignores 
how oppressive institutions shape behavior. Gouldner (1970) 
complains it is overinvolved with the powerless and fringe 
elements and that it fails to study the powerful. Mills 
(1966) observes that it is a perspective which is infatuated 
with science, technology, and biologically oriented models of 
action which ignore critical perspective. Prendergast & 
Knottnerus (1993) argue that it answers what it considers an 
inadequate objectivism with subjectivism, idealism and 
humanism. 
Denzin (1992) presents simple and compelling evidence to 
the contrary with respect to criticisms regarding text and 
emotions. However, the other critiques are more 
sophisticated and complex than his response to them, and 
continue to haunt Interactionism. These critiques in general 
appear to focus on a failure to address the external and 
coercive nature of social experience and a lack of objective 
predictive method. This critical body is further supported 
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by other critics with prescriptive agendas to cure SI of its 
problems. Collins (1992) suggests adding a Durkheimian 
dimension of solidarity as well as disregarding Mead's 
polemics against Newton and determinism as standing in the 
way of science. McPhail and Rexroat (1979) claimed to have 
uncovered a "detailed and explicit" positivist methodology in 
Mead's writing. Their agenda upon scrutiny becomes, as 
Denzin (1992) notes, another form of positivist critique 
along the lines of Huber (1973). 
Within SI Stryker probably speaks for the more 
positivist oriented research tradition in general by 
expressing his frustration at the idea of accepting Blumer's 
advocacy of indeterminacy in social life and complains: 
Thus along with denying the possibility of explanatory 
sociological theory, Blumer severely restricts the 
legitimate range of investigatory (data gathering) 
techniques as well as analytic methods (Stryker, 
1992:186). 
He further argues that, 
to accept a principled indeterminacy in social life does 
not demand that we reject the aspiration to generalized 
theoretical knowledge based on the "fit" of empirical 
evidence to prior theoretical arguments, that we reject 
"conventional" science as an appropriate model for the 
work that we do (Stryker, 1992:187). 
The aspects he finds illegitimate and intolerable in Blumer's 
approach are that (metatheoretical level) general predictive 
social theory is impossible, (methodological consequences) 
investigation without a priori theory is considered bias, and 
that the method fails to address structure adequately. 
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This complaint regarding structure agrees with most 
other major theorists above and has become known as the 
astructural bias (Reynolds, 1993; Prendergast and Knottnerus, 
1993). The complaints about predictive theory and method are 
clearly positivistic in nature. They seek explanation and 
causality as methodological approaches and are grounded in 
Newtonian positivist perspectives. The critique more central 
to sociology here, disregarding positivism, is the concept of 
social constraint and Stryker (1992:188) is quite eloquent on 
this point: 
Somehow we need to come to grips with the full 
implications of the recognition that it is interaction 
that shapes the self but it is social structure that 
constrains, and so within limits shapes, interaction 
(Stryker, 1992:188). 
There is considerable support in Blumer's (1969) 
writings to the effect that he never invalidated the 
techniques of positivism except in their exclusive use. He 
acknowledged social structure as a reality, but only part of 
reality. In fact Blumer acknowledges the constraining aspect 
of society: 
The differences do not mean, incidentally, that Mead's 
view rejects the existence of structure in human 
society. Such a position would be ridiculous. There 
are such matters as social roles, status positions, rank 
orders, bureaucratic organizations, relations between 
institutions, differential authority arrangements, 
social codes, norms, values, and the like. And they are 
very important (Blumer, 1969:75). 
Mead's perspective, as this chapter will show, invalidates 
positivism as a fundamental perspective. Blumer's position 
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apparently had to be radical to overcome the cultural bias 
(behaviorism) threatening to overwhelm SI. Stryker (1992) 
and others see it as only an effort to hold off Structural 
Functionalism. Mead and Blumer did not construct a 
perspective over and against positivism and structuralism, 
but one that was meant to encompassed and transcended the 
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limitations of perspectives bounded by those concepts. 
Although these criticisms appear to represent a rich 
diversity of failings, as well as confusion, it is also 
possible to view them as the facets of two underlying issues. 
One is the positivist cultural bias of SI's critics and the 
other is an important omission in the explication of Blumer's 
development of Mead's perspective. This omission is the 
systems aspect of Mead's perspective. These two themes are 
intimately related and can account for a large measure of the 
shortcomings of SI. This chapter will seek to develop these 
two themes. 
Implications of Mead's Position 
There are many themes which run through the history of 
science, but it is postulated here that one of the most 
critical of these is the primary/secondary division early 
advocated by Descartes, Bacon, Locke, Newton, and in his own 
way, by Kant. We have discussed its advantages for 
establishing control, finding consistent patterns, and 
offering a stable reference in the storm of emerging European 
culture. Some historians have questioned whether Europe 
might not have gone into decline like India without this 
stable body of knowledge (Palmer, 1964). 
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Science became closely associated with war technology, 
trade technology, bureaucracy, and those who controlled the 
rising capitalist bureaucratic system. As previously 
discussed it was the ultimate bureaucratic form of knowledge; 
simple, refined, precise, consistent, reliable, economical, 
accurate, and powerful. Science became the voice of 
authority,. the uncontestable rationale for doing. Facts 
became the bureaucrat's weapon, the lawyer's weapon, the 
military's weapon. 
Science has become a part of our culture. It has a 
mythology. As Burke (1965) noted it is a form of rhetoric. 
It can exist only in a certain cultural context and is 
supported by the grand narratives of progress (Lyotard, 
1991). It has its canons, its martyrs, and its saints. 
Comte attempted to make it explicitly a religion. After 
several hundred years it has profoundly adjusted our 
cognitive filters as Bechtel, Gergen, Hubner, Hesse, Foucalt, 
Kuhn, Lyotard, and an army of other scholars and scientists 
can testify. 
We see the material dichotomies the way we have learned 
to see them from science (Lyotard, 1991). The relatively new 
knowledge, that we are looking at a universe of various 
energy quanta in shifting probability, fields boggles our 
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concretely material minds. We want to continue looking at 
the safe, ordered, and explained world of Newton. We want to 
practice science the way we thought it was practiced. Like 
the primitive cultures we have invaded and crippled, we want 
to return to the old way, to reformulate the maizeway of the 
grandfathers (Newton et al), as Anthony Wallace (1979) 
suggested. 
The details regarding the weaknesses of science have 
been explored: the underdetermination of theory, value-
ladeness of facts, the problems with induction, Heisenburg's 
Indeterminancy, etc (Science is more of a club or a culture). 
We have taken special note of the constant effort to separate 
mind and matter and build the proper connection between them. 
In the face Heisenberg's warnings and despite his efforts the 
Vienna Circle, Popper, and a throng of others have tried to 
save the old science; despite the danger of pouring new wine 
in old bottles, Frank and his followers only put new labels 
on old product. The mind-matter division is still a cultural 
and cognitive problem in the scientific community; especially 
in sociology. 
George Herbert Mead was acutely aware of the source of 
these problems and attempted to establish a new direction. 
His success, of course, was ignored by those enamored to the 
old ways. Academia has its politics, its networks, and its 
biases. Mead did not publish a great deal, but his ideas 
often surfaced in the writings of others like Cooley and 
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Dewey (Cook, 1993). 
Although Mead did not specifically address all of the 
problems with philosophy and science in the way in which they 
are currently discussed, most of these difficulties are 
resolved through the implementation of his perspective. As 
formerly mentioned, Mead was familiar with Relativity theory 
and taught courses on the subject at Chicago (Miller, 1973). 
It was his program, like Locke in his time, to develop a 
philosophy grounded in the most recent advances of science. 
Miller (1982:8) says, "Mead wants to furnish a theory of the 
self consistent with all of the latest developments in the 
physical sciences." 
Many of the mainstream philosophers of science touched 
upon or arrived at similar conclusions to Mead's, but were 
unaware of his work and failed to fully develop the 
implications of these conclusions as Mead had done (Miller, 
1973). It is the overall aim of this investigation to 
demonstrate that within this tradition of sociology is a 
solution to many of its difficulties as an emerging science. 
Primary and Secondary Qualities 
In the previous sections much emphasis has been placed 
on the division of experience into realms of primary and 
secondary qualities. This emphasis is derived from Mead's 
observations. He frequently commented that this step taken 
by early philosophers of science was a fundamental error in 
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their development of a system of knowledge. In attempting to 
explain the world in terms of mass and motion, individuals 
relegated all unexplainable factors to the realm of "mind." 
It was Meads thesis that scientists continued to divide the 
world into what can be controlled and called it objective 
reality and relegated what its method cannot deal with to the 
realm of mind and non-reality. It tended to drive analysis 
to extremes of solipsism or determinism. Miller (1973) 
argues that Mead was able to steer a course between these two 
extremes. Mead argues against cartesian dualism and Lock's 
empiricism as well as the monism of Berkeley (subjectivism). 
The GOnsequence of this division was stated by Mead in 
this manner: 
Scientific psychology tends to divide the psychic 
situation into two parts, bifurcating states of 
consciousness and the causes of these states, thus 
setting up a sort of parallelism. This pushes all of 
consciousness into one field of observation and leads to 
the idea of the conscious world as opposed to the 
physical world, that of electrons and protons (Mead, 
1982: 109). 
Mead was apparently aware of Heisenburg's work and develops 
this consequence to its logical conclusion: 
But the electrons happen to be determined by the 
relationship between the intellect of the physicist and 
the proton; so the organism of the scientist also 
determines what the object out there is (Mead, 
1982: 115). 
Mead draws the obvious conclusion from the quantum 
interpretation of events: "Mind and body are not to be 
separated on the basis of our present physical science" 
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(Mead, 1982:167). 
He goes on to elaborate about the exconununication of 
secondary qualities to what he calls the realm of "imagery" 
and how this leads to a tautological relationship between 
observer and observed that defines events causally: 
Physical science has no place for imagery or the 
meaning of things and so far as physical science is 
concerned, all that is left over from its account of 
physical objects is disregarded. It interests itself in 
what can be controlled, stated in terms of mechanical 
control, which implies a direct causal relation 
throughout (Mead, 1982:110-111). 
But he insists that this is an error: 
Imagery is not a structure or conscious stuff different 
from the physical world. It is not a stuff than enables 
us to tell the difference between outside and inside, as 
the bifurcation of the world implies. We must consider 
inside and outside together, and the world cannot be 
divided into inside and outside (Mead, 1982:107). 
Mead proposes that mind is a complex emergent phenomena 
which cannot be separated from physical phenomena and that is 
co-emergent in an on-going basis. He explains that once we 
are free of this dichotomy we should also see the fallacy 
that mind emerges mechanistically from material structures. 
In his interest to explain the genesis of self Mead 
(1982:107) sought to be "free of the assumption that the self 
is built from the physical world and conscious states." He 
saw behaviorists as following this error in analysis. 
Mead understands mind as emerging from its material 
context through a complex history of action over time. His 
Philosophy of the Present proposes a systems theory in which 
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the present is recreating itself, as well as the past and the 
future, in an on-going basis. The act is the manifestation 
of the phenomena of "sociality" on a higher systems level 
than material sociality. This sociality reflects an 
intelligence which is fundamental to matter itself. "This 
tendency is what marks intelligence. We find it in all 
stages, perhaps even below life levels, in crystals" (Mead, 
1982: 109). 
Behind the "act" is intelligence and it cannot be 
explained in mechanistic terms. To try to build 
organizations out of individual acts is trying to explain 
intelligence of organizations-the social whole- in terms of 
mechanics. The emergent solution in harmony with Mead is 
another level or order of intelligence. "Mechanical 
explanation does not make room for this selecting process or 
act" (Mead, 1982:109). "Life systems" express this impulse 
or tendency (Mead, 1982:109). Living systems are not 
mechanical and neither is behavior. 
According to Mead consciousness, mind, and self, cannot 
be separated from action (1982:19). Mead's position is that 
mind, the self, and the symbolic process, "though dependent 
upon a physical environment as well as a social environment, 
and necessarily functionally related to the latter, are also 
real and objective" (1982:20). (not epiphenomenal and 
reactive- this is pluralism) Miller says Mead is opposed to 
Durkheim's transcendent group mind. The difference between 
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mind and matter is not substantive. but functional. 
Mead is proposing that intelligence is a fundamental 
force of the universe and is related to sociality (develop 
sociality). The form intelligence takes is a reflection of 
the activity of an organism, its potential range within the 
environment, and the history of its interaction. 
This intelligent action comes in the form of the 
selection of stimuli for the purpose of interaction. "The 
selection of stimuli is the intelligence of the form" (Mead, 
1982:116). For Mead intelligence does not have to be 
conscious. The form can be a crystal, an organism, or an 
organization. 
In sum, Mead is proposing that intelligence emerges from 
the ongoing interaction of evolving complex forms of material 
reality (now various densities based on vibrational 
frequencies of energy in quantum probability fields) based on 
the phenomena of sociality- or the interactional nature of 
all phenomena. As we shall further explain; mind, self, and 
society cannot arbitrarily be separated from each other or 
from action itself. They are all facets of the phenomena of 
sociality or society system as it emerges in more complex 
forms and higher system levels. 
This picture is very consistent with modern physics. It 
also has profound implications for ontology and epistemology, 
which were not lost upon Mead at all as he developed his 
philosophy of knowledge. This picture also develops the 
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implications of a non-dualistic perspective 
(primary/secondary) with respect to mind and matter. Mead 
has explored the implications of the new physics in a very 
different program than his contemporaries. Wittgenstein and 
Quine continued to develop their philosophies based on the 
Cartesian dualism (although they qualify their dualism 
considerably) and struggled with the frustrating consequences 
as did those who ignored the implications of the new physics 
in other domains of science. 
Mind, Self, Society, and Language 
Mead is fundamentally concerned with the concepts of the 
whole and its relation to the parts. Rather than engage in a 
mathematical analysis as Russell did with set theory, Mead 
sought to employ a larger conceptual domain of philosophy and 
scientific discovery to construct his picture of epistemology 
and ontology. His concept of sociality plays with the 
relationship of parts of the universe to its theoretical 
whole. In the same manner Mead plays with the idea that this 
is an important principle in the process of the emergence of 
the phenomena of mind. In his review of some of the examples 
of sociality as it manifests across the philo-genetic scale, 
he notes that termites are a community with no mind 
(1982:136). He observes a similar relationship at the 
organismic level: 
The unity that transcends the organism does not enter 
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into the life of the separate cells of the organism. 
There is unity of the organism, but it does not get into 
the separate units (Mead, 1982:165). 
He notes that human society is an exception: "With humans, 
who have significant symbols, the whole process enters into 
the life of the separate organism" (1982:165). 
Mead explains that interaction is problematic for humans 
and that grasping for objects seen at a distance has resulted 
in gesturing between humans. This gesture has evolved into a 
complex language (the depth of which Blumer fails to 
recognize, but Goffman makes a career out of). Grasping 
action, language, and the mind co-evolve. Language emerges 
in growing complexity over time through interaction. 
Words/symbols are anchored in physical gesture and scripts, 
or collapsed acts. "The percept is thus a collapsed act 
which gets its full meaning only in the social structure of 
the group" (1982:133). The percept, or perception itself, is 
conditioned by the script. 
Here Mead deviates from modern cognitivists (still 
working with implicit Cartesian dualism) because he locates 
the act as an organism/environmental system: 
The act is not to be located inside the brain; it 
belongs to the organism in its environment. Hammerness 
is in the hammer. This comes about through social 
mechanisms within a social structure (Mead, 1982:133). 
The social structure is part of mans environment and imagery 
is not a conscious stuff different from physical events. His 
social structure emerges at the same time as mind and its 
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perceived environment. "Language is an all important medium 
of the social process that completes the act" (Mead, 
1982:142). The language of the society provides the 
ontological reality it perceives, the theater of action (see 
Goffman). 
An individual without a social structure has a different 
object from that of an individual in a social structure. 
A hammer is not a hammer to a Gorilla (Mead, 1982:133). 
Mead perceives the group as evolving an expanding world 
of social objects growing out of the complex dialectics of 
language, environment, and action. "The social medium 
represents a certain type of activity; we are adjusting 
ourselves to the activities of 0th.er beings" (Mead, 
1982:141). Finally Mead comes back to the relation of the 
part to the whole with the emergence of the self: "The group 
is essential for the completion of the normal act of the 
individual; all completion of acts occurs through this 
structure" (Mead, 1982:144). The combined activity of the 
organism within the group becomes the collapsed act which is 
the self: 
The unity that makes up the self is the unity of a 
social organization that makes one feel part of the 
social process, where one is ready to put oneself in the 
position of others (Mead, 1982:164). 
With the emergence of the individuated self comes self-
consciousness. "Consciousness is the entrance into the life 
activity of the individual of the organization of the larger 
whole to which he belongs" (1982:166). 
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Consciousness then is a function of the relationship of 
the individual to the whole group through the aggregate of 
collapsed acts, derived over time and symbolized in gesture. 
This concept parallels Quine's with regard to meaning and the 
entire language system. The web of self-consciousness for 
Mead is similar to process as the Web of Meaning for Quine. 
One philosopher relates to a social system, the other to a 
language system. The meaning of self or identity is derived 
from the group in the same way as the meaning of a word is 
derived form a language. 
Self is a process of taking the role of other, of 
objects, and of the inside objects; the world that pushes 
back. The world at an instant, however, as in math, does not 
exist. 
Implications for Knowledge 
Language for Mead is not a metaphysical given, a world 
apart from the physical, derived from a world of absolute 
Platonic forms. Language is a social event emerging through 
interaction with the environment. Co-emergent with language 
and society is mind and self. The self is both object and 
subject in society. This reflects the reality of the non-
social world of animals. But for Mead the social world is 
the real world. It cannot be separated. This requires us to 
take the role of the other. The other is always there. We 
can only occupy one place at a time. We know of the 
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objective world because it pushes back upon us, independent 
of our program. But social objects are a combination of mind 
and matter. They are real and highly mutable because of 
this. Trees cannot fall in the woods if no one is there. 
There are no trees without human cormnunity because there is 
no social mind. There are only differentiated energy fields 
unfolding. 
Mead would agree with Quine that different ontologies 
occupy different social worlds and that both can be true at 
the same time. This is in harmony with Einstein's conception 
of two systems defining the same event differently. The 
ontologies of our gravity field define the same physical 
object differently than the ontologies of a black hole. 
Wittgenstein found a limit to language that corresponds to 
Mead's conceptualization. Many questions are meaningless 
when related to physical systems but not to social systems. 
Meads conceptualization transcends and contains Quine and 
Wittgenstein because it resolves the dualism they are based 
on from the start. 
What does this have to do with science? As you recall 
Locke was interested in public knowledge and consensus. 
Language is public by nature in Mead's system. To objectify 
an object which is already objective is redundant. To strip 
it of its secondary qualities in fact makes it esoteric, not 
public and objective. Cultures develop public ontologies 
which are quite objective. They are not stable or static 
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however. Social objects change or mutate between contexts to 
some degree. They must in order to maintain their complex of 
meaning. Social objects are by nature highly mutable as 
Bailey (1994) notes. Atoms and molecules are very distant 
social objects and highly abstract. It was this fact that 
inspired Blumer to develop his methodology. 
Cartesian dualism and the division of Galileo are not 
legitimate based on the findings of modern physics and Mead 
developed a perspective that was congruent with these new 
findings. It was this perspective that was the basis for 
Blumer's method (Blumer, 1969). Mead also conceptualized his 
new perspective in terms of systems. This was not utilized 
by Blumer explicitly in his method. What follows will 
discuss how Mead envisioned the role of systems in the 
emergence of social phenomena. 
Mead and the Idea of System 
I shall rely heavily on Miller for support as he is one 
of the leading authorities on Mead as well as trained in the 
discipline of philosophy. Mead, however, also is quite clear 
on these matters in his collected lectures in the Philosophy 
of the Present (1980). Miller notes that 
Sometimes Mead refers to an order as a system, sometimes 
as a perspective. In The Philosophy of the Present he 
generally uses the word system, but in many places the 
two other terms would be equally appropriate (Miller, 
1973:204). 
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Mead's meaning of system according to Miller is as follows: 
A system consists of a set of entities or objects that 
are interrelated in such a way that the significance of 
any one entity or object depends upon its relation to 
other entities or objects of that set, and by virtue of 
their interdependence they constitute a coherent whole 
as over against a mere aggregate. This applies to 
systems of facts or happenings in nature and to formal 
systems such as logic, mathematics, and language systems 
(Miller, 1973:189). 
For an element to belong to a system means that it is to 
be understood from a certain point of view or 
perspective, and it is to be interpreted by use of a 
certain categorical scheme and that what it is or how it 
functions is determined by its relation to other members 
of the system (Miller, 1980:189). 
This transcends objectivist/realist definitions of 
system, which makes it a more unique definition. Mead is 
speaking in terms of what positivists might call a 
mind/matter synthesis. A systems identity is established by 
the constraint it places on its members. This constraint 
arises from their unique pattern of "sociality" or 
relationship. In physical systems this would be unique 
physical features which functionally relate an object to 
other objects- such as a piston to an engine (Bailey, 1994). 
This also extends for Mead to the realm of meaning. Non-
physical objects can have unique features which define them 
as part of a system (Buckley, 1967). Thus we have thought 
systems as well as biological systems. This is very similar 
to the way in which Turner (1985) tells us Spencer uses 
system, however Spencer's physical version was wrong and 
confused entropy with equilibrium. 
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No object, and for Mead all objects are social objects, 
can have an identity without relationship in a system. 
Miller notes, 
If anything is comprehensible it is because of its 
relation to some other entity or entities in a system. 
Without presupposing a system, nothing could be thought 
about; nothing would have significance, since nothing by 
itself (such as a particle) has significance (Miller, 
1973: 189) . 
Objects within a system gain their identity from the system 
by their relation to other elements in the system ie through 
sociality: 
these relations must be such that certain combinations 
of them will make the individual entities in the system 
intelligible or understandable (Miller, 1973:190). 
Socialty is therefore fundamental to system and object 
identity or meaning. As we shall recall McPhail & Rexroat 
(1979) criticize Blumer for not having a clear definition for 
meaning. This exclusion helps to explain why. 
In the philosophy of the present Mead speaks quite 
clearly for himself: 
The' other dimension of sociality, where this term 
expresses the determination of the nature of an object 
by the natures of other objects belonging to the same 
system, is evident in the conception of energy systems, 
in the development of multicellular forms in which the 
life of the whole system is the integrated life of the 
differentiated cells that make it up, in the social 
systems involved in the propagation of the species and 
in the integration of societies, from those in which at 
first balance is reached between reproduction and the 
consumption of one form by another, up to those in which 
a social process is mediated by differentiation of 
individuals. In all these the nature of the individual 
is in varying degrees the expression of the natures of 
other members of the system or society (Mead, 1980:77). 
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For Mead a society is explicitly a system, 
A society is a systematic order of individuals in which 
each has a more or less differentiated activity. The 
structure is really there in nature, whether we find it 
in the society of bees or that of human beings. And it 
is in varying degrees reflected in each individual 
(Mead, 1980: 87) . 
Mead further argues for the generic concept of 
specialization: "A society is a systematic order of 
individuals in which each has a more or less differentiated 
activity" (Mead, 1980:86-87). 
For Mead mind is an emergent from a system: 
"that it is a natural development within the world of 
living organisms and their environment. Its first 
characteristic is consciousness, that emergent which 
arises when the animal passes from the system in which 
it formerly existed to an environment that arises 
through the selectiveness of its own sensitivity, and 
thus to a new system within which parts of its own 
organism and its reactions to these parts becomes parts 
of its environment (Mead, 1980:84). 
More direct to the point he states, "I have wished to 
present mind as an evolution in nature, in which culminates 
that sociality which is the principle and the form of 
emergence" (Mead, 1980:85). 
The past experience of the organism becomes part of its 
environment in the form of its new interaction. 
The animal comes to respond to an environment consisting 
largely of possible futures of its own delayed 
reactions, and this inevitably emphasizes its own past 
responses in the form of acquired habits. .These pass 
into the environment as the conditions of his acts 
(Mead, 1980: 84) . 
Eventually in higher order primates, 
These characters of the environment constitute the stuff 
out of which values and meanings later arise, when these 
characters can be isolated through gestures in 
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communication (Mead, 19 8 0 : 8 4 ) . 
Finally, 
The systems to which I have referred are in all cases 
interrelations between the organism and the world that 
reveals itself as environment, determined by its 
relationship to the organism (Mead, 1980:84). 
We can see that Mead is referring to different systems 
emerging at different levels of organization. The principles 
of sociality and emergence hold consistently in this process. 
Emergents are in the form of mind and consciousness. This is 
an open systems perspective on the phenomenal world. Mead 
ends up where Heisenburg (1971:85) does, "Any essential 
change in the organism brings with it a corresponding change 
in the environment." 
Animals evolved toward bringing more and more of the 
activity of the animal within the environment to which 
it responds, by the growth of the nervous system through 
which it could respond to its sense processes and also 
its response to these, in its whole life activity (Mead, 
1980:85). 
The animal could not transcend its differentiated nature and 
become "an object to itself as a whole until it could enter 
into a larger system within which it could play various 
roles, ."(Mead, 1980:85). Mead (1980:85) explains what 
this larger system is in the next line, "It is this 
development that a society whose life process is mediated by 
communication has made possible." For Mead (1980:85) this 
"is the realm of continual emergence." 
In fact as we have noted, Mead did have a systems 
perspective, but it is not objectivist in nature because that 
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would have contradicted physics. The question arises as to 
how such a concept be reintegrated with Blumer. A close 
reading of Blumer and Mead reveals that Blumer is for the 
most part very true to Mead's ideas, although he leaves a 
great deal out. McPhail and Rexroat (1979) attempted to make 
much out of this, but clearly did not understand Mead very 
well (Denzin, 1992; Johnson & Schifflett, 1992). Miller and 
Collins, as discussed, point out that Blumer's omissions are 
due to the fact that Mead is not interested in sociology, but 
in philosophical problems. Mind. Self. and Society is a by-
product of his interest in explaining mind. Blumer on the 
other hand is not a philosopher and may have not understood 
the ramifications of Relativity- few did at the time. 
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CHAPTER 7 
BLUMER AS SOLE INTERPRETER 
Thus far we hav~ established the role of positivist bias 
in generating an invalid critique of interactionsim. We have 
demonstrated that Mead's perspective resolves the Cartesian 
duality implicit in that perspective and that his perspective 
is firmly grounded in the new physics. Sociology has a much 
stronger basis here for a methodology tailor made for social 
phenomena. There has recently been much controversy 
concerning how well Blumer utilized Mead's perspective 
(Johnson & Shifflett, 1992). This dissertation has 
established that Mead did have a systems based perspective 
and it should be clear at this point that Blumer failed to 
acknowledge and employ fully the systems aspect of Mead's 
perspective. Two questions arise in relation to these 
findings. The first regards the extend of Blumer's 
legitimacy as sole interpreter of Mead. The second question 
concerns why he avoided using systems theory. A third issue, 
not directly related to these two but of paramount 
importance, is the implications of systems theory for 
Blumer's methodology. How should it be incorporated in that 
methodology and what advantages might such an incorporation 
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hold? These are the main issues this chapter will deal with. 
Justification for Further Explication of Mead 
Inside the interactionist tradition Wood and Wardell 
(1992), who appear to understand and have read Mead quite 
well, also argue that Blumer's interpretation of Mead results 
in a perspective with a basic astructural bias because it is 
not entirely true to Mead's perspective. They insist that 
. "not even Blumer can claim to know what Mead 'really' meant" 
(Wood & Wardell, 1992:20) and Johnson and Schifflett 
(1992:43) echo their sentiments that "No one can ever report 
finally on what Mead would say." Finally Stryker (1992:184) 
says "for recent years have made it abundantly clear that 
there is not and probably cannot be a single authoritative 
reading of Mead." 
There is considerable frustration within SI with 
Blumer's authoritarianism with regard to Mead and it is most 
eloquently expressed by Stryker. He · despairs .the polemics in 
Blumer's message and the danger of scholasticism and 
attending dogmas that circumscribe free investigation. 
Preferred perspectives result in a situation in which, 
We then are used by our perspectives rather than using 
them, and perspectives themselves are likely to ossify, 
to become unquestioned Truths and potentially fallible 
ideas subject to logical and empirical examination and 
reformulation (Stryker, 1992:189). 
Blumer set a tone and style that was combative and disdainful 
of alternatives and "he must be held importantly responsible 
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for the scholasticism within symbolic interactionism that I 
am deploring" (Stryker, 1992:189). 
Collins (1992:62) correctly reminds us that Mead 
"developed a sociological theory of mind, not primarily as a 
contribution to sociology, but because it enabled him to 
solve philosophical problems" and "Mead's theories have not 
been exploited and developed to their full potential" 
(Collins, 1992:61). There is considerable consensus that not 
all of Mead has been accounted for and that within what has 
been lost may be an answer to the astructural bias. It is 
suggested by many that political reasons played a significant 
role (Sciulli, 1988). 
Blumer (1979) himself acknowledges in his response to 
Fischer and Strauss (1979) that there were indeed areas of 
Mead's philosophy which were not utilized by the Chicago 
department, but that this was because they felt that they 
were not pertinent to the focus of the department. Blumer 
(1979:21) explains the "departments interest and concern were 
with what was happening in certain areas of contemporary 
society .", whereas Mead's agenda was built around 
broader philosophical concerns. Johnson and Shifflett (1992) 
echo this point, agreeing with Collins that Mead's concerns 
were very broad with respect to sociology. 
Blumer does not directly refute the suggestion by Fisher 
and Strauss that there were aspects to Mead's theories that 
constituted "excess baggage" (Fisher & Strauss, 1979:11), but 
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he does make it clear that all of Mead's ideas were important 
to the department with respect to constructing a 
"perspective" (Blumer, 1979:21). It is clear from this that 
Blumer did not explicitly employ all of Mead's ideas and it 
should be obvious that this would have been impractical. 
However, this does not mean that there is nothing in Mead 
that was overlooked or that might be dusted off and 
reconsidered. 
./ 
To argue that the interpretation of Mead stops 
with Blumer is to argue against scholarship and ignore the 
fact that Blumer was not a philosopher or trained in that 
discipline. Others who are trained in philosophy, such as 
Miller (1973), offer continuing insights into Mead and the 
implications of his work. It is from this position that I 
argue for further interpretations of Mead's work and 
refinement of Blumer's interpretation and implementation. 
Many false dilemmas arise in the minds of those who 
contemplate interactionism or Mead. This is due do the 
confusing nature of Mead's perspective for individuals with 
the cartesian cognitive bias because Mead "attempts to 
resolve the realism versus idealism controversy" (Johnson & 
Shifflett, 1992:42). Miller (1973) makes it clear that Mead 
meant to steer a course between determinism and solipsism in 
his philosophy. Relativity theory had already accomplished 
this in physics and Mead wished to do the same in philosophy. 
Blumer remained true to this perspective in developing his 
methodology, as far as it went. I would also argue that he 
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could have gone further in fulfilling that perspective. 
Blumer's Perspective and Method 
What is Blumer's method and how does it compare with 
positivist methods? 
Blumer (1969:9), in line with Mead's overall thrust, is 
that humans are basically symbolic in their orientation and 
although, 
in their association human beings engage plentifully in 
non-symbolic interaction as they respond immediately 
and unreflectively to each other's bodily movements, 
expressions, and tones of voice, but their 
characteristic mode of interaction is on the symbolic 
level, as they seek to understand the meaning of each 
other's action (Blumer, 1969:9). 
Contrast this with the fact that 90% of communication is 
non-verbal. Although Blumer disregards Mead's discussions 
concerning the unconscious and its relation to habitual 
behavior, he does explicate Mead's position on social 
objects: 
Out of a process of mutual indications common objects 
emerge-objects that have the same meaning for a given 
set of people and are seen in the same manner by them 
(Blumer, 1969:11). 
The emergence of social objects is an objectification of 
collective dispositions toward percepts and arises form 
negotiation regarding lines of possible action. This is 
joint action, which is the fundamental sphere of analysis for 
Blumer: 
A joint action, while made up of diverse components acts 
that enter into its formation, is different from any one 
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of them and from their mere aggregation. The joint 
action has a distinctive character in its own right, a 
character that lies in the articulation of linkage as 
apart from what may be articulated or linked. Thus, the 
joint action may be identified as such and may be spoken 
of and handled without having to break it down into the 
separate acts that comprise it (Blumer, 1969:17). 
Here Blumer is defining an emergent whole, in symbolic 
form, with its own unique identity. This is in harmony with 
Meads ideas concerning sociality and emergent wholes. It 
describes "sums" greater than their aggregate parts derived 
from the interaction of situated actors. These are system 
concepts, but Blumer is using a term he coined, "joint 
action," which appears in retrospect to be an {political) 
avoidance of systems concepts. 
Blumer (1969:17) notes with respect to joint action that 
"even though it may be a well-established and repetitive form 
of social action, each instance of it has to be formed anew." 
This statement reflects Mead's emphasis on the importance of 
emergence and its introduction of novelty into all events 
(Cook, 1993). Social objects are highly mutable and reflect 
the emerging definition of the situation as it proceeds and 
transforms through interaction. 
The actor selects, checks, suspends, regroups, and 
transforms the meanings in the light of the situation in 
which he is placed and the direction of his action. 
Accordingly, interpretation should not be regarded as a 
mere automatic application of established meanings but 
as a formative process in which meanings are used and 
revised as instruments for the guidance and formation of 
action (Blumer, 1969:5). 
Several sociologists have understandably rejected the notion 
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that this is an entirely conscious process and have argued it 
would be overwhelming if it were self-consciously performed 
(Reynolds, 1993). People however have habitual modes of 
action and culturally shared expectations with regard to a 
range of potential definitions with regard to social objects. 
The preponderant portion of social action in a human 
society, particularly in a settled society, exists in 
the form of recurrent patterns of joint action. In most 
situations in which people act toward one another they 
have in advance a firm understanding of how to act and 
of how other people will act. They share common and 
pre-established meanings of what is expected in the 
action of the participants, and accordingly each 
participant is able to guide his own behavior by such 
meanings. Instances of repetitive and pre-established 
forms of joint action are so frequent and common that 
it is easy to understand why scholars have viewed them 
as the essence or natural form of human group life 
(Blumer, 1969:17-18). 
Although the two above statements may appear to be 
somewhat contradictory, the point Blumer is striving for is 
that "New situations are constantly arising within the scope 
of group life that are problematic and for which existing 
rules are inadequate" (Blumer, 1969:18). He does not want to 
convey the impression that habitual action is highly stable 
over time. 
Repetitive and stable joint action is just as much a 
result of an interpretive process as is a new form of 
joint action that is being developed for the first time 
(Blumer, 1969:18). 
Blumer often appears to offer us the over intellectualized 
actor-like Parsons oversocialized man. 
In this situation, he notes, interprets, and assesses 
things with which he has to deal in order to act." and 
"Through such self-interaction he constructs his line of 
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action, noting what he wants or what is demanded of him, 
setting up a goal, judging the possibilities of the 
situation, and prefiguring his line of action {Blumer, 
1969: 55). 
This seems to somewhat contradict Mead's idea of the 
spontaneous aspect of the "I" with regard to his conception 
of self. In his conceptualization of joint action there is 
very little room for other forces to enter into the 
decisionmaking process which is portrayed as highly voluntary 
in each individual. This removes the possibility of 
deterministic forces sneaking in through unconscious factors. 
It also contradicts the very concept of situatedness in a 
system of actors, as Mead would define them. If they are a 
complex system, and they exist in a complex system, it is 
unlikely that they could be aware of all factors in play at 
once. Things are habitualized and routinized in order to 
handle the large amounts of information that are being 
processed. For Mead this is the role of the nervous system 
in higher organisms as he discusses it in The Philosophy of 
the Present. Mead discusses the unconscious as follows: 
Sophisticated attention picks out and isolates things, 
but beyond the spot of light we attend to, we work 
unconsciously. Such unconscious conduct may be highly 
intelligent, but it is not in a perceptual world. In 
perception there is a content beyond what sets free the 
response or the consummation of the act. Thus one can 
take a meal without perception and still enjoy it {Mead, 
1982:141). 
The situatedness of the individual in the group, according to 
Mead, makes one vulnerable on the unconscious level to the 
attitudes of others. 
197 
Addressing oneself requires having a delayed reaction; 
it deals with the earlier organization of the act, 
before it reaches expression or completion. As the 
individual takes this attitude or group of attitudes 
there is the emergence of the subconscious. The 
attitudes of others are the beginnings of their acts, a 
relationship which in turn marks the behavior of the 
individual in question (Mead, 1982:149). 
Based on Mead's definition of society as a system, this 
follows inevitably. It should be obvious that Mead has a 
conceptualization of the subconscious and that it is tied to 
his ideas regarding percepts, systems, and attitudes. 
Excluding systems allows one to exclude the emergent 
adjusting mechanism of the subconscious. 
Blumer (1969:58) may argue against the idea of overt 
coercive social forces in a deterministic sense but 
acknowledges that "At any one point the participants are 
confronted by the organized activities of other people into 
which they have to fit their own acts." This perspective on 
self-determination agrees with Mead in the following: "The 
self may be involved in a social process, but the process 
determines one's behavior only insofar as one takes the 
attitude of others"· (Mead, 1982:166). But Mead goes on to 
qualify this position: 
The social process shows the means by which the 
individual comes back to himself and becomes an object 
to himself. The child answering to his own stimuli acts 
as others act toward him. The fact that the social 
group makes uniform demands upon the individual gives 
his self-consciousness. This is how individua_ls ar~ 
controlled through mores. Where the group is closely 
organized, this power becomes overwhelming and there 
cannot even be a difference of opinion. But when there 
is such complete adjustment and integration there is 
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stagnation, and the only escape for the individual is to 
leave the community or group. The power of this is 
shown in the remorse experienced by criminals of those 
who have crossed social line (Mead, 1982:147). 
Thus the definition of the situation is jointly constructed 
and to this extent it must by definition be coercive with 
regard to expectations. 
Blumer does not deny the existepce of social structure, 
just the reification of it: 
The differences do not mean, incidentally, that Mead's 
view rejects the existence of structure in human 
society. Such a position would be ridiculous (Blumer, 
1969:75). 
Blumer wishes to deny structure as having any life of its own 
apart from the actors. Yet this denies the emergence of any 
level beyond actors in evolution (contrary to Mead-especially 
if the act is primary) and he has already said that the joint 
act is an emergent whole. The whole, as we have seen in 
Mead's definition, determines to some degree the organization 
of the parts. Blumer's (1969:75) main argument is against 
rigid determinism arising from reification: 
But their importance does not lie in an alleged 
determination of action not in an alleged existence as 
parts of a self-operating societal system (Blumer, 
1969:75). 
What about reactive systems, what about Mead's objects 
pushing back, and what about social objects having objective 
reality (and force)? 
Blumer says, "Social interaction is obviously an 
interaction between people and not between roles," but this 
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seems to overlook the capacity to totally identify with a 
role and associated scripts. But he does admit "It is only 
in highly ritualistic relations that the direction and 
content of conduct can be explained by roles (Blumer, 
1969:75) ." But isn't this common? Goffman has made a career 
out of the ritual of the interaction order. 
Blumer's real point is that structure does not cause things 
but people do-but Mead went further than this. Causality is 
not a valid issue. Actor and context cannot be truly 
divided. In this there is no real actor-only acts. This is 
in fact closer to Goffman. Volition for Mead is not 
absolute- but relative. The self is a relative emergent. 
Blumer fights for ghosts in .the Meadian world. Mead's theory 
has a system aspect and a concept of the subconscious that 
goes beyond Blumer's conceptualization. It is closer to 
Gergen's (1991) "contextualized self." 
Joint Action 
Positivists and qualitative researchers as well as 
theorists have been talking past each other .for some time 
now. Their brilliant and complex arguments against each 
other have been based on a fundamental set of assumptions 
which are never addressed and consequently the edifice of 
their arguments is a vain expenditure of intellectual 
prowess. The unresolved assumptions which will forever 
divide these two camps need to be explicated if they are ever 
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to be addressed and resolve. 
A central and ancient on-going debate which best 
exemplifies this confusion revolves around Blumer's 
Interactionism and positivist methodologists. Consequently 
we will explore Blumer's methodology regarding joint action 
and the reasoning behind it. According to Maines and Morrione 
(1990), joint action is Blumer's manner of dealing with 
social phenomena beyond the micro-level. 
Joint Action vs Systems 
What is Blumer's definition of system and why does he 
regard it as part of an erroneous perspective. What is joint 
action and how well does it explicate Mead's perspective? 
How does it compare to the concept of system. 
These appear to be central questions to answer because 
one of the most important places to integrate the concept of 
systems is in the area of joint action. This is where it has 
the most promise in advancing Interactionist theory as it 
will allow for greater considerations of power, coercion, and 
unanticipated consequences. 
Maines (1992) as well as Maines and Morrione (1990) 
claim that joint action is Blumer's method for dealing with 
social structure or macro sociology. They emphasize that 
Blumer strives for an otologically correct perspective, but 
they fail to explicate the meaning of that statement. This 
is a fundamental point of confusion for all involved. Maines 
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and Morrione (1990) emphasize Blumer's interpretation of 
society as a framework, but this is not Mead's perspective 
(It is important to note their recognizing the similarity in 
some aspect of Blumer's idea to chaos theory. The reason 
these perspective dovetail so neatly is because Mead based 
his perspective on Relativity!). Having considered their 
comment on this perspective, we will inspect Blumer's own 
comments on the subject. We will further consider how 
effective it is and why the addition of the concept of 
systems would improve this position. 
To fully understand Blumer.'s discussion on joint action 
one must have a good understanding of Mead. Blumer 
transformed the essence of Meads perspective into method, but 
failed to import the important'concept of system. This would 
have made his efforts at macro sociology more accessible to 
the understanding of positivists in conjunction with a 
detailed explanation of Mead's use of the concept and how it 
extends into social research. It may be that Blumer felt any 
discussion of system would be interpreted in a structural-
functionalist vein and SI would be confused or co-opted. The 
definition of system that Blumer employs is not Mead's, but 
Parson's. 
Blumer opens his discussion of joint action by reminding 
us that: "Mead saw joint action, or the social act, as the 
distinguishing characteristic of society" (1969:70). It is 
consequently a fundamental unit of analysis for Blumer. It 
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can be applied to the negotiated action between two people or 
two corporations. For this reason the unit of analysis 
within his analytic process does not vary with macro or micro 
structures (Blumer, 1969). The same analytic concepts are 
employed in the same manner for all levels of social 
analysis. Examples of joint action he offers range from 
family dinner to a war. 
Blumer says with respect to the family dinner that, 
"Each participant necessarily occupies a different position, 
acts from that position, and engages in a separate and 
distinctive act" (1969:70). It is the fitting together of 
acts under the shared definition of family dinner that makes 
family dinner the unit of analysis (joint action). 
Participants are related in a network defined by their shared 
definition of what is happening. This coincides with the 
idea that "a set of elements" defining "a network of 
relations" constitutes a system. 
For Blumer the coming together of acts "or alignment" is 
not mechanical, actors actively interpret and define what is 
taking place. This is consistent with Mead's argument that 
the manipulato:t)' phase of human action mediates stimulus and 
response. 
The identity of the act is a key to the interpretation 
and orientation for the actor to decide on his behavior. 
Blumer never acknowledges the fact that much of this process 
is not conscious, it is habitual. The habitual aspect then 
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becomes constraining and coercive. As we have noted, for 
Mead actors are not always aware their interpretive process. 
This is also reflected in the fact that the "I" is 
innovative, creative, and emergent. Definitions, such as 
labels, define the limits of lines of action to be 
considered. 
Usually, the course of a joint action is outlined in 
advance by the fact that the participants make a common 
identification of it; this makes for regularity, 
stability, and repetitiveness of joint action (Blumer, 
1969:72). 
According to Mead, this is a process that defines the 
subconscious arena of activity as mentioned above. 
Having defined joint action, Blumer explains its 
importance with respect to the analytic process. 
1. "It acknowledges that society resides in action which is 
an on going process and "not in a posited structure of 
relations" (1969:71). Blumer's statements that we are dealing 
with frameworks, networks, and situatedness indicates we are 
dealing with situated relations, defined by their position in 
the network. These assertions could not be more systems in 
quality. 
2. "Without action, any structure of relations between 
people is meaningless" (1969:71). Action should be the focus 
of interest, not structure as positions. This agrees with 
Mead's assertion that sociality generates action which 
defines actors in any system (Mead uses the concept of 
system). Actors are defined by their active relating. 
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Blumer also argues next, 
such action has to be seen and treated, not by tracing 
the separate lines of action of the participants-whether 
the participants be single individuals, collectivities, 
or organizations-but in terms of the joint action into 
which the separate lines of action fit and merge 
(Blumer, 1969:71). 
This is consistent with Meads assertion that relations of 
actors constitute a whole and those relations must be 
regarded with respect to that whole. 
3. Each joint action has a career and history. Uniqueness 
of local context and individual systems is acknowledged as 
well as complexity of each variable under consideration. 
4. The career or history of a joint act is orderly, fixed, 
and repetitious ie a pattern. Participants frequently define 
situations together in habitual patterns. Mead was 
especially sensitive to the habitual nature of action. 
5. At this point Blumer details why joint acts are subject 
to considerable uncertainty and very difficult to predict. 
These reasons give support to and reflect Maines' and 
Morroine's (1990) statement that this is found in Chaos 
theory. In systems terms, we could simply say that 
intersystem connections as well as local system connections 
are so dense in number that these joint actions are rich in 
fuzzy entropy or rich in potential meanings. Emergence 
dominates these joint actions because: 
a. They have to be initiated by someone (although this does 
not acknowledge the power of habit and ritual) 
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b. They can be interrupted, abandoned, or transformed 
c. No common definition may emerge 
d. Actor definitions may vary widely, confusing interaction 
e. New elements may call for innovation 
f. Alternative information enters the situation 
In his discussion of method Blumer (1969:17) reflects 
Mead's concern with wholeness of the act, "The joint action 
has a distinctive characteristic in its own right, a 
character that lies in the articulation or linkage as apart 
from what may be articulated or linked." This is a veiled 
way of saying the sum is greater than the parts, which is a 
system concept, and it "may be spoken of and handled without 
having to break it down into the separate acts that comprise 
it" (Blumer, 1969:17). This is a clumsy description of 
Mead's perspective which avoids politically incorrect terms. 
Structurally Determined Action 
Blumer (1969) observes that psychology and sociology see 
action as determined by outside forces and individuals as 
passive. This is his main complaint. He fails to indicate 
that this is a natural consequence of positivist perspective 
which biases our cultural ontology. He instead complains 
that behavior cannot be accounted for by ego demands, 
attitudes, role requirements, values, status expectations, or 
structural stresses alone. Within a few paragraphs however, 
he acknowledges the importance of these ideas. 
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Blum.er (1969:73) emphasizes the need to account for the 
manipulatory phase of human behavior more fully and efforts 
"to study and explain social action should respect and 
accommodate these features." It is necessary to understand 
actors definitions of situations and taking the role of the 
other as the most effective tool for this, as calculations 
would be too complex. Blumer further complains that outside 
observers may distort the actors perspective to the point of 
obscuring the actors perspective. 
Blumer wishes to reverse the emphasis that determinative 
positivist bias interjects into social analysis. Social 
action is not divided between conformity and deviance. This 
is too simp,listic. In fact, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Blumer acknowledges the constraining aspect of 
society: 
At this point we uncover Blumer definition of systems: 
"But their importance does not lie in an alleged 
determination of action not in an alleged existence as parts 
of a self-operating societal system" (Blum.er, 1969:75). 
Blum.er is defining a mechanistic determinative closed system. 
This usually posits the elements as independent of the 
system. This is like Parson's and Pareto's definition of 
system. Society emerges from joint action and "not the 
requirements of a system" and "it sees society not as a 
system, whether in the form of a static, moving, or whatever 
kind of equilibrium, ."(Blum.er, 1969:75). This 
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equilibrium concept is also unique to Parsons and his 
misapprehension of systems theory. Clearly Blumer is 
reacting to a concept of .systems that is Parsonian and not 
Median. From the earlier discussion-on systems this should 
be clear. 
Society, in Blumer's perspective, is seen 
as a vast number of occurring joint actions, many 
closely linked, many not at all, many prefigured and 
repetitious, others being carved out·· in new directions, 
and all being pursued to serve the purposes of the 
participants {well not always. . {Blumer, 1969:75). 
Mead's definition of system is more profound and refined than 
the idea of joint action, and there is no need other than 
political {as often is the case) to create a new term or 
vocabulary. 
I have demonstrated that Blumer left out many important 
ideas of Mead's, but in fairness to Blumer it is necessary to 
acknowledge his awareness of this himself. 
In closing I wish to say that my presentation has 
necessarily skipped much in Mead's scheme that is of 
great significance. Further, I have not sought to 
demonstrate the validity of his analysis {Blumer, 
1969:77). 
The Value of Adding Systems 
Mead utilized the concept of system in his original 
formulation of how sociality emerges as an act. Mead uses 
the concept of two systems to explain phenomena at many 
different levels and clearly considered it central to his 
overall perspective {Miller, 1973). Central to the concept 
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of systems is the reflexivity involved between elements or 
actors. Both sociality and constraint are present as 
ontological factors generating identity. Elements shape 
their action and hence their identity using the system as a 
whole to guide them. This is also the essence of joint 
action. Joint action however communicates a sense of 
aggregation where forces act in only one direction, and this 
is something Mead clearly was against. Elements of a system 
shape each other through the system as a whole. The 
whole/part relationship as we have seen is fundamental to 
Mead's perspective. It is the absence of conceptual emphasis 
on this point that alienates many sociologists. 
Although Blumer translated Mead with considerable 
accuracy, we should not consider this the final word, unless 
we are interested in dogma or religion. The evidence is 
quite clear for those willing to read Mead in the original. 
Blumer himself acknowledges there is more in Mead than he has 
used. System is a concept of great heuristic value that has 
been omitted from the interactionist tradition. Cooley's 
abundant use of the term also supports this notion, and Mead 
in his eulogy to Cooley explained that his main dispute with 
him was concerning his solipsistic stance (Cooley, 1956). He 
said nothing about a problem with Cooley's systems 
perspective. 
The addition of this concept of system is important to 
reintroduce because it allows for greater clarity and 
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efficiency in analysis: 
1. It would clarify actor/environment distinctions. 
2. It would articulates more finely the connection points 
in networks/frameworks. 
3. It would provide for a more extensive and consistent 
frame work to link analytic studies (cumulativity). 
4. It would account for coerciveness more clearly and in 
accurate terms. 
5. It would renders SI better able to incorporate power 
differentials. 
6. It would clarify the observers position in the framework 
7. It would make the perspective more accessible to 
positivists (Increases interactivity of perspective) 
8. It would makes it easier to integrate more fully 
additional aspects of Meads perspective. 
9. Its acknowledgement opens the door to further 
refinements in light of Mead's theories (not to mention 
Cooley, Dewey, and James). 
It is from this position that I argue for further 
interpretations of Mead's work and refinement of Blumer's 
interpretation and implementation. As Johnson and Schifflett 
(1992:43) note: "No one can ever report finally on what Mead 
would say." The arguments of McPhail and Rextroat attempt to 
disqualify Blumer entirely, which would seem to be 
counterproductive, if not folly. Their argument in 
combination with others does indicate how frustrated 
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positivists are with Blumer's perspective. Mead's ideas are 
very compelling, yet Blumer's methodology and historical 
association seems to deny access in theory experimental 
approaches. 
To argue that Mead had an explicit positivist research 
methodology is an interesting strategy, but fails on an 
epistemological level besides being insupportable in terms of 
a review of his writings as both Blumer and Johnson and 
Shifflett note. Johnson and Shifflett (1992:40) are well 
supported in their statement that "Mead studied science not 
as a research methodologist, nor even as a philosopher of 
science in the Vienna tradition." Mead's interest in science 
was in relation to his philosophical agenda. Both Cook 
(1993) and Miller (1973) indicate that Mead was interested in 
the ontological construction of reality and he wanted to use 
the latest findings in physics as guideposts and referents in 
his analysis. To this end he took courses in Relativity and 
studied Whitehead. 
Mead was not a methodologist nor a sociologist. Blumer 
was not a philosopher. There are bound to be some errors in 
the translation, but it is doubtful that they would be so 
profound as to disqualify Blumer in view of his tutelage. It 
is my thesis that Blumer's perspective is fundamentally 
correct, but limited in extent due to political battles 
within the discipline as well as Blumer's lack of training in 
philosophy and physics. 
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Why Did Blumer Omit Systems? 
Sciulli (1988) notes that Parson's is Blumer's negative 
straw man and acknowledges that he had a very poor 
understanding of Parson's perspective. Structural 
functionalism was closely identified with systems theory and 
we established above that it was Parson's version of systems 
theory that Blumer felt he opposed. Rose has noted many 
similarities between Parson's and Blumer according to 
Reynolds (1993). It is also true that Turner(1974) claimed 
that they had very similar perspectives. Blumer was clearly 
concerned that his perspective would be confused with 
Parson's which we have identified as positivist in terms of 
basic assumptions. Sciulli (1988:65) argues "Blumer's 
sociology challenges paradigms based on a distinction between 
subjective and objective that assign primacy to the objective 
dimension; ... II 
I believe it would not be unreasonable to suggest that 
Blumer felt that the use of the concept of system would 
overidentify him with the prevailing perspective which 
umbrellaed the positivist methodology. Blumer was offering 
an alternative method of derivation and verification of 
theory. "His conception challenges sociological positivists 
who would limit that which is empirical to that which is 
quantifiable" (Sciulli, 1988:61). Generating his own term 
would give him greater control over the development of 
methodology. Durkheim had made this strategy quite clear in 
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his "Rules" (Durkheim, 1950). 
The omission of the systems element from Mead's thought 
may have left the hole in Blumer's perspective and method 
which has been justifiably critiqued by other theorists. In 
his analysis Reynolds (1993) cogently argues that it is the 
astructural bias in the interactionist perspective has lead 
to an inadequate approach to macro-structure resulting in the 
apolitical and ahistorical aspects in SI. This dissertation 
argues that the astructural bias is a consequence of SI's 
grounding in the new physics in combination with incomplete 
explication of Mead's philosophy in sociology. A systems 
component (which was omitted) added to SI could go a long way 
toward addressing this problem. 
In this chapter we have considered the Blumer's 
perspective in relation to systems theory and method. We 
attempted to clarify where Blumer's concept of joint action 
distorted Mead's perspective and why Blumer may have chosen 
his particular position. We have briefly stated what the 
addition of systems might do for Interactionist theory. In 
the next chapter I will attempt to roughly sketch the 
contours of a new slightly adjusted version of interactionism 




Blumer was keenly aware that perspective and method go 
hand and hand. Sciulli (1988:61) reports that he argued that 
"positivism in sociology actually misapprehends and distorts 
empirical,reality." I believe we have found strong $Upport 
for that position up to this point. The question remains as 
to how we would expand Interactionism through systems without 
falling into the positivist position. What follows is a 
rough outline of what might be done and how it may be 
rationalized. The result would be a more comprehensive 
perspective with greater descriptive and explanatory power. 
Wittgenstein had established the idea of "general 
language" and argued that no formal meta-language could be 
logically established. He was therefore skeptical of 
Carnap's work. Carnap, however, came to the conclusion that 
the formal language he was proposing was a sub-language of 
general language. This type of specialized language often 
develops around crafts of various types. If we accept 
Lundberg's analysis that general language is objective, as in 
agreement with Mead's argument that perspectives are 
objective, then positivism is merely attempting to develop a 
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sub-language which is no more objective than general 
language. Carnap's efforts with this language may have 
failed because the relation between sub-languages and general 
language may be too complex to map. 
I think it would be foolish to disqualify formal 
languages and mathematics as valuable to sociology, they are 
a special tool of great value in carefully defined contexts. 
However, to attempt to entirely capture social phenomena 
through their deployment is not only philosophically unsound, 
but consistently proved to be a disastrous failure throughout 
the entire century. I suggest that certain categories of 
variables can be legitimately analyzed utilizing this 
approach. Even then they may require qualitative 
reinforcement. Quantitative analysis is a sub-domain of 
qualitative analysis which utilizes a richer and more 
interactive set of research concepts with regard to 
sociological data. 
I believe Blumer has established a very sound program in 
general with regard to method. His general thrust is to 
employ generic ideas in local contexts to uncover patterns of 
interaction. By continually comparing concepts that emerge 
from a dialectic between generic concepts and observation, 
concepts which capture the local meanings emerge which can be 
related to the general language system. Through this 
procedure a full empirical description of local patterns of 
social phenomena is produced. Explanations can then be 
abstracted once the description is imported back into the 
general language context. 
The weakness in Blumer's method I argued in the last 
chapter was in the generic concept of joint action. It lS 
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insufficient to produce a rich account of action within local 
contexts. It tends to isolate local contexts too much from 
other contexts. No context survives in a vacuum. By 
considering contexts and actors as systems we can trace 
coercive elements that enter contexts both consciously and 
unconsciously. I believe it was these unconscious coercive 
aspects of everyday life that Goffman so thoroughly reported 
on. Altercasting as a generic concept also takes on a new 
dimension from this point of view. 
Damasio (1994) has produce strong evidence from a 
neurophysiological perspective that decisionmaking is 
dependent on somatic markers. These markers provide an 
emotional valence to ideas and images in the mind. Decision-
making then is dependent on emotion and emotions·should be 
taken into account if we are to have a full empirical report. 
There is strong evidence that much of emotional phenomena 
works to a large extent on a subconscious level, mainly 
because it is non-rational due to its association with older 
brain structures. 
Attitudes, emotions, and habitual behavior may all have 
profound effects on the individual through group dispositions 
and gestures as they unfold in the interaction context on 
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non-conscious level. Not only may attitudes and beliefs be 
coercive as Mead discusses, but also emotions. As a 
consequence we would also require an account of the 
researchers ongoing emotions and what part they played in his 
analysis. 
Mead's actual position on this is very similar to 
Weber's Verstehen sociology. As Parkin (1982) notes, a 
totally conscious actor taking into account all action would 
not be capable of false-consciousness in the Marxist sense. 
Coercion in a symbolic universe frequently comes on a non-
conscious level. Weber remarks: "In the great majority of 
cases actual action goes on in a state of articulate half-
consciousness or actual unconsciousness of its subjective 
meaning" (Weber in Parkin, 1982:27). It is important to also 
note the similarities between Weber's method of ideal types 
and Blumer's generic sensitizing concepts. Weber, unlike 
Blumer, was willing to explicitly concede the place of 
mathematics as a sub-domain of Verstehen analysis. 
In an analysis of local contexts we should attempt to be 
clear on what percentage of an emergent social object is 
derived from outside the interaction system. What other 
systems are exporting information and bias into the context 
we are observing? Are actors consciously aware of these 
other influences and in what form does that awareness come. 
To what degree would their options change if their awareness 
of these influences changed? Are they acting in "bad faith" 
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or "false consciousness?" Systems theory offers sensitizing 
guides with regard to the situatedness of local concepts and 
how they might be connected to other contexts. 
In this research scenario generalization is always at 
the expense of local accuracy. Mead himself made a great 
point of this (Miller, 1973). As a consequence descriptions 
imported into general language for analysis could be 
abstracted to derive patterns for later comparisons with 
other investigations. Cumulativity could be utilized to 
determine if general patterns emerge from findings in similar 
categories of contexts. This is much along the same lines 
suggested by Lincoln and Guba with their concept of 
transferability. This is not to be confused with positivist 
ideas regarding general laws and axioms. The limitations of 
these general patterns could perhaps be qualified with an 
emotional valence. 
There is a corresponding mathematics to support Blumer's 
method in Fuzzy logic systems. Fuzzy systems theory 
(Multivalent systems theory) is associated with chaos theory 
(Kosko, 1993). Fuzzy sets have percentages of qualities 
present and not present and define variables with higher 
numbers of features than binary system analysis affords. A 
set "house" may include cardboard box or mansion and 
everything in between. The greater the density of the set, 
the greater its fuzzy entropy. Fuzzy sets may be employed 
with simple generic rules in local contexts to grow local 
rules for prediction and control of local phenomena. This 
approach is employed as a technology at present to control 
physical systems too complex for traditional logic systems. 
It is based on a sound mathematics derived from Russell's 
paradoxes (Kosko, 1993). 
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The point I am making is not that Blumer's perspective 
should be mathematicized, only that there is support for the 
logic of his approach in an existing mathematical system. 
This approach, however, requires computer hardware to operate 
and is limited in scope. I would suggest that the human bio-
computer is more capable of analyzing local rules. The other 
problem is that fuzzy rules grown locally won't apply 
elsewhere. It is an interesting paradox that increased local 
control means decreased general knowledge. The explanation 
of multiple contexts is latent in the generic rules 
themselves. With regard to social phenomena, general laws of 
the kind developed with physical phenomena may not be 
practical or ethically desirable. 
This is a brief outline attempt to only roughly describe 
the contours of the alteration I am proposing. The exact 
details would constitute another effort of the same magnitude 
as the present. I have tried to provide an in depth rational 
for pursuing sociology from a perspective grounded in the 
sociological tradition, anchored by physics, and carefully 
reasoned from a philosophical perspective. Through the use 
of an interactionist emergent systems perspective, elements 
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of non-conscious interaction, solidarity, and coercion could 
be included in interactionist analysis in a manner which 
would reflect a dimension of social experience it has not yet 
addressed. Room would be made to employ mathematics in a 
limited domain, instead of dogmatic decrees that math has no 
place in sociology. Most important of all, is the idea of 
doing sociology primarily from the perspective of meaning, as 
conceived of in dramaturgy ie "emerges out of a behavioral 
consensus between human beings" (Brissett & Edgley, 1990:2), 
with positivistic approaches operating as a sub-domain and 
not the reverse as is the situation today. Mead has given us 
a clear explanation of meaning. We could build a better 
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